Minority Entrepreneurs in East Africa: An effectual approach for Norwegian start-ups in Kenya by Thorp, Erik-Nicolai Korme et al.
Minority Entrepreneurs in East Africa
An effectual approach for Norwegian 
start-ups in Kenya
Andreas Hvam Michelsen
Stian Mundal
Erik-Nicolai Korme Thorp
NTNU School of Entrepreneurship
Supervisor: Roger Sørheim, IØT
Co-supervisor: Jørund Buen, Differ AS
Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management
Submission date: July 2012
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract
With the economic growth in the emerging markets surpassing the growth in
industrialized countries, an increasing number of entrepreneurs are grasping this
opportunity by establishing new ventures in such markets.
Through a four months field experiment in one of these emerging markets, Kenya,
this thesis concludes that entrepreneurs from the industrialized-Western hemi-
sphere, with a proper understanding of the local culture and its customs, have
a competitive advantage over native East-Africans. This is due to the network
effects between minority entrepreneurs and the valuable role social capital plays
in these untransparent markets. Through the methodology of action research, the
study also shows that the effectual approach to business development is suited to
quickly test a business model with limited prior knowledge about the market.
This is a case study conducted on RESolar, a Norwegian start-up company that
sells solar power plants to corporate customers in the tourism sector in Kenya.
The classic effectual approach is refined with additional elements from resource-
based theory, social capital, network theory and the lean start-up approach before
it is tested out in the field experiment. The competitive advantage enjoyed by
minority entrepreneurs is enabled due to the nature of the Kenyan market. The
customers and other key players in the market are in many ways in a similar
situation. They are foreigners that have developed companies in a broad range
of sectors. New growth companies are often started by minorities. Social capital
and the effects of the minority entrepreneur network therefore play a bigger role
in this market than usual and should be utilized to the full extent.
The authors also recommend future entrepreneurs to use the unified effectual
framework that this thesis creates as a model for their business development in
foreign markets.
i

Sammendrag
Verden er i stadig utvikling, og mens økonomisk vekst avtar i den industrialiserte
verden s˚a vokser økonomien i flere deler av den tredje verden. Et økende an-
tall gru¨ndere og investorer ser denne utviklingen, og flere ønsker a˚ utnytte dette
gjennom oppstartsselskaper og investeringer.
Gjennom et fire m˚aneders feltstudium i Kenya kartlegger denne oppgaven et av
disse markedene og konkluderer med at gru¨ndere fra den vestlige verden, med
forst˚aelse for lokal kultur, har et konkurransefortrinn i forhold til øst-afrikanere.
Dette skyldes nettverkseffektene som oppst˚ar mellom minoritetsgru¨ndere og den
betydelige rollen social capital spiller i disse uoversiktlige markedene. Gjennom
bruken av aksjonsforskning viser ogs˚a studien at forretningsutvikling gjennomført
med the effectual approach er velegnet for raskt a˚ prøve ut en forretningsmodell
med begrensede forkunnskaper om markedet.
Dette er et case study av RESolar, et norsk oppstartsselskap som selger solcelle-
kraftverk til bedriftskunder i den kenyanske turistindustrien.
Den klassiske effectuation metoden p˚a forretningsutvikling blir utvidet med yt-
terligere elementer fra resource-based theory, social capital, network theory og the
lean start-up approach før den prøves ut i markedet. Konkurransefortrinnet som
minoritetsgru¨ndere opplever skyldes strukturen i det kenyanske markedet. RE-
Solars kunder og andre lokale nøkkelaktører befinner seg alle i samme situasjon.
De er utlendinger som har utviklet firmaer i et fremmed marked ettersom nye
vekstselskaper ofte startes av minoriteter. Social capital og nettverkseffekter mel-
lom minoritetsgru¨ndere spiller derfor en større rolle i dette markedet enn i andre
markeder og bør utnyttes s˚a langt det lar seg gjøre.
Forfatterne anbefaler fremtidige gru¨ndere a˚ ta i bruk det utvidede rammeverket
som blir fremstilt i denne oppgaven og bruke det som modell for egen forretnings-
utvikling i fremmede markeder.
iii

Preface and Acknowledgements
This master thesis is the work of Stian Mundal, Erik-Nicolai Korme Thorp and
Andreas Hvam Michelsen and is a research project at Centre for Sustainable En-
ergy studies (CenSES) . We are all students at the Norwegian University of Science
and Technology (NTNU) School of Entrepreneurship pursuing a Master of Science
in Entrepreneurship. This thesis is based on our experiences and research we have
conducted since we started developing RESolar in January 2011.
We wish to thank our supervisor, Professor Roger Sørheim at the NTNU Entre-
preneurship Center, and our secondary supervisor Jørund Buen from Differ AS
for their feedback and keeping us focused through the last eventful six months.
Additionally we wish to direct our gratification to all the persons that has helped
us on our way with our master thesis and development of RESolar. Thanks
to Professor Mark Curtis and his wife Christine for taking time with us and
introducing us to resource persons in the renewable energy sector in Kenya.
We would also like to thank Svein Mork Dahl, Jostein and Gerd Holmedahl and
Johnni Kjelsgaard for providing their support and friendship through our stay in
Kenya and also for taking the time to let us interview them.
Moreover, we wish to thank Leif Dons for being our “advisory board” and sharing
his knowledge and concerns of doing business in Africa.
Finally we want to direct our greatest thanks and wishes to our families for being
supportive through this intensive semester. Thanks to Kristen Thorp, Ellen and
Erik Michelsen, Per Hvam, Stine Mundal and Ingeborg Engh for taking their time
to help us with the thesis.
v
vi
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Context 3
3 Methodology 5
3.1 Research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Selection of theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Action research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3.1 What is action research? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3.2 Critique and defence of action research . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.3 Why did we choose action research? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.4 Cogenerative action research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4 Practical structuring of our research team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.1 Responsibility and work distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4.2 Work day structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5 Data gathering, interviews and meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.6 Evaluation of our methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.6.1 How did we evaluate our research method? . . . . . . . . . 15
3.6.2 How did this work out for us? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.7 Credibility, validity and reliability to our result? . . . . . . . . . . 19
4 Literature review 21
4.1 Minority entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 The outside-in perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3 The inside-out perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3.1 The network entrepreneur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3.2 Social capital as a resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4 The effectual approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.5 Exploitation and exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.6 Lean manufacturing and lean start-up approach . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.7 Business model innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.8 Framework for an effectual approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.8.1 Comparison of presented theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.8.2 Framework development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
vii
viii CONTENTS
4.8.3 The unified model of an effectual approach . . . . . . . . . 40
5 Story of RESolar 45
5.1 Concept development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2 Business model innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.3 The new business model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.4 Business development from Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.5 Market entry in Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6 Findings and discussions 51
6.1 Business development for Western entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.1.1 Minority entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.1.2 How to handle structural challenges? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.1.3 How to live with uncertainty? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.2 Dynamics in the effectual approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.2.1 1. Context assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2.2 2. Internal resource assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2.3 3. External resource assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.2.4 4. Execution process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2.5 4a. Ready . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2.6 4b. Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2.7 4c. Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2.8 Concluding discussion on the effectual approach . . . . . . 64
6.3 The role of social capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.3.1 From a social to a business relationship . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.3.2 From a business to a social relationship . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.3.3 Network-sourced relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.3.4 Lessons learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7 Conclusions and implications 71
7.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.2 Implications for practitioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2.1 Cultural differences in the sales process . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2.2 Uncertainty in business development . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2.3 Issues with infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.2.4 Student entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.2.5 Suggestions to improve the Norwegian support systems . . 73
8 Further research 75
A Interviews with entrepreneurs 83
A.1 Interview with Svein Mork Dahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A.2 Interview with Johnni Kjelsgaard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A.3 Interview with Jostein and Gerd Holmedahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
B Business plan spring 2011 95
C Business plan autumn 2011 125
List of Figures
3.1 Action-reflection cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 The cogenerative action research model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 Porter’s five forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2 Porter’s generic competitive strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3 Causal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.4 Effectual model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.5 Business model innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.6 The unified model of an effectual approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1 Illustration: Business model alternative one . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2 Illustration: Business model alternative two . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.3 Illustration: The new business model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.1 The unified model of an effectual approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
List of Tables
4.1 Central minority groups in the Kenyan business life . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 The difference between effectuation and causation . . . . . . . . . 30
ix
x LIST OF TABLES
Chapter 1
Introduction
While the economy is stagnating in the debt ridden industrialized Western world
the emerging economies of the developing world are estimated to account for more
than 50% of global growth from 2010 to 2015 (Economist, 2010). More and more
companies and entrepreneurs are grasping this opportunity and one of these is
the case-company in this thesis, RESolar. RESolar is a Norwegian solar start-up
that is established in Kenya, one of the largest and most dynamic solar markets in
Africa (Jacobson and Kammen, 2007). Entrepreneurs in such markets are often a
cultural minority in the country they arrive and business clusters are frequently
developed around these minority entrepreneurs.
Few studies have been conducted on the challenges an immigrated entrepreneur
from the industrialized world faces when establishing a company in an emerging
economy. This thesis will map and solve some of these challenges based on a
four-month in field experiment as the case-company RESolar takes an effectual
approach to business development.
The study will answer these three research questions:
1. How will business development be affected by the fact that we are Western
entrepreneurs?
2. How has the dynamics in the effectual approach worked for RESolar’s
business development?
3. What is the role of social capital in creating viable business relationships?
To answer these questions a methodology based on action research has been em-
ployed in this case study. In close resemblance with the work method used in the
business development of RESolar, action research suggests to continually improve
the research method as the research project develops. Data has been gathered
through experiences in the case-company and in interviews with other minority
entrepreneurs in Kenya.
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Useful academic theories for the minority entrepreneur are presented. Common
for these perspectives are that they are based on trial and error where you test
your ideas and resources in the market. Results from such trials are reviewed and
used to improve the next market test. Theories presented include resource-based
theory, social capital, network theory, exploration, lean start-up approach and
effectuation. These theories are all put in a context of the minority entrepreneur.
Aspects from these theories will be used to construct a unified model for an
effectual approach.
The method and model described above will be tested in field while conducting
business development of RESolar. Based on findings discovered in the start-up
process in Kenya, both model, method and business strategy will be continuously
evaluated and improved.
In conclusion we find that the unified effectual approach works well in the emerging
market of Kenya. In an untransparent market social capital provides enormous
value. For the entrepreneur we suggest to use network sessions to ease market
entry. Minority entrepreneurs have a competitive advantage due to networks of
minorities. At the end of the thesis suggestions are presented for further research.
The academic literature lacks studies on how entrepreneurs can handle uncertainty
in start-up projects and how Western minority entrepreneurs can enter emerging
markets. Further research is also suggested on our unified model.
Chapter 2
Context
The background for this project was an idea to capture the market for rural
electrification. The idea was founded on the fact that 1.6 billion people do not
have access to electricity and history has shown that people after time want such
basic needs covered. RESolar’s business concept was developed in collaboration
with the entrepreneurs Kristian Tangen and Jørund Buen from Differ AS and
three students from the School of Entrepreneurship at the Norwegian University
of Science and Technology; Andreas Hvam Michelsen, Erik-Nicolai Korme Thorp
and Stian Mundal. The latter are the authors of this thesis.
Now the business idea for the start-up is to reduce electricity costs for businesses
by providing them with energy economization solutions like solar water heaters
and solar power plants.This will be paid for by the customer with monthly in-
stalments at a lower price than their current energy bill until the solution is paid
down. When the solution is paid down the customer will have a low-cost energy
source for the rest of the products’ lifespan.
RESolar outsources all technical calculations, design, dimensioning, logistics, con-
struction and installations to strategic partners. The start-up focuses on three
core activities; sales, gathering of operation data from customers and payment
services. RESolar fills a central gap in the market with their financing plan as
one of the main barriers for customer adaptation of renewable energy today is the
lack of such a service.
The company is strategically located in Nairobi, Kenya. Political focus on im-
proving the business sector and relative political stability has made East Africa
an attractive area to conduct business in for both foreigners and local companies.
Other important factors for making Kenya an attractive location are its ports and
that English is the official language. The headquarters of many international or-
ganizations and corporations are located in Nairobi. The electricity grid is poorly
developed outside the main cities and leaves many businesses with no other altern-
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atives than to help themselves in regard to electricity supply. To a large extent
these businesses use diesel generators for electricity supply.
The target customers of RESolar are businesses with their own electricity pro-
duction, primarily in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The beachhead customers
are off-grid safari camps in Kenya. Another aspect that has become ever more
pressing is the focus on being “green” and environment friendly.
This gives the diesel generators a poor reputation since they pollute and make a
lot of noise, which safari guests staying at these places do not like.
Chapter 3
Methodology
This thesis uses the methodology of action research with RESolar as the case we
research. When using action research it is recommended to start by addressing
what exactly one looks for and pinpoint the exact area of research before starting
off in the field (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011, p. 90).
The subject of this thesis is how one can establish oneself in Kenya as a Western
entrepreneur and how this process will work with an effectual approach to business
development. This holds relevance to us in RESolar as we moved to Kenya in
February 2012 and started our business development. During our planning phase
in the autumn of 2011 we tried to gather information and articles to advise us how
to prepare and what the challenges could be. This investigation did not result
in identifying what we were looking for and our most important finding was that
there is not much information about this at all. As researchers interested in this
on an academic level and with invested self-interest in the findings, it was natural
for us to approach this research question ourselves.
There were two main approaches available if we wanted to pursue this. Either
we could do case studies on one or more start-ups already in Kenya and write a
thesis about their experiences, or we could try to start our own company and do
research on our own experiences first hand. Either way we had to move to Kenya,
and with a running start-up the obvious choice was to do research on our own
start-up. The next question to arise was how to approach the market. Would it
be best to first conduct an extensive market research, form a business plan and
then execute, or would it be best to jump into it and try? In our project thesis we
concluded that doing market research without being present in the market would
be difficult, if not impossible.
From our curriculum at NTNU School of Entrepreneurship we have learned about
the experimental approaches of effectuation and concluded that as long as we
were going to Kenya with a start-up, the best approach would be to go for it and
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experiment while we conducted our research. Effectuation is an entrepreneurial
method based on assumptions, experiments and revisions to build a company with
the resources available for the entrepreneur.
The research project is structured as an action research project. Action research
was recommended by our supervisor as a framework for researchers that particip-
ate in their own research subject. Especially with the continuous evaluation and
changes of direction from effectuation, action research is able to capture those
changes into the study. Action research is a democratic research method with a
main goal to include the research subject in creating change within itself (McNiff
and Whitehead, 2011).
We do not ask “How do one start up a business in East Africa?”, but rather ask:
“How do we go about to start up a business in East Africa?”. This is a question
formed as suggested for action research (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011). Based
on this we consulted the literature, the findings from our project thesis, our own
experiences and ended up with our three research questions:
1. How will business development be affected by the fact that we are Western
entrepreneurs?
2. How has the dynamics in the effectual approach worked for RESolars
business development?
3. What is the role of social capital in creating viable business relationships?
3.1 Research questions
In our project thesis we set out to create a stepwise model for how a company best
could establish oneself in a foreign market, with a focus on East Africa, based on
traditional business literature. The project thesis had a very theoretical approach
and used analytical frameworks for business development.
Our most important finding from this project was that market research done from
abroad on a foreign market where little data is available does not yield many usable
results. Another finding was that it is difficult to create a stepwise entry model
for entrepreneurs based on traditional analytical business literature.
As far as we could find there are no research done on how to establish a company
in Africa for entrepreneurs from the industrialized world. We found some studies
about the current situation and on how the market is but nothing about how to
operate in it as a minority entrepreneur.
Through our curriculum at NTNU School of Entrepreneurship we have previously
learned about effectuation, a more practically applicable theory. We found little
research done on the use of effectuation for entrepreneurs who start up in a foreign
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market. Based on our experiences from the project thesis and our knowledge of
effectuation we wanted to know how it was to execute the effectual approach and
how well it would work with regards to workflow and results. We therefore wanted
to make a framework based on effectuation and test this in real life. This amounted
in the research question: “How has the dynamics in the effectual approach worked
for RESolar’s business development?”
We had also been through theories touching upon minority entrepreneurs in the
project thesis. Through our findings we got the understanding that cultural and
structural challenges of being a minority entrepreneur in Kenya would affect the
business development of RESolar to some extent. This resulted in the research
question: “How will business development be affected by the fact that we are West-
ern entrepreneurs?”
Finally as a turnkey provider with a business model that relies on business net-
works we wanted to research the role of social capital and business networks and
how it affects business developments and relationships. This amounted in the last
research question: “What is the role of social capital in creating viable business
relationships?”
3.2 Selection of theory
With these three research questions we wanted to select theory that were similar
to the effectual approach. Through our curriculum at NTNU School of Entrepren-
eurship we have learned about alternative theories that claim to be more suited
for start-ups than the traditional approach taught in MBA-programs.
It is said that a start-up is not a small version of a big company but rather
an experiment of what works and what does not work. In this thesis we refer
to this as the effectual approach, it includes several resource-based approaches
that deals with experimenting in the market. This includes the classical inside-
out perspective, exploration and exploitation, the lean framework in addition to
other models and procedures that compliments the effectual approach. Based
on these theories we set out to create a unified model to include all the theories
related to the effectual approach.
We started to search for literature in the curriculum of previous university courses
at NTNU, such as Technology Based Business Development, International Busi-
ness Development, Idea Search and Market Assessment and Strategic Manage-
ment. Curriculum from the summer term at the Norwegian Entrepreneurship pro-
gram at Boston University. We then searched the list of references from the initial
articles and other papers that have cited the initial articles. In addition to this we
have broaden our horizon by searching online on Google Scholar, Scopus, ISI Web
of Knowledge and Euromonitor after phrases such as: minority entrepreneurs,
8 CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
entrepreneurship, Kenya, effectuation, Sarasvathy, action research, lean, Scrum,
resource-based view, social capital, network entrepreneur and business model in-
novation. Additionally we got help from our supervisor Roger Sørheim and his
colleagues Vegar Lein Ausrød , Vivek Sinha and Ola Edvin Vie to gather relevant
literature for our thesis.
The nature of the research project is limited by what actions are possible with
RESolar. This narrow definition of the research has limited the selection of the-
ories. Still there are some literature that would have been interesting that we did
not select. We were most interested in theories that give practical implications for
how to develop companies. Born global theory describing companies like RESolar,
even with effectuation as in Andersson (2011), mostly explains why born globals
arise and not how to become a successful born global. Theories on microfinance
and financing in general in emerging markets although interesting to RESolar,
rather describes the subject more than help you attain such financing. Interesting
reads could have been Waddle and Perlack (1992) and Erickson and Chapman
(1995).
Information on the Kenyan market, especially the market for solar power would
also provide interesting background information, but it falls outside the scope
of this thesis, especially since it only describes the market for rural consumer
electrification. Some research is done on this field, including Yadoo and Cruick-
shank (2012); Duke, Jacobson and Kammen (2002); Jacobson (2007); Acker and
Kammen (1996); Jacobson and Kammen (2007).
Further, there were some literature available on the role of social networks and
minority entrepreneurs that did not fit into our limited scope. Kilby (1983) de-
scribes alien entrepreneurs, Zhou, Wu and Luo (2007) explore the role of social
network in Chinese born globals, McDade and Spring (2005) discuss a “new gen-
eration of African entrepreneurs” and Kristiansen (2004) study how high-quality
social networks put entrepreneurs in a better position to perform well as entre-
preneur.
Lastly we also chose to leave theories on cultural differences out. We studied
this in the project thesis and the theory available was found not to provide much
valuable insight into project development in different cultures.
Simultaneously with the research project, we have started a company that has
entered this market. Even though a lot of our time and resources have been
devoted to establish RESolar, we have tried our very best to cover as much relevant
theory as possible and conduct a comprehensive and adequate literature review.
We have covered the most relevant theory for a comprehensive literature review
and a complete unified model. There is a possibility that we might have overlooked
theory that could have been of importance to us. However we believe that our
literature review covers all main aspects of the theories and models mentioned.
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3.3 Action research
3.3.1 What is action research?
“Action research is the study of an issue and how one can improve and/or fix the
issue. Unlike other scientific methods the researcher, most often a practitioner, is
an insider.” (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011). Action research is most often used
to answer questions that try to improve practices or procedures in the researchers
company. McNiff and Whitehead (2011) suggest one conduct action research with
an action-reflection cycle:
Figure 3.1: Action-reflection cycle (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011, p. 9)
There are several assumptions underlying the action research method. Due to
the nature of action research where the researcher is participating in the research
subject, action research is naturally “value laden” and “morally committed”. The
“[. . . ] researchers perceive themselves as in relation with one another in their
social contexts”. Therefore they bring in their own values and perspectives into
the research (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011, p. 27).
Further on, it is given that in action research you research on yourself and how you
interact with others. Also “[k]nowledge is uncertain” and “[k]nowledge creation is
a collaborative process”. Action research as a method is supposed to be developed
while used. Action research is most often used to improve workplaces and evaluate
practices through better learning with social intent (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011,
pp. 31, 34, 36).
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A typical action research project is suggested to follow this procedure:
• Identify a research issue.
• Identify research aims.
• Draw up a research design (plan).
• Gather data.
• Establish criteria and standards of judgement.
• Generate evidence from the data.
• Make a claim to knowledge.
• Submit the claim to critique.
• Explain the significance of the work.
• Disseminate the findings.
• Link new knowledge with existing knowledge (McNiff and Whitehead, 2010,
pp. 8-9).
(McNiff and Whitehead, 2011, p. 26)
The action research method originated in social sciences in the 1930s and 1940s
and has been especially used to improve methods in education. Lately it has
moved into other research areas and has gathered more acceptance in the research
environment (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011, p. 50).
When working with an action research project, McNiff and Whitehead (2011)
state that it is important to understand and value that you as a researcher is
both a “[. . . ] capable practitioner” and a “[. . . ]capable theorist”. You also need
to understand that an action researcher will work in two contexts at the same
time, both in the practice context and in the knowledge context. This is obvious
to us since we work both with RESolar and the master thesis at the same time.
We want to “[. . . ] contribute to new practices (this is the action focus of action
research)” and “[. . . ] contribute to new knowledge and theory (this is the research
focus of action research)” (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011).
3.3.2 Critique and defence of action research
Many academics classify action research, applied research and most qualitative
research as unscientific as the findings often are anecdotal and based on telling
stories rather than “doing science”. In these circles, science is viewed upon as
something that needs to be completely objective and rigorous, using statistical
tests and staying away from the world of application (Greenwood and Levin,
2007). This type of research is what Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons (2001) refer to
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as Mode 1 knowledge production or reliable knowledge. Action research on the
other hand produces knowledge in the context of application and is what would
be Mode 2 knowledge that is “socially robust”.
Action research does not claim to be context free, quite the opposite, action re-
search celebrates the fact that it is context based knowledge and thus applicable
in the real world, not just in theory. Action research is also transferable to new
contexts without any abstract generalizations about the knowledge. Another im-
portant aspect about action research is that it takes a bottom-up approach of
democratic research. This means the attitude towards the research subjects is
that they know more than the researcher about the actual on-ground situation in
question (Greenwood and Levin, 2007).
3.3.3 Why did we choose action research?
McNiff and Whitehead (2011) state the following: “Use action research when you
want to evaluate whether what you are doing is influencing your own or other
people’s learning, or whether you need to do something different.” Participatory
research, another name for action research is designed for research where the
researcher is a part of the research subject. Action Research is not only descriptive,
it is also a method designed to create change and find solutions to the problems
one uncovers in the research. This is exactly what we do in RESolar. “The focus
of the inquiry is determined by what the participants consider important, what
affects their daily lives. The inquiry process thus is linked to actions taken to
provide a solution to the problem being examined.” (McNiff and Whitehead, 2011,
p. 63). Additionally, action research is designed to be used in a setting where the
researcher naturally gets a subjective bias to his results. This fits us well as our
results will be subjective.
Another important aspect of action research is how the methodology hedge for
evaluation and restructuring of the methodology while in field. This is useful
when a researcher enters a market he knows little about and a good assumption
about best practice work structure is hard to create.
McNiff and Whitehead (2011) further list three goals for action research projects:
“When you want to improve your understanding”, “When you want to develop
your learning” or “When you want to influence others’ learning”. If your study
tries to answer such questions action research will be a suitable research method.
Below, we compare and argue how each research question are connected with the
three goals above.
1. How will business development be affected by the fact that we are Western
entrepreneurs?
We want to improve our understanding of how our Western background
influence business development. When we discuss the findings of this
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project we want to develop our learning and hope readers of the thesis can
learn something as well.
2. How has the dynamics in the effectual approach worked for RESolar’s
business development?
We both want to learn how to use effectuation and better understand how
effectuation works in the context of RESolar. In other words how
effectuation can be used as a tool for business development. Other
entrepreneurs might learn something through our experiences.
3. What is the role of social capital in creating viable business relationships?
Understanding of the role social capital has in business relationships can
be crucial for a start-up company. We want to learn how social capital can
be used to RESolar’s benefit. We hope others can learn something from
our conclusions.
To sum up this brief discussion on why we chose action research, we see that our
research project is well suited for such a research method according to McNiff and
Whitehead (2011). This is why we selected action research for this thesis.
3.3.4 Cogenerative action research
Greenwood and Levin (2007) describes the cogenerative model, which also is in-
teresting to look at in this research project. They define two different parts of the
research. First you define a research question. Then you work together with others
to solve the problem and generate a solution. This method is done in collabora-
tion between an internal and an external part. The internal actor is the problem
owner and the external actor is often a professional or an academic brought in
to solve the problem. A figure of this model is depicted in figure 3.2. When a
solution has been generated, both external and internal parts have to reflect over
the findings. After this, a new cycle of research question can be started.
Figure 3.2 is a simplified version of the model described in Greenwood and Levin
(2007, p. 94). We find that in our research project this simplified model fits
better. This simplified model gives a general outline to how a process should be,
but not how the researcher should structure the day or what techniques he should
apply to best follow this process. In this thesis we will use techniques from two
frameworks; Scrum and lean. Both originating from the software development
sector. We have used these techniques earlier and have found them effective and
useful.
Scrum is originally a methodology for software development. It is a so-called agile
development method. Although most of this method is purely software-related,
some of the elements are useful in a more general setting and have been applied
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Figure 3.2: The cogenerative action research model
in this research project (Sutherland, 2011). The essential elements that have been
used in this research project are daily Scrum meetings, sprints and sprint review.
Daily stand-up meeting is a 15-minute meeting to start the day, evaluate how
the last day went and what today’s goal are (Schwaber, 2009). Sprints are a way
to split up the work with several smaller milestones during the project. After a
sprint the team shall gather to evaluate the sprint work-method. Three questions
are suggested: “What do we want to continue to do?” “What do we want to stop
to do?” “What do we want to start to do?” This cyclical approach is somewhat
similar to the cogenerative action research model, and we find that it is a detailed
technique of how to execute the model in practise.
The lean start-up approach (Ries, 2011) will be described in further detail in the
Literature review. The cycle of build-measure-learn from lean start-up is similar
to the cogenerative action research model and basically outlines a similar iterative
process. In this thesis we will implement validated learning from lean. In short
this is how lean describes how the researcher or entrepreneur makes assumptions,
take them to the field and evaluate the findings before making new assumptions
again. This is further described in the literature review as well.
3.4 Practical structuring of our research team
Our research team consists of three students from NTNUs School of Entrepreneur-
ship. We are located in Nairobi, Kenya and Trondheim, Norway. Being geograph-
ically dispersed and only able to sit together for seven weeks of the six months
study, we found it necessary with a detailed list of tasks to do through the term.
We also made a list of milestones with deadlines to reach. Inspired by the Scrum-
framework (Schwaber, 2009), we call each period between two deadlines a sprint
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and we also assign responsible persons to the different parts of the project.
3.4.1 Responsibility and work distribution
There are several important tasks that have to be completed through this term
both for RESolar and for the master thesis. Michelsen and Mundal are perman-
ently on ground in Kenya. Thorp is responsible for office routines and keeping
in touch with Norwegian partners. Customer account management is as far as
possible split evenly between Michelsen and Mundal. The suppliers are assigned
to those making initial contact. For the master thesis, each task is assigned at
the beginning of every sprint.
3.4.2 Work day structure
To create some sort of structure and a daily routine and be able to work focused
on both thesis and business development, we wanted to assign specific workdays
to each of them. Every Monday and Tuesday is thesis-work days, Wednesday and
Thursday should be spent working on RESolar. Fridays were designated to do
back-office, iterating our work process and discussing the past and coming week.
3.5 Data gathering, interviews and meetings
When collecting data for research projects, McNiff and Whitehead (2011) state
the following:
“In your action research you are looking primarily for two things:”
• “Episodes of practice that show the developing educational influence of your
own learning”
• “Episodes of practice that show your educational influence in the learning of
others”
Data shall be gathered mainly in two ways, through interviews with entrepreneurs
and through minutes from meetings.
Interviews will be conducted with fellow minority entrepreneurs, preferably en-
trepreneurs that are experienced with conducting business in the East African
region. Especially it will be interesting to talk with founders of companies in the
energy-sector or venture capitalists and others in investment-companies. As our
research question is about Western entrepreneurs this will also define whom we
will talk to.
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The interviews will be conducted as an open unstructured interview opposed to a
more detailed and systematic approach. Entrepreneurs are in general people that
have a lot to tell and have difficulties sticking with one topic at the time. It is their
stories that we are interested in and therefore we believe that a freer interview
will give us the best result. The interviews can be found in full in appendix A.
Minutes has to be typed up shortly after each meeting and archived digitally.
We also archive email correspondence with actors we meet. By doing this we
ensure that the meeting protocols and correspondences are systematized and easily
accessible to everyone on the team. A weekly research diary will be kept to
ensure that we document data and findings that we discover outside of structured
meetings. We will evaluate our findings every week to see if there are important
points we need to research further to answer our research question.
3.6 Evaluation of our methodology
How did we plan to develop and evaluate our research project? We started out
with a model of our method that we constructed on Thorp’s first visit to Kenya.
The model was based on a cyclical approach with evaluation and iteration of the
model at given time intervals. Evaluation was to be done every Friday, where four
subjects were to be assessed:
• Responsibility distribution: Do any of the team members prefer or excel at
any specific tasks?
• Work method: What days should be designated to what kind of work?
• How to log meetings and work: Write minutes during meetings, batch all
minutes on Fridays, or do some every day?
• Questions for interviews with other entrepreneurs: Try some interviews, see
how our questions work, do we get the information we need or do we have
to change our questions?
The other important aspect of our iteration model was how we evaluate and im-
plement iterations. When evaluating, we were to go through all points mentioned
above, write a report and implement changes. Based on the evaluation a new or
refined method should be tried until the next evaluation.
3.6.1 How did we evaluate our research method?
During the run of the research project we tried to apply the method described
above. The notion to evaluate the method every Friday never got started, instead
we did iterations throughout the project when we found them critically needed.
The iterations were aimed to create more structure and kick-start our work if
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things moved too slowly. Some of the things evaluated were as follows. We
reviewed what we had done with the project lately, how that could be done better
and if there were something to be learned from it.
We restructured the distribution of responsibility several times. To begin with
Thorp should work more on the thesis, while Michelsen and Mundal primarily
focused on RESolar. Responsibility was to be shifted around when needed. It
took a while before we found it necessary to change this. The second attempt was
to assign the responsibility of RESolar to Mundal and assign Michelsen and Thorp
to the thesis. This worked better, however especially RESolar moved slowly with
the new distribution. At the final attempt we spread the RESolar work on the
three of us: Customers, Suppliers and Financing. This still works and seems to
be an even distribution.
The initial plan for the workday structure proved difficult to follow. We did
on several occasions discuss that we should find a new structure. There always
seemed to pop up new things that required our full work capacity. Some examples
were when we unexpectedly won the Energy Award 2012 (Grønn Fases Energipris
2012 ) and had to create press material, when we received difficult enquiries from
customers or new information on the financing structure that required our full
work capacity.
We have been better at logging meetings and work. Minutes from all meetings
were digitalized and shared with all team members. Since we did not evaluate
the method fully there are no logs from such evaluations. We tried to write a
short diary to keep track of what work was done, since days were hectic this was
forgotten after some weeks.
The three interviews we conducted were done thoroughly and logged well. Emails
are archived automatically in a digital system, this works as expected. All in all
we have been fairly good to keep record of what we do and this has helped and
kept structure to our work.
Although we never iterated the whole model we did improve the most critical
elements when needed and the changes that were implemented worked well.
The interviews were conducted at the end of our stay in Kenya. There were
several advantages of having the interviews late in the stay. We were conscious
of what we needed answers to and we knew the interviewees. A set of questions
were created and reviewed together with our supervisor and then we did the three
interviews with the same set of questions. Our criteria for choosing interviewees
were primarily that they had been located in Kenya continuously over a long
period of time. Secondly, that they have conducted business privately and not
just been a representative for a big company or organization.
The interviewees have all long business experience from Kenya. Due to their
different backgrounds and their field of work in Kenya we believe they present a
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solid and realistic description of how it is to be a minority entrepreneur in East
Africa. Even with different fields of work we feel certain that their backgrounds
are similar enough to be of relevance for us and still contribute to illuminate our
questions from different perspectives. When we make conclusions on the basis of
our own experiences and the interviewees we feel confident that what we present
is correct.
Svein Mork Dahl
Dahl is from Arendal, Norway. His first experience with Kenya was through the
Norwegian NGO ARC-aid, where he worked for one and a half year. After this
he wanted to stay in Kenya and established himself in Nairobi, where he now
has lived for four years and is married to a Kenyan. He has a background as an
investment banker, lawyer and entrepreneur.
Dahl is actively involved in several projects and businesses. He is part owner of a
finance broker EmAC, develops agriculture investment funds, establishes Innova-
tion Norway’s business exchange program and is also active in social entrepren-
eurship projects.
Primarily we find Dahl relevant for RESolar due to his involvement in current
projects and his extensive network in Kenyan business life. He is relatively young
and started up for himself approximately four years ago. He therefore knows
what we are going through and has the ability to help us and point us in the right
direction.
Gerd and Jostein Holmedahl
The Norwegian missionaries Mr and Mrs Holmedahl have lived and worked in
Kenya for nearly forty years. They first came to Kenya in 1973 after escaping from
Ethiopia when the communists overthrew the Ethiopian government. Through
their long period in Kenya they have been involved in several projects. Mostly
their work have been related to develop Scripture Mission, which is the Norwegian
Lutheran Mission organization working in East Africa.
Mr and Mrs Holmedahl are of importance for RESolar as they have been in the
country for nearly four decades. They have a lot of experience, can put things
in perspective to how it used to be and where the development is headed. As
missionaries most of the work that Mr and Mrs Holmedahl have mostly been non-
profit work. That does not make them any less entrepreneurial than us. They
came to an unknown market, established schools, health clinics, wool production
companies to employ women and are currently running a small bed and breakfast
as a side business. They have gone through the same processes that we have to
go through and felt the same uncertainty when “paving the way”. They had to
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gather financing, find locations, establish network, build partnerships and relate
to locals.
Johnni Kjelsgaard
Kjelsgaard is a Danish investor and businessman that have started over 20 busi-
nesses. Back in 1998 he founded a company in the IT-sector in Kenya. He has
later started an investment company and this year a business incubator in Nairobi,
where RESolar is located.
Kjelsgaard is, as Dahl, a pure businessman, only with more years in the Kenyan
market. With long experience from establishing businesses in Kenya and the
neighbouring countries he knows what it means to be a minority entrepreneur in
East Africa.
Kjelsgaard is a great resource for RESolar and can give advice on every aspect
of doing business in Kenya. Not only because he is Scandinavian in Kenya, but
because he has started several businesses here, some of which has failed and other
which has succeeded.
3.6.2 How did this work out for us?
Following the methodology of action research has been an asset for both our
research and start-up. By doing evaluations and iterations we forced ourselves to
take a step back at times and reflect on where we were going and whether or not it
was the right path for us. This opened our eyes at several occasions, unfortunately
the amount of evaluations were less frequent than we initially planned. We found
out that we had difficulty following the planned structure of frequent evaluations
and iterations that action research, Scrum and lean recommends. We believe
this has been due to lack of work structure that arose from working at separate
continents.
Due to the fact that two of us were operating in a developing country we often
had to deal with poor Internet connections. This should not necessarily be a
structural problem with the right planning, nevertheless we failed to take this
into account when we planned our collaboration method. Our team has been
dependant on Internet based collaboration tools like Google Documents, Skype
and Dropbox that rely on stable Internet connections. When you operate in an
environment where the connection is slow and drops out quite frequently, other
tools should be used. Instead of realizing this at an early stage and reflecting
on an alternative we started rescheduling our morning meetings to the undefined
future and ended in effect up working oﬄine and quite separated. This in turn
resulted in the separated team members drifting apart, negatively affecting both
work efficiency and degree of collaboration towards common goals. Every time
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Thorp visited Africa the team came together with a stronger structure and ended
up being a lot more productive after their evaluation meetings. In retrospect we
clearly see that this is an important aspect that can be hard to catch in the heat
of the moment and will hurt the progress of the research development if it is not
addressed.
Lack of structure resulted in some unfortunate outcomes that might have reduced
the quality of our research. After some weeks we stopped using the research diary
and did fewer methodology evaluations along the way than what we planned.
With more follow-ups we believe we could have changed direction when we were
on the wrong path sooner, thus saving ourselves unnecessary work and worries.
We see that it has been hard to adjust and adapt our research methodology when
we do not evaluate what we are doing often enough and that this is caused by lack
of structure. Nevertheless, action research has been a very suitable methodology
in our case. The process has been natural and intuitive and the times where we
actually reflected on what we were doing and where we were going, we ended up
with a highly improved approach. In conclusion we feel that action research is an
extensive methodology that is easy to use and provides the research team with
good results when followed properly.
3.7 Credibility, validity and reliability to our result?
Greenwood and Levin (2007) defines credibility as “the arguments and the pro-
cesses necessary for having someone trust research results”. They further determ-
ine two different groups of credibility; “First there is knowledge that has internal
credibility to the group generating it. [...] External credibility is knowledge cap-
able of convincing someone who did not participate in the inquiry that the results
are believable.”. By its definition, all action research projects provide internal
credibility as the research is conducted with participation from the stakeholders
involved. The question is to what degree our research is transferable and whether
or not our conclusions are reliable and holds external credibility.
A study can be considered reliable if other researchers can reach the same con-
clusions in a new study. To improve our reliability we conducted interviews with
other minority entrepreneurs at the end of our study. As explained above, our
interview objects are experienced in the Kenyan context, with a similar back-
ground as us. Since all interviews confirmed our findings and conclusions without
knowledge about what we found, we believe this improves the reliability of our
study. Most of the challenges we met such as infrastructure, uncertainty, the lack
of formal support institutions and the untransparent marketplace are all common
for any Western entrepreneur who comes to East Africa. Therefore we find it
likely that others will come to the same conclusions as we have.
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Our findings are contextual dependent and qualitative, which means we cannot
claim that our findings are empirical or statistically significant. Still our conclu-
sions can be valid in other situations. For other Norwegian or Western entrepren-
eurs who plan to establish a company in Kenya or East Africa the recommend-
ations will be more or less directly transferable. More generally, our experiences
and findings from the effectual framework should be valid and relevant for all en-
trepreneurs. Likewise, our conclusion on the role of social capital and the effects
of minority entrepreneur networks holds validity for all businesses and business
people from the west operating in East Africa.
Even though the effects of minority entrepreneur networks for Asian entrepren-
eurs might be different than for Western minorities, the validity of the effectual
approach still stands. In the same way we believe that everyone planning to start
something in a foreign market should use the effectual approach of experimenting
in the field and thus our paper holds relevance for them as well.
Western minorities that are already established in East Africa will have something
to gain from reflecting on the effects of the minority networks, but little else. For
business people in general, which enter a market in a foreign culture, this study
might not be valid, but the effects of the minority networks should still be relevant.
A globalized company with a rigid business plan, which holds a policy of doing
the same everywhere might have little to gain from this paper. Companies that
do this, Western or not, will have little to gain from our findings.
A last note should be made on ethical and confidential issues. Simultaneously
working with the start-up project RESolar we have had access to some data as
founders and not researchers. Some of the findings presented below might not
have been available for external researchers and therefore an ethical issue arises.
Has it always been clear to RESolar’s business partners that they also are subject
to research? And does it matter if they are aware of it or not? In some cases
the team have considered it unfortunate to inform business partners that their
opinions might be included in a master thesis since we pose as sellers of our own
product and not academics in sales meetings. We have decided also to include
some of these findings.
Chapter 4
Literature review
The aim of this literature review is to compare effectuation and similar theories
for business development and try to unify them in the end. We will go through
the inside-out and outside-in perspective, exploration and exploitation, the lean
start-up approach and business model innovation and compare them to the ef-
fectual framework. Based on how the theories fit together, a unified model will
be constructed and complemented with the context of the minority entrepreneur
literature, the role of social capital and the network entrepreneur.
The first part of this literature review presents the different theories individually
and elucidate the main aspects of each framework. The next part then evaluates
how the different theories fit together and complement the effectual framework.
Grounded in this evaluation a unified model is constructed to include the suitable
elements. The model is then to be used by the case-company RESolar in their in
field experiment.
4.1 Minority entrepreneurs
For almost 1000 years East Africa was influenced by the Far and Middle East,
especially Arabia, India, Persia and China. The first Portuguese arrived in 1498
on a mission to dominate the economy and Christianize the Swahili coast. For
several hundred years the Portuguese tried to take control, but because of Swahili
resistance and with the help of Omani Arabs the Portuguese were removed by
1729 (Mwakikagile, 2007).
The Kenyan population is among the most diverse populations in Africa. The
non-African groups, Arabs, Indians and Europeans, still play a fundamental role
in the Kenyan business life (Mwakikagile, 2007). The following table displays
some of the key minorities represented in the East African business environment.
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Non-African
groups
Business sector
Arabs A small but historically important minority ethnic group in
Kenya mainly engaged in trade. They are principally
concentrated along the coast in cities such as Mombasa.
Indians Are primarily noted for their business acumen and form one
of the most prosperous communities in the region.
Europeans Primarily consist of descendants of British colonials. Many
are of aristocratic descent and still continue to wield
significant influence, especially over Kenya’s political elite.
Britons and other Europeans in Kenya have also
traditionally dominated the local business community.
Table 4.1: Central minority groups in the Kenyan business life (Mwakikagile,
2007)
Minority entrepreneurs’ influence in Kenya
The World Bank conducted a study of Kenyan enterprises in the late 90’s, pub-
lished in 2003. The study was done through the World Bank’s Regional Program
on Enterprise Development (RPED). This data emphasizes that most Kenyan
firms are owned by Non-Africans. Vandenberg calculate that Asians own between
65% and 89% of Kenyan firms with eleven or more employees (Vandenberg, 2003,
p. 445).
When looking at size and growth of companies it is clear that the minorities per-
form better. Ramachandran and Shah (2007) find that the average Kenyan firm
owned by a minority is close to four times larger than indigenously African owned
companies, measured in number of employees. Especially in larger start-up busi-
nesses, but also in general, it is clearly seen that a majority of the entrepreneurs
encountered in Ramachandran and Shah’s survey are of a Non-Kenyan origin.
Biggs and Shah (2006) find that non-indigenous African entrepreneurs raise per-
formance through networks and private governance systems.
Networks of minority entrepreneurs
Studies show that immigrated minority entrepreneurs are likely to cluster to-
gether. Ramachandran and Shah (2007) point to several aspects where minority
entrepreneurs enjoy several benefits due to their ethnicity. For instance they have
a larger chance of receiving trade credit and can expect to sustain supplier rela-
tionships for longer (Biggs, Raturi and Srivastava, 2002; Biggs and Shah, 2006;
Ramachandran and Shah, 2007).
There seems to be several reasons to why the foreigners tend to stick together.
4.1. MINORITY ENTREPRENEURS 23
In an earlier article, Ramachandran and Shah (1999) finds that “[e]xternal envir-
onmental parameters such as limited occupational choice, the never-distant threat
of expulsion, and enforceable cooperation with fellow minority entrepreneurs [...]”
These conditions leads to “[...] networks of trust which provide access to scarce
information, risk-spreading arrangements, favourable terms of credit and a larger
pool of individuals to whom managerial responsibility can be delegated.”
Ramachandran and Shah (1999) conclude that these networks and mechanisms
are extremely important to the performance of entrepreneurs. Through lower
transaction costs, easier contract enforcement and better access to financing and
information, Indians and Europeans by far outperform the indigenous African en-
trepreneurs. Encouragingly for African development though, Ramachandran and
Shah (1999) suggest that education at secondary and university levels substitutes
for access to these minority entrepreneur networks.
Networking among minority entrepreneurs
How does the minority entrepreneur connect to a network? In a study of three
young born-global entrepreneurs by Harris and Wheeler (2005), it is shown that
entrepreneurs in a new market often form “highly serendipitous and fortunate
relationships”. Such nodes in an entrepreneur’s network can provide help with
expanding the network with new contacts, point and introduce both suppliers
and customers. Even more importantly such relationships can help transform
and redirect new market entries (Harris and Wheeler, 2005).
It appears to be important to be prepared to connect to new nodes at all times.
Harris and Wheeler’s study show that new relationships can arrive rather ran-
domly. “In all the relationships rooted in social activity, whether business related
or not, a relationship developed to some degree, without any idea of the business
exchanges that may or may not subsequently take place.” (Harris and Wheeler,
2005).
Network with countrymen
When connecting with new nodes it seems particularly likely that they will be
originated from the same country as yourself. Evaluating the data in Harris and
Wheeler (2005) one can see that of the eleven relationships they studied, eight of
them were with fellow countrymen.
This notion that minorities tend to seek together with their own countrymen
can further be explained from a different perspective. In his book “Predictably
Irrational” author Dan Ariely call it relativity. When considering the people
around you, persons with the same ethnicity or similar cultural backgrounds will
appear to have a lot more in common with you. When surrounded by apparently
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Africans Ariely’s conclusion is that countrymen will be easier to befriend and
begin fruitful networks with. Put simply, you find it nicer to chat with people
you share background with, just because of that background (Ariely, 2008).
4.2 The outside-in perspective
In the classic and generic business literature there is generally two important
views on how the company should attack and enter the industry. Traditionally
the most used perspective is outside-in, where Michael Porter is the most know
theorist. Porter’s key themes are strategic positioning, competition and compet-
itive advantage and the value chain (Porter, 1985, 1980). A brief summary of his
ideas follows.
Strategic positioning is about how to enter a new market, and is illustrated by
the “five forces” in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Porter’s five forces (Porter, 1980)
The key learning from these five forces are that one has to position oneself cor-
rectly and build defence against the five forces to sustain competitive advantage.
Further, Porter describes a generic competitive strategy best shown as in fig-
ure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Porter’s generic competitive strategy (Porter, 1985)
The clue with the generic competitive strategy is to choose between low cost
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and differentiation and be careful not to be stuck in the middle. You should
establish your company in an existing industry and make adaptions based on
what possibilities exists besides your competitors. “The key to a company’s growth
and success is to stake out a position that is less vulnerable to attack from other
companies.” (Baraldi, Brennan, Harrison, Tunisini and Zolkiewski, 2007)
The last concept introduced by Porter is the value chain. As Baraldi et al. (2007)
puts it: “The value chain is primarily analysed in terms of sequential interdepend-
ent activities from which a competitive advantage can be created. The advantage
can be generated because of an effective co-ordination between these activities and
the optimization of their interconnections. A company’s value chain belongs to a
broader value system that involves the upstream value chains of the suppliers and
the downstream value chains of the channel actors.”
4.3 The inside-out perspective
The outside-in perspective as described in the previous section is usually put up
against the inside-out perspective. Where the outside-in theories sees how the firm
better can adjust to the market already existing, the inside-out theorists prefer to
look at it the other way around. How can a company use the resources it already
has for maximum impact on the market. Inside-out is usually tied to the term
“Resource-Based Theory”. One of the most known theorists is Jay Barney with his
“Resource-Based View” Barney (1991). The resource-based view states one needs
“physical, human or organizational assets that are valuable, rare, inimitable and
non-substitutable (VRIN)” to build sustainable competitive advantage(Barney,
1991). Origins can be tracked back to Penrose (1959), much research was done
by Wernerfelt (1984), Rumelt (1984) and Barney (1991). Baraldi et al. (2007)
summarizes the resource-based view well: “Competitive advantage is derived from
the control of unique resources”.
Barney (1991) cites Daft (1983) when describing a firm’s resources: “Firm re-
sources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes,
information, knowledge etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive
of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness”. The
following characterize valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources:
• Valuable: “attributes only become resources when they exploit opportunities
or neutralize threats in a firm’s environment” (Barney, 1991).
• Rare: Resources cannot be common among competitors.
• Imperfect imitable: How difficult will it be for your competitors to copy your
resources? Are there unique historical conditions? Can they be causally
ambiguous? Or socially complex?
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• Non-substitutable: “there must be no strategically equivalent valuable re-
sources that are themselves either not rare or imitable” (Barney, 1991).
Another concept that is essential in the inside-out perspective is dynamic capab-
ilities. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) describe them as “The firms processes that
use resources, specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release
resources to match and even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are
routines by which firms achieve new resource configuration as markets emerge,
collide, split, evolve and die.” Further Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) states that
“[dynamic capabilities] value for competitive advantage lies in the resource con-
figuration that they create, not in the capabilities themselves”. It is important for
the company to look everywhere for asymmetries in the firm and develop them to
competitive advantages.
4.3.1 The network entrepreneur
Burt (1992) describes a concept called “The network entrepreneur” that gives a
somewhat cynical and clinical view on how the best network should be. The two
important basic premises that Burt mentions are that a well-structured network
can provide a player with a competitive advantage but that the market is im-
perfect. Secondly establishing and maintaining a well-structured network costs
resources, both human and financial. An expansion of the network is therefore
only good if the new contact gives you as a player a new network cluster. This is
called a non-redundant network expansion.
Burt (1992) discusses the value of locating and filling structural holes. In short a
structural hole means a “missing link” between one or more nodes in a network
that would benefit from having a connection. By mapping and filling these holes
an entrepreneur can gain a lot by being the link between these two. One should
therefore seek to achieve as many non-redundant contacts as possible and fill
structural holes between one self and other networks.
The two main principles to optimize a network are:
Efficiency – Maximize the highest number of non-redundant contacts to cover
the highest number of structural holes as possible
Effectiveness – Expand to network clusters that you do not yet have any network
connections
This approach is a part of what Granovetter (1973) refers to as the strength of
weak ties. The theory revolves around the notion that if you focus on keeping
as many non-redundant contacts as possible, and only put as much time into
maintaining each one of them so that you can keep using them you will optimize
the efficiency of the network. In addition, the theory of the strength of weak ties
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suggests that you will get more relevant information through weak ties than you
will get through strong ties (Levin and Cross, 2004).
4.3.2 Social capital as a resource
Adler and Kwon (2002) have described and summarized both the concept of the
network entrepreneur and the strength of weak ties and combined them under the
term social capital. Social capital is a widely discussed term among researchers
of sociology and business. They put together a new and more conclusive concept
for social capital. Their definition gives clear benefits to the firm in three forms;
information, power and solidarity. Information both through strong and weak ties
is especially important for entrepreneurs.
Further, Adler and Kwon (2002) identified that the core intuition guiding social
capital research is that the goodwill that others have toward us is a valuable
resource. They define social capital as: “The goodwill available to individuals or
groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s social relations.
Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it makes available
to the actor” (Adler and Kwon, 2002, p. 23).
Adler and Kwon (2002) distinguish three conceptual types of relations; market
relations, hierarchical relations and social relations. It is likely that any relation
between people include a mix of the three types. “However it is the social relation
that constitutes the aspect of social structure underlying social capital.” (Adler and
Kwon, 2002)
As mentioned initially defining social capital is widely discussed in academia and
what primarily separates the different views depends firstly on if they focus on
the substance, the source, or the effects of social capital. Secondly it depends on
if they focus on the relations between actors, external, the structure of relations
among actors within a collective, internal, or both of the views, integrated (Adler
and Kwon, 2002).
External dimension
A focus on the external relations is also known as bridging and is connected to
the network ties and how such connections might provide valuable information
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Sørheim, 2003; Adler and Kwon, 2002). This view
looks into how individuals and firms get exposed to opportunities through their
social network and how this creates a competitive advantage (Adler and Kwon,
2002; Burt, 1992).
“Through social capital we receive opportunities to use our financial and human
capital.” (Burt, 1992)
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Burt (1992) describes the network entrepreneur as a player that brings three kinds
of capital to the competitive arena; Financial-, Human- and Social capital. It is
through social capital the actors receive opportunities to use their financial- and
human capital. In contrast to Burt’s view of Social Capital another group of
authors, like (Fukuyama, 1995), focus on the collective actors’ internal character-
istics in groups like organizations and nations (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
Internal dimension
The internal structure in a collective group depend on having a set of informal
values, norms or other common grounds that binds them together in cooperative
relationships (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
“The ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organ-
izations” (Fukuyama, 1995; Adler and Kwon, 2002)
Integrated approach
The third group of authors are neutral to this internal or external dimension
Adler and Kwon (2002), and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) have come up with an
integrated approach where both dimensions are included (Sørheim, 2003). The in-
tegrated approach includes three specific dimensions of social capital, a structural-,
a relational- and lastly a cognitive dimension.
The structural dimension It can often be a tedious and resource demanding
job to acquire relevant information when needed. By having the right network
one can benefit from the information flow in at least three ways; access, timing
and referrals.
Access is relevant for receiving valuable information and knowing how to use it.
To prevent overflow of information the network has the important job to also act
as a screening process (March, 1991; Sørheim, 2003). Timing is relevant since
critical information has different value depending on when it is received. Lastly,
referrals relates to the importance of being mentioned by name and recommended
to potential partners at the right time and circumstances (Sørheim, 2003).
“Granovetter (1985, p. 490) illustrates the importance of reputation and being
referred in the right circumstances are of great value; ‘Better than the statement
that someone is known to be reliable is information from a trusted informant that
he has dealt with that individual and found him so’ ”(Sørheim, 2003).
The relational dimension The relational dimension of social capital brings up
the aspects related to trust, trustworthiness and motivation (Tsai and Ghoshal,
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1998; Sørheim, 2003; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Trust is defined in various
ways as described by Welter (2012). In this paper we define trust as “[t]he will-
ingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectation that the other party will perform a particular action important to the
trustee, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” as in
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995). These matters are important in order to
clarify the motivation of individuals to involve themselves in knowledge creation
through the exchange and combination of resources (Sørheim, 2003).
The cognitive dimension For people to create common grounds and a shared
vision, they need to be able to share and exchange information e.g. have some
sort of shared codes and language (Sørheim, 2003).
4.4 The effectual approach
“I always live by the motto of Ready-Fire-Aim. I think if you spend too much
time doing ready-aim-aim-aim-aim, you’re never going to see all the good things
that would happen if you actually start doing it and then aim. And find out where
your target is.” – Interview object from Sarasvathy’s study in 1997 (Sarasvathy,
2001b).
So what is the effectual approach to reasoning and how does it differ from a causal
approach? Causal processes are defined as to take a particular effect as given and
focus on selecting between means to create that effect. The effectual processes are
defined to take a set of means as given and focus on selecting between possible
effects that can be created with that set or means (Sarasvathy, 2001a). This can
be simplified by comparing two different approaches to the same problem.
A causal affiliated person, often a professional with a MBA-degree would start a
business venture by creating a business plan based on market analyses, data on
competitors and on what resources needed to be acquired to reach a fixed goal.
The effectual person would often start with his own abilities and see where they
could take him. This starts with the three core questions:
• Who am I?
• What are my skills and knowledge?
• Who do I know that can help me?
The effectual person skips the phase of planning an entire business concept and
action plan before he starts his venture. The effectual start is much more iterative
and interactive. Instead of doing customer surveys and analyses, he will go directly
to the customer and try to sell directly. The feedback from the market would then
guide the entrepreneur to stake his venture in the right direction.
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Table 4.2: The difference between effectuation and causation (Sarasvathy, 2001a)
Categories of
differentiation
Causation processes Effectuation processes
Givens Effect is given Only some means or tools are
given
Decision-making
selection criteria
Help choose between means to
achieve the given effect
Help choose between possible
effects that can be created with
given means
Selection criteria based on
expected return
Selection criteria based on
affordable loss or acceptable risk
Effect dependent: Choice of
means is driven by
characteristics of the effect the
decision maker wants to create
and his or her knowledge of
possible means
Actor dependent: Given specific
means, choice of effect is driven
by characteristics of the actor
and his or her ability to discover
and use contingencies
Competencies
employed
Excellent at exploiting
knowledge
Excellent at exploiting
contingencies
Context of relevance More ubiquitous in nature More ubiquitous in human
action
More useful in static, linear, and
independent environments
Explicit assumption of dynamic,
nonlinear, and ecological
environments
Nature of unknowns Focus on the predictable aspects
of an uncertain future
Focus on the controllable
aspects of an unpredictable
future
Underlying logic To the extent we can predict
future, we can control it
To the extent we can control
future, we do not need to
predict it
Outcomes Market share in existent
markets through competitive
strategies
New markets created through
alliances and other cooperative
strategies
This approach also leaves the entrepreneur much more flexible to handle unfore-
seen events and lets him experiment a lot more with possible approaches to the
market. The effectual entrepreneur handles unforeseen events when they arise
instead of using a lot of resources to map them beforehand. This way of making
the best of contingencies is a core aspect of the effectual entrepreneur and allows
him to change direction as new challenges and opportunities arise. Given the
higher degree of uncertainty, they have to be able to handle this more often and
make the best of it at all times. Even if uncertainty and contingencies plays a
key role for the effectual entrepreneur, the effectual approach is not a random
strategy. Effectuation is a method one uses to benefit and use the uncertainties
and contingencies to develop new and unforeseen results (Sarasvathy and Dew,
2010).
Davidsson’s (2005) four ground pillars describes the core aspects of effectuation
and shows in a specific manner how it differs from causation. The four pillars are
presented below:
4.4. THE EFFECTUAL APPROACH 31
(a) Given means (b) New means are generated
Figure 4.3: Causation focuses all plans towards one direction (Sarasvathy, 2001b)
Affordable losses The effectual approach starts by asserting affordable losses
instead of the causal approach that speculates in expected returns. The core
philosophy is that it is more important to limit the damage if unsuccessful, than
to get the highest possible return if successful. This arises from the how the
effectual entrepreneur goes out to experiment while the causal entrepreneur plans
everything before execution.
Approach to actors The causal approach handles other actors by analysing
whom he has to beat to be successful. The effectual approach handles other
actors by asking himself who he should partner up with or cooperate with to be
successful. In short, strategic alliances rather than competitive analysis.
Emerging opportunities Effectuation focus on possibilities that arise in the
marketplace rather than what is known beforehand. Exploitation of contingencies
rather than pre-existing knowledge. The entrepreneur is sensitive to what comes
up along the road and prepared to turn these contingencies into business strengths.
Managing the uncertain future Causation wants to tackle the uncertainty
by mapping it and then analyse what the best possibility for action is comparable
to the classic business plan. Effectuation is more prepared for uncertainties and
contingencies that arise and exploit these unforeseen events into benefits along
the way. Causation logic assumes one can predict the future, while effectuation
logic suggests that if one can create the future one does not have to predict it.
In the real world
The causal approach to reasoning is a lot more widespread in the world of suc-
cessful professional managers at large corporations and is also what is taught as
curriculum at most MBA schools. The effectual way of reasoning on the other
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Figure 4.4: Effectuation is to focus towards a range of potential opportunities
(Sarasvathy, 2001b)
hand is empirically shown to be widespread among successful serial entrepreneurs.
However, no one uses solely the effectual or the causal approach since most will
need a mix of the two. Both rational choices based on causation and a methodo-
logy based on effectuation is necessary as guidelines for good actions and decisions
since they work best on different areas of business life. Causal processes are well
designed for making the best of acquired knowledge while effectual processes are
good for exploiting contingencies (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2010).
4.5 Exploitation and exploration
Exploitation and exploration are considered extremities in the paradox on how
to allocate resources in an organisation (Graff and Narvhus, 2012; March, 1991).
Organizations that apply an exploitation approach work to eliminate inefficient
process and try to use their resources in the most efficient manner (Green, 1999).
Such organisations are often considered profit-making machines as they try to re-
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duce costs as much as possible at the same time as they increase production. Lean
manufacturing is recognized as one of the more extreme variants of exploitation
strategy (Graff and Narvhus, 2012).
There are some controversies on the usage of exploitation in organizations (Green,
1999; Graff and Narvhus, 2012). Two points are especially emphasized; exhaustion
of humans and inhibition of innovation. Exploitation may utilize humans to the
extremes and this may lead to terrible work conditions and can come close to
human slavery (Graff and Narvhus, 2012). Further, innovative initiatives face the
risk of being diminished due to the organizations focus on short-term performance
(Nohria and Gulati, 1996). The positive impacts of the exploitation tactic are
summarized in three elements: Discipline, Development of Core Competencies
and Inhibition of Slack Accumulation (Graff and Narvhus, 2012). In short, the
organization works to be better at what it knows well without using unnecessary
resources.
Exploration is considered a contradiction to exploitation and encourages collec-
tion of new information that can increase organizational production in the future
(March, 1991; Graff and Narvhus, 2012). “An exploratory organization has a
mindset based on experimentation, flexibility, divergent thinking, and increasing
variance.”(Graff and Narvhus, 2012)
As a contradiction to exploitation, explorative strategies are often considered to
be weak on the strengths in exploitation strategies. Three critiqued elements
of exploration is: Lack of Effectiveness (March, 1991), Ignore Core Competen-
cies (Gupta, Smith and Shalley, 2006) and the “Failure Trap”, where “[t]he firm,
therefore moves from one opportunity to the next without exploiting prior learn-
ing and experience (Levinthal and March, 1993)” (Graff and Narvhus, 2012). On
the positive side, exploration enables organizations to achieve long-term viability
through new opportunities (Atuahene-Gima, 2005). Plus a firm with an explor-
ative strategy can build up an ability to handle environmental uncertainty that is
superior to other actors in the same industry (McGrath, 2001; Graff and Narvhus,
2012). “Adaptability [from exploration] becomes increasingly important when the
competitive landscape intensifies.” (Graff and Narvhus, 2012)
4.6 Lean manufacturing and lean start-up approach
The production practice lean manufacturing derives from the Toyota Production
System, a Japanese management philosophy that was established by the Toyota
Corporation (Ohno, 1988; Becker, 1994). Lean manufacturing considers all activ-
ities that do not create value for the customer to be waste and should therefore
be avoided (Reeb and Leavengood, 2010).
In essence the lean start-up approach is another alternative solution to the causal
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planning approach for a start-up to go forward with. The idea is to build a
prototype with a minimum set of features, minimal viable product, sell it to early
adopters, get feedback from the customers and make improvements on the product
as fast as possible. This is called the build-measure-learn cycle. The process is
to continue to iterate and make improvements until the product is fully featured
and the customers love it (Ries, 2011).
Leap of faith
A start-up’s business plan usually begins with a set of assumptions, and for the
start-up everything depends on these leap of faith assumptions. Having a first-
hand understanding of the customer is therefore important so these assumptions
can be tested as quickly as possible. In lean manufacturing this is called “genchi
gembutsu” and translates into “go and see for yourself” so that decisions can be
based on first-hand knowledge (Ries, 2011).
In the early phase of the start-up it is challenging to predict what will happen
and what the future will look like. A mind-set of experimentation and learning
is necessary to raise the odds of success (Gruber, 2010). Lean manufacturing
use the production of high-quality physical goods to measure progress. The lean
start-up approach also measure progress, but uses a different unit of progress,
namely validated learning. “By making predictions ahead of time about your
product/service and documenting them, you know when you are off the mark and
you can use the results to iterate your product and test new assumptions, this is
validated learning.” (Ries, 2011)
Because of the uncertain future a start-up faces, the questions of who the custom-
ers are and what they might find valuable are unknown (Ries, 2011, p. 48). It is
therefore challenging for start-ups to know what work is value-creating and what
work is wasteful (Ries, 2011, p. 47).
The start-up should apply its available “tools” for finding out what customers
value. The first step is to build a minimum viable product with the least applicable
features needed to get customer feedback and then start gathering this feedback.
Ries, Eisenmann and Furr (2011) defines the minimal viable product as: “the
smallest set of features necessary to secure the next round of validated learning”.
Minimum viable product A minimal viable product helps the entrepreneurs
start the process of learning who their actual customers are and what they value
as quickly as possible. A minimal viable product is not necessarily the smallest
product imaginable, they can range in complexity but they are simply the fastest
way to get through the build-measure-learn feedback loop with the minimum
amount of effort (Ries, 2011, p. 93). The initial minimal viable products do not
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need to be perfect, the main goal is to get the product sold to early adopters and
adjusted to the customers before it can target the mass market. An aspect that
worries entrepreneurs with regards to building a simple minimal viable product
and releasing it, is the fear of competitors. Sooner or later a successful start-up
will encounter competitors and the only way to win that race is to learn faster
than anyone else and accelerate through the build-measure-learn cycle faster than
your competitors can manage (Ries, 2011, p. 111).
Pivot or persevere?
Ries (2011, p. 149) defines pivot as “a structured course correction designed to test
a new fundamental hypothesis about the product, strategy, and engine of growth”.
For a start-up to succeed it has to constantly take into consideration the feedback
it gets from its customers and the marketplace. Then either continue at the
current path, persevere, or change to a new direction, pivot.
For a start-up to constantly make these fundamental decisions is challenging and
highly emotional. The start-up team needs to address this in a structured way
and schedule regular pivot and persevere meetings no matter how the flow is. In
pressed times when the start-up is running low on cash, there are two alternatives
for how to extend the start-up’s “life-line”. Either the start-up has to reduce its
costs or raise more funds. The essential aspect that the start-up team needs to
keep in mind is that they have to increase the number of pivots they can conduct
so that the start-up will increase its opportunities to succeed with its business
strategy. If reducing the company costs results in a slower process through the
feedback loop then the start-up has only achieved going out of business in a slower
pace (Ries, 2011).
4.7 Business model innovation
When entering a new market as a small, new start-up, it may often be smart to
use a different business model compared to incumbents in the market. Especially
during the downturns of the 2000’s, there has been much focus on business models
and development of new models, so called business model innovation.
First, what is a business model? In general a business model is a way to describe
what and how a company’s costs and revenues are generated. Several ways to
depict the business model has been developed. Here we will explain two models
that the authors have found relevant and useful. In the HBR-article “Reinventing
your business model”, Johnson, Christensen and Kagermann (2008) describe a
model with four elements; customer value proposition, profit formula, key resources
and key processes. This is illustrated in figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Business model innovation (Johnson et al., 2008)
Another popular description is the Business Model Canvas by Osterwalder (Os-
terwalder and Pigneur, 2010). He defines business model in the following way:
“A business model describes the rationale of how an organization creates, delivers
and captures value.” The business model canvas consists of 9 building blocks;
customer segments, value propositions, channels, customer relationships, revenue
streams, key resources, key activities, key partnerships and cost structure. As one
can see, these two models have a lot in common but the canvas provides a more
granulated model.
How does one innovate a new business model? Essentially, you only have to change
some or all of the elements in your existing model. For a start-up this would
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typically mean to look at what the incumbents do and do something different.
Johnson et al. (2008) recommends starting with creating a new customer value
proposition. Using a “Job-to-be-done”-focus it is easier find what the customer
really needs and then fit your product or offering to this need. When you have a
new customer value proposition, it will be easier to find what profit formula, key
resources and process will be needed to deliver this.
4.8 Framework for an effectual approach
The theory presented above is to be used in analysis of data found in the study
of the case company RESolar, as described in the Context chapter. To make the
analysis and discussion of the findings easier we summarize the models and theor-
ies in a more conclusive way. We will use the effectual approach as a foundation
for a framework and include relevant aspects from the other perspectives where
they are found useful.
To build this framework we will first process all theories presented above in an
orderly manner and reason for whether they should be included in the framework
or not. Then we present a structured framework and explain where in the frame-
work the various theoretical elements belong. In the end we visualize the model
and summarise it for the entrepreneur.
As a general framework the effectual approach is fairly similar to the resource-
based view. In resource-based view you analyse the resources contained in the
firm. Similarly, with effectuation one start with an assessment of the internal
resources. In the inside-out perspective where the resource-based view belongs,
there is also a focus on what you and your organisation can do rather than the
outside-in view of constantly assessing what your environment is doing. The focus
on your internal resources can be concluded to be the foundation of effectuation.
The resources that are recognized in resource-based view are the same as those
recognized in effectuation.
We find that the resource-based view is more directed towards existing firms,
whereas effectuation is more suited for the entrepreneur. The effectual approach
has a broader definition of resources since resource-based view is focused on re-
sources that can build competitive advantage, usually in an existing market. Ef-
fectuation can be considered to be more creative and more suited to capture new
opportunities and markets. This is why we decided to use effectuation as the
foundation for the framework and connect the other theories into this framework.
The lean start-up approach framework also deserves to be mentioned in particular
as a concise framework for start-ups. The method originated in a software-start-
up environment, therefore we find that most parts of the lean start-up approach
framework are not useful in the general cases. One can further note that lean start-
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up approach is strongly connected to both lean manufacturing and effectuation.
This provides an easily available “handbook” for the software start-up based on
an effectual approach.
4.8.1 Comparison of presented theory
Here we will go into more detail on similarities and differences between the theories
presented above and the effectual approach. We decide if the various concepts
are suited for inclusion into a unified framework that will be compiled after this
comparison. The theories will be discussed one at the time in the same order as
in the literature review above.
Minority entrepreneurs
The first part of theory from the literature is about minority entrepreneurs and
how the networks and ties between different minority entrepreneurs function. Net-
works of minority entrepreneurs, networking among minority entrepreneurs and
network with countrymen should be affected by two of the three effectuation-
questions that Davidsson (2005) mentions in his article: Who am I? and Who
do I know that can help me?. By asking oneself who am I? the entrepreneur can
reflect on what cultural ties he has and whom he should approach to benefit from
his minority entrepreneur network.
In other words, to figure out who do I know that can help me in the minority
entrepreneur network. Another valuable point we can learn from the minority
entrepreneur literature is how it affects the effectuation pillar approach to actors.
Minority entrepreneurs usually enjoy each others company and have a natural
tendency to stick together and help each other out. They should therefore be
willing to cooperate more easily than other actors in the market. This should
make market entry easier. Since minority entrepreneurs are far from home, why
should they not help each other?
Outside-in
The strategic view of outside-in is most commonly referred to as the opposite
of inside-out and the resource-based view. The main theories from this chapter,
Porter’s five forces, the generic competitive strategy and the value chain are all
theories that take the classical causal reasoning-approach to business development.
Even though this is not a direct opposite of the effectual approach we do not feel
that these theories are suited for our model as they are not similar to any of the
core theories of effectuation.
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Inside-out
The strategic view of inside-out on the other hand, has many similarities with the
effectual approach. The resource-based theory has a similar focus as the three
core effectual questions presented by Davidsson (2005): Who am I?, What are
my skills and knowledge? and Who do I know that can help me?. The answer to
these questions are the resources the entrepreneur possesses and should be used
to create dynamic capabilities in addition to a business model and a product that
is valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable as described by Barney (1991).
The network entrepreneur from Burt (1992) bears similarities to the effectual
question who do I know that can help me in addition to the chapter approach to
actors. The network entrepreneur uses his network to build strategic ties and
should according to effectuation form cooperative ties to his competitors and
substitutes in the market.
In combination with effectuation and minority entrepreneurs, a tactic for the net-
work entrepreneur can be to approach people with the same cultural background
since ties are easier formed with nodes that share cultural background. Getting
acceptance into such networks usually goes fast and often brings with it several
new nodes and increase the entrepreneurs’ social capital. Social capital is formed
because minority entrepreneurs feel that other people from their culture are trust-
worthy and hence trust each other sooner. This sense of commonalities and the
common cognitive dimension motivate the minority entrepreneurs to help each
other out.
Exploitation and exploration
Both exploitation and exploration are originally directed towards established com-
panies. There are still similarities with effectuation and strategies for the entre-
preneur to be found in this paradox. Exploitation tactics are to some extent
comparable to Davidsson’s (2005) emerging opportunities. The goal both for ef-
fectuation, exploitation and resource-based theory is to do fewer different activities
but do those you do better.
Exploration on the other hand can be connected to Davidsson’s (2005) managing
the uncertain future. Exploration is aimed to discover new information and know-
ledge in your organization. Through this exploration you will be better prepared
for the future, which is exactly the conclusion made in the effectual approach.
Lean start-up approach
Ries’ (2011) lean start-up approach is perhaps the framework most similar to the
effectual approach of the presented literature. The build-measure-learn cycle is in
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general comparable to the market experimentation process of effectuation. The
leap of faith, to make assumptions before market entry are found both explicitly
in lean and implicitly in effectuation.
Both frameworks recommend entering the marked solely based on what the entre-
preneur already knows. The assumptions are built on the answer to the effectual
question what are my skills and knowledge and not on external information that
needs to be gathered. After the assumptions are made the lean start-up approach
tells the entrepreneur to engage with experimentation and create a minimal viable
product. This is equivalent to what Davidsson (2005) refers to as “managing the
uncertain future” and what March (1991) refers to as exploration.
This process from lean is closely compatible with valuable, rare, inimitable and
non-substitutable resources from inside-out. In this scenario the entrepreneur
should build a minimal viable product that is valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable based on the resources at hand.
The overall lesson is that in both lean and effectuation the entrepreneur should not
use too much resources to plan before he knows how the market functions and how
the initial response is. After market feedback lean recommends the step of “pivot
or persevere”, a step where the entrepreneur decides if he should alter the product
or service based on the market feedback or if the market prefer his proposition
“as-is”. This this is what Davidsson (2005) refers to as emerging opportunities and
is in the start-up context comparable to March’ (1991) exploitation. This process
is referred to as validated learning in lean.
Ries (2011) explicitly recommends that start-ups should not focus on revenue or
profits but rather on perfecting the business model and deal with the revenue
stream when a proper business model and a proper product is in place. Lean
thereby implies bootstrapping and running a financial strategy of dealing with
affordable losses and cutting costs at all corners where it is possible, just as effec-
tuation does.
Business model innovation
Business model innovation covers all the aspects of a business model. The cus-
tomer value proposition will in the effectual setting deal with creating a valuable,
rare, inimitable and non-substitutable minimal viable product based on the re-
sources available to the entrepreneur. The issue of funding and potential returns is
treated by the effectuation theory in what Davidsson (2005) refers to as affordable
losses by suggesting that one should cut the cost structure as much as possible
and evaluate how much you can afford to lose. The revenue model and the mar-
gin model on the other hand is more related to the classical causal approach of
predicting the future and will therefore not be implemented in our model.
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Key resources is handled by all the core effectuation questions: Who am I?, What
are my skills and knowledge? and Who do I know that can help me? Naturally, it
is also related to social capital and the network entrepreneur from the inside-out
perspective since the key resources shall describe how the entrepreneurs social
capital can help with the different processes of the business model. Key resources
are also applicable to the creation of a minimal viable product as this is based on
what the entrepreneur has available. In a pure effectual approach key processes
are not that relevant to map. Instead you rather create the processes needed on a
trial-and-error basis, if anything, you start by building a minimal viable product
and map key processes along the way.
4.8.2 Framework development
In this chapter we have built a model with the elements that we have chosen
in the chapter above based on the effectual framework from Davidsson (2005).
We have chosen to make a model based on what we perceive to be the logical
chronological steps an entrepreneur takes as he follows an effectual approach to
business development and structure the relevant theory accordingly.
4.8.3 The unified model of an effectual approach
Figure 4.6: The unified model of an effectual approach
The model, in figure 4.6 starts with a context assessment where the entrepreneur
shall address which market he operates and is located. Internal resource assess-
ment, with the sub-chapters “What are my internal resources?” and “What am
I willing to invest and risk?” address what the entrepreneur possess of internal
resources. Then the external resource assessment asks who do I know that can
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help me and makes the entrepreneur look for external resources that can help him
out. The execution process that consists of the three elements ready, fire, aim,
follows with how the entrepreneur conducts his in-field approach. We believe
these five modules are a natural separation of the process that should encapsulate
the different relevant theories with ease and be intuitive for the entrepreneur to
follow.
1. Context assessment
Even though it is not mentioned in the literature we believe that every entrepren-
eur on some level starts off with a context assessment. In the context assessment
the entrepreneur asks himself “Where am I and where am I going?”. Initially
this starts off with what industry or market the entrepreneur wants to operate in.
Secondly the entrepreneur needs to address where he is located geographically and
how this would affect him and his potential business. This includes structural,
political and cultural challenges that may arise in his part of the world. Lastly
the entrepreneur needs to make a hypothesis about where he wants to go, why he
wants to operate in this market and what the goals of the start-up are. After this
is addressed the entrepreneur is ready to start with the business development.
2. Internal resource assessment
Internal resource assessment is structured with the two main questions “What
are my internal resources?” and “What am I willing to invest and risk?”. We
have structured it this way because we feel that it is natural for an entrepreneur
to first assess what kind of internal resources he has access to before he makes an
assessment on how much he is willing to invest and risk.
What are my internal resources? Who am I? What are my skills and know-
ledge? How much financial resource do I possess?
In this chapter the resource-based view from inside-out has its natural place as it
deals with what kind of resources the entrepreneur possess. This also applies for
the key resources point from the business model innovation theory. In addition to
this two of the three core questions from Davidsson (2005), who am I and what
are my skills and knowledge, fall into place here.
How much am I willing to invest and risk? We have decided to place
affordable losses here because we believe it is important for the entrepreneur to
decide how much he is willing to invest or potentially lose before he moves on
with his venture.
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3. External Resource Assessment
Who do I know that can help me? In this part of the model the last one of
the three core questions from Davidsson (2005), who do I know that can help me
fits in. The network entrepreneur and social capital from inside-out treats who
the entrepreneur knows and how his relationship to them are, in addition to how
the entrepreneur should build his network and how he puts it to best use. The
effectual approach to actors fits this chapter as it advises the entrepreneur to form
cooperative ties to other similar actors in the market instead of attacking them
head on.
Networking among minority entrepreneurs deals with this as it advises the minor-
ity entrepreneur to form structural ties with fellow entrepreneurs with same cul-
tural background. In such a network the entrepreneur can expect a faster forma-
tion of ties with more trust and help.
4. Execution process
Similar to what is described in the lean start-up framework the execution process
is an iterative process. We use the concept of ready-fire-aim to name the three
parts of this process. The duration the entrepreneur is able to continue and repeat
this process should be defined under the point of affordable losses in the internal
resource assessment.
4a. Ready – Make assumptions and build minimum viable product
The execution process starts with ready. The entrepreneur needs to prepare for
market entry. To do this one does a leap of faith and makes assumptions. This
is why leap of faith from lean start-up is appropriate in this phase. You need to
take a look at what you can put together that will be hard to imitate as described
as valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resources under inside-out.
Lastly you create a minimum viable product to bring into the market. The method
of creating a minimal viable product from lean start-up is therefore suited here.
4b. Fire – Explore the markets
Next phase is to fire and explore the markets. The concept of exploration is
recommended here as it allows the organisation to use a trial-and-error approach.
Further managing the uncertain future from effectuation tells you to go into the
market and embrace the uncertainty ahead. The point of this step is to test your
minimal viable product in the market before you do any more development.
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4c. Aim – Discover, evaluate and pivot
Last phase of the execution process is where you take one step back and reassess
how your fire went. Aim is the last step in the effectual approach. This is where
you take the time to discover emerging opportunities that might have showed up.
Further exploitation strategies tell to improve internal process for better efficiency
and quicker results, in this framework one exploits new knowledge.
The serendipitous events that arise according to the minority entrepreneur liter-
ature should also be addressed in this phase. It is likely that you have met new
customers or suppliers that can help restructure your product. From the lean
start-up perspective it is simply important to consider pivoting or persevering.
Can you continue in the same direction or do you need to pivot somewhere else?
Lastly, be aware of business model innovation, especially if you pivot. The use of
this framework may allow you to improve your market offer significantly.
Repeat
Ready, fire and aim should be repeated continuously just as validated learning
from the lean start-up approach suggests. Every once in a while the entire process
from 1 through 4 should be repeated to assess all the elements as contingencies
arise.
Chapter 5
Story of RESolar
The objective of this chapter is to give the reader a general overview of RESolar’s
journey from the initial business concept origination up until today. Through an
explanation of the happenings and events that lead to RESolar’s establishment in
Kenya, the reader will get the background information needed to understand the
topics that will be brought up in Findings and discussions.
The story of RESolar is divided in five subchapters and the essential happenings
for the development of RESolar are presented chronologically from January 2011
to June 2012.
5.1 Concept development
Development of the project started in January 2011 after Buen and Tangen from
Differ AS originated the idea in 2010. The goal of the project was to provide
electricity to rural areas in developing countries. Extensive amount of market
research on global markets were conducted and it was decided that Africa was
the continent to go for. Several African countries were examined, especially An-
gola, Kenya, Namibia and Nigeria. A plan to sell solar generated electricity to
consumers in rural villages was created. Finally, in late spring 2011, the team
decided to select Kenya and the East-African region as the entry market. The
business concept was to build an organization that developed and built modu-
larized solar power plants based on readily available technology and parts. The
firm should further install and maintain these power plants. Revenue would ar-
rive from sales of electric power to consumers in a mini-grid. We estimated one
mini-grid for each village or town. See appendix B.
After five months RESolar had looked at different possibilities for how to create a
sustainable and robust business model and tried to decide between two different
business models.
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The first model was to sell electricity per kWh through a pre-paid system. In
addition we would receive foreign aid from the Norwegian government and the
carbon quota based clean development program issued by the United Nations.
Figure 5.1: Illustration: Business model alternative one
The alternative model was based on the fact that some countries have open tenders
on villages where the government want electricity installed. We wanted to go into
this process, build power plants and sell them to the government. In many ways
we would be a turnkey contractor. We also considered the opportunity to enter
the aftermarket to provide consulting, service and maintenance.
Figure 5.2: Illustration: Business model alternative two
5.2 Business model innovation
At this point, Thorp and Mundal were to take a summer term at the Norwe-
gian Entrepreneurship program at Boston University. Michelsen was to go to
Kenya and Tanzania to conduct an in-field market research. All three were to
further investigate how RESolar could become a reality. Part of the Norwegian
Entrepreneurship program that Thorp and Mundal participated in also included
continued work with RESolar’s business model. Together with a summer intern,
Vetle Nilsen, they worked to develop a more precise and consistent business plan
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and a business model based on the business model canvas from Osterwalder and
Pigneur (2010).
Going into details on production, scaling, financing and market entry, they dis-
covered several major holes in both the earlier defined business models. Among
several things, the team had little knowledge about building solar power plants,
designing modularized solutions or calculating dimensions of mini-grids. Further
Thorp and Mundal concluded that the financial predictions were weaker than
earlier believed in the consumer market. Evidence showed that it would be diffi-
cult to enforce customer contracts and that solutions for the grid would be subject
to sabotage and illegal connections.
Since we had the opportunity to send Michelsen to visit the market and potential
customers in East Africa, we found this to be an efficient way of learning about
the culture and the market first hand. In Kenya Michelsen concluded much of the
same as Thorp and Mundal. Many of the activities we had planed to do in-house
were marginalized industries with a myriad of suppliers. There would be small
margins to earn from these sectors, only severe competition. By being out in the
field Michelsen saw and realized the complications of the current business model.
When we finally concluded that this market approach was not sensible for us, we
needed to rethink our strategy.
Even though the communication between Boston and Nairobi was challenging, the
two halves of the team actually thought of almost the same new business model
but failed to communicate this to each other. This is how one can describe the
process for the Boston-team. They took a step back and asked: “What is our
competence? What services are actually needed in the Kenyan energy market?
How can we build competitive advantage among established actors?”. Without
knowing it we took an internal resource assessment based on both resource-based
view (Barney, 1991) and the effectual approach (Sarasvathy, 2001a).
We found that our core competencies were in sales and business development. Fur-
thermore we saw that while there were many firms doing solar power plants both
on large and small scale, few were targeting the business-to-business market. In
addition, those targeting business customers, most suppliers used little resources
on sales and marketing. We found that customers in the business segment would
have higher perceived value of solar electricity and that their willingness to pay
would be higher. We concluded that a pivot like this was necessary. RESolar
was still selling renewable energy to electrify rural areas, only now we targeted
business customers with a defined willingness to pay and usage of electricity.
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Figure 5.3: Illustration: The new business model
5.3 The new business model
According to the business literature, we have in retrospect learnt that this is what
is called a business pivot as explained by Ries (2011). The result of the pivot is
that RESolar will reduce electricity costs for customers through energy econom-
ization solutions like solar water heaters and solar power plants. The targeted
customers have diesel generators and are seldom connected to the national power
grid. Primarily will the first customers be found in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda,
and the beachhead customers are off-grid safari camps in Kenya.
The energy products will be sold with a financial solution so that the customer
pays with monthly instalments at a lower price than their current energy bill, until
the loan is paid down. The financial solution is similar to a regular mortgage,
provided by local banks through corporate brokers. RESolar has agreements with
such brokers to reduce risk for RESolar and ease rapid scaling of sales. When the
mortgage is repaid, our customers have reduced energy costs for several years to
come. The goal is to reach a down payment period of three to six years and solar
power plants can be guaranteed for up to 25 years.
To be able to concentrate on the core competencies of sales, energy usage audits
and payment services, RESolar will outsource all other parts of project develop-
ment. This includes technical calculation, design, dimensioning, logistics, con-
struction and installation. Essentially, RESolar fills a gap in the market between
suppliers, loan providers and customers. The market does not provide anything
in between microfinance and major investment loans to our core customers yet.
We believe that there is need for a mediator or middleman between suppliers and
customers and as of now there is no one providing this service.
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5.4 Business development from Norway
Once the team was back in Norway it took some time to get the same cognitive
landscape since we had different views of the situation. After long dialogues and
discussions, we discovered that although we initially seemed to disagree, we found
common ground when we concluded on the same business model.
The fall of 2011 was spent in Trondheim and used to further define the business
model, conducting market research and test the market. We wrote a project thesis
on entrepreneurship and the development of RESolar. We experienced that doing
market research in Africa from Norway gave little relevant value and it were more
a demotivating activity than anything else.
During a discussion in late December we concluded that doing business develop-
ment in Kenya, from Norway, did not give the results we hoped for. After sharing
our mental maps and getting a common understanding of how we perceived the
situation, we looked at what could be affordable losses for us and what would be
the worst-case scenario.
5.5 Market entry in Kenya
Mundal and Michelsen moved to Kenya in the beginning of February 2012. The
first weeks were spent on getting many practicalities under control, find a place
to live, an office space and a car.
We soon realised that we would need a larger network to solve the task that we
had anticipated that we could do ourselves. Luckily several of the persons that we
got to know initially, proved highly helpful and relevant in several aspects. Our
connections put us in contact with customers and also helped us find a financial
partner and an office space. Instead of doing cold calls we were able to book direct
meetings with customers and also conducted an energy audit at a hotel, called
United Kenya Club.
After three weeks Thorp came down for the first time. Most of the practicalities
were in order and with Thorp in Kenya, we could move into our new offices and
start to do business. The processes that Michelsen and Mundal had initiated were
taken to the next level. Meetings were held with our financial partner on how to
construct the financial packages, how to find lenders and we met with potential
customers and competitors.
When Thorp went back to Norway the team went on Easter vacation. After the
holiday we got back to Nairobi and got the news that we had won the Energy
Award 2012 of 50’000 NOK. This was not something that we had planned for, so
the two subsequent weeks got filled with to-dos from forming a web page, writing
press releases and preparing for the award. The workload we had put on ourselves
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proved to be too much and after receiving Energy Award 2012 we lost some of the
motivation and drive. This went on for some weeks with elements of sickness and
low working moral until Thorp came down the second time in the end of May.
In the middle of our stay we realized that we needed more customers in the
pipeline because the sales process with each individual client would take longer
time than expected. The process of getting the suppliers and financial solution
would likewise require more time. Until that time our hands had been full working
with customers that we had been referred to and business colleagues had warned
us that cold calling would never work so we had been reluctant to pick up the
phone.
Getting Thorp down helped the team to get out of the bad spiral, and in the next
couple of days we cold called approximately sixty customers. Out of this cold
calling round we went out to several customers and also conducted energy audits
at two safari camps.
The week before returning to Norway we attended the Karibu Tourism Fair in
Arusha and got in contact with several potential customers and suppliers in Tan-
zania.
Chapter 6
Findings and discussions
In this chapter our findings will be presented, analysed and discussed against the
literature and our model. The discussion chapter is primarily limited to find-
ings from RESolar’s business experiences in Kenya. The time-span of RESolar’s
Kenyan experiences were when action research and research questions were used
and therefore most findings is from this period of time. Still, some episodes are
added from Story of RESolar in chapter 5, since they add significant value to the
discussion. In total, the findings include evidence gathered through one year of
market research, first hand business experiences and interviews with Scandinavian
minority entrepreneurs located in Kenya.
This chapter is structured according to our three research questions, starting with:
How will business development be affected by the fact that we are Western entre-
preneurs?, How has the dynamics in the effectual approach worked for RESolar’s
business development? and What is the role of social capital in creating viable
business relationships?
6.1 Business development for Western entrepreneurs
In this chapter we will discuss the following research question: How will business
development be affected by the fact that we are Western entrepreneurs?
This research question is divided into five sections. First, the aspects considering
that we are minority entrepreneurs and how this affected our business relations
will be discussed. Next we look into the structural challenges of developing a
company in Kenya. Thirdly we will address how the uncertainty that followed
with our situation affected the business development. In the fourth section we
make a remark on the effect of age in Kenya and at last we conclude with some
lessons learned.
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6.1.1 Minority entrepreneurs
Lessons from supplier encounters
As a central part of our strategy for developing RESolar we need to rely on
strategic partners to supply us with products and structure the financial packages.
This process put us in contact with suppliers from East Asia, East Africa and
Northern Europe.
In the initial stages of developing a relationship with a partner there is a lot of
uncertainty and it is common for both parties to be open for an initiation period,
where one learns how to work with one and another. In our Skype talks and
chats with the Asian suppliers the negotiations were polite and positive, but also
challenging and complicated due to miscommunication and trouble understanding
each other.
It was easier to deal with our European suppliers. It did not take more than two
Skype meetings of thirty minutes each with six months in between to engage a
cooperative partnership. No contract has been formed yet but we have a verbal
agreement about them being our supplier, so this relationship builds fully on trust
(Mayer et al., 1995). When you think about the fact that Asantys, a German
renewable energy product supplier, is part owners in one of our competitors, this
partnership becomes even more interesting.
From the very beginning we felt immediate trust and Johannes Germ from As-
antys gladly shared information, technical data and financial numbers of previous
projects with us in our very first Skype meeting. We felt that they really liked the
fact that we as fellow Northern Europeans were going to enter the same market as
they had been in for a little under a year. We believe we had a similar cognitive
landscape with Asantys since they had been in Kenya several times before, and
therefore they did not complain over poor quality with the Skype line. Because
of the shared cognitive landscape, in talks about strategies and market challenges
it were easy to get our points across.
This is spot on regarding what the theory from networks among minority entre-
preneurs suggests (Ramachandran and Shah, 2007). Based on this theory our re-
lationship with the Norwegian renewable energy product supplier GETEK should
have been even easier to manage. Our relationship with GETEK has been good
and they have been a great partner so far. But making ourselves understood and
sharing our experiences with them has been harder than with Asantys. We believe
this to be due to a lower degree of a shared cognitive landscape since GETEK
only has been in Kenya one time before, while Asantys has operated in Kenya for
a while.
However, both GETEK and Asantys have been a pleasure to deal with in com-
parison to our dealings with Chinese suppliers. We have so far only dealt with
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them through email and Skype, but the encounters have been frustrating and we
have had a hard time getting our point across to them. From our point of view
it feels as if they do not quite understand how our customer development works
or how we as a middle man in the market operate. They want the data from our
customers before they are willing to give out product information. When we tell
them that we need product data to test it out on our clients they switch topics.
Another experience is that when they do not understand what we are asking for,
they avoid the question instead of asking for a clarification.
Obviously, the Chinese understand each other and big suppliers know how to do
business. Never the less, we felt the cultural differences first hand when we dealt
with them. The rapport is non-existing, and we believe this to be solely because
of a different foundation of reference. From this finding it is easy to understand
why most minority entrepreneurs choose to do business with fellow countrymen
or people from the same cultural background.
We also felt it fairly difficult to deal with most local Kenyans as their culture
dictates them to avoid initial disappointment, which in turn makes them promise
everything they think you would like to hear. This includes everything from
delivery dates to meeting times.
One example of this was our first meeting with the Norwegian owned hotel Eden
Gardens. The meeting was booked with the Norwegian owners and confirmed
with Maureen the local Kenyan CEO. Maureen did not show up to the meeting,
which was at her own camp. After 15 minutes she called and told us that she
was still held up in another meeting across town and asked if we could wait. We
proposed to meet her at a cafe at her location to save time. This was not a
problem, and she assured us that she would get to the cafe before we could finish
our 20 minute drive. At the cafe we had to wait another 20 minutes before she
showed up. This do happen occasionally in most places of the world, and most
times it is understandable. Had this been a one time thing it would not have been
something we reflected over, but when it happens often, and in most cases involve
local Kenyans a pattern emerges.
We did find exceptions, Michael Musau and Teddy Bukhala from EmAC our
financial supplier have been easy to deal with. They show up on time and are
fairly good at telling us how the actual situation is. Both Musau and Bukhala
are educated in England, and have worked there for several years prior to starting
EmAC in Kenya.
An additional aspect that makes working with Kenyans and Chinese more chal-
lenging than with other business people is the language barrier. When the other
party cannot express themselves fluently, discussions and negotiations are diffi-
cult to conduct. This can sometimes even unconsciously, make both us and the
Kenyan or Chinese counterpart more reluctant to finalize a business deal.
The minority entrepreneur literature tell us that entrepreneurs team up with
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fellow countrymen because of their shared background, we found this to be true.
However we want to emphasize that we believe this to be mostly because they
have the same educational background and a shared cognitive landscape. Local
Kenyans are almost as easy to deal with as British as long as they have a British
education, or have worked in Britain. In the same way, a German partner may
be easier to deal with for a Norwegian actor than a Norwegian partner, as long as
the German partner possesses a more similar cognitive landscape. Same cultural
background is just an easy screening technique for the entrepreneur that comes
natural. This screening technique gives a high success rate of finding people with
the same cognitive landscape with the least amount of effort. It is here important
to mention that skin colour is also a screening technique that is widely used, both
by minority entrepreneurs and by local Kenyans. The historical aspect of previous
British rule with white people in power plays a part here, but another reason for
this is the common belief that no person from the Western hemisphere would
move to Kenya unless he had business to conduct there.
“Being white is an advantage, they believe that you have more knowledge than
them and also that you are Norwegian is an advantage since they think you have
money. As a white guy everyone wants to be associated with you. Local people
befriend you since they hope and believe that something will drip on them.” –
Svein Mork Dahl, the Norwegian entrepreneur
After the initial screening is done we still see a higher degree of trust between
countrymen than between people from different countries. Of course there are
exceptions to this like our relationship with the German supplier Asantys and the
Norwegian supplier GETEK, but in general countrymen almost blindly trust each
other from the beginning. There are several reasons to this. On a business relation
level, you trust the legal framework of your home country and feel that you can
prosecute with your country’s laws should a scam or similar occur. Another thing
is the sense of common nationality that makes you feel at home, a feeling that is
anchored with safety and trust (Ariely, 2008).
In our case we rarely actively reflected on the nationality of people we met, but
after a short while a pattern emerged. We dealt mostly with Western entrepren-
eurs in business and spend our social time with Western people. It is not an action
we chose strategically it just feels right, but this might have limited our horizon.
Lessons from customer encounters
The cultural difference is also present in interactions with customers. We ended
up having a much better relationship and a smoother sales process with Western
run safari camps than other camps. With other Westerners we share the same
reference points and are accustomed to do business in the same way. With a com-
mon ground it is easy to have meaningful and productive conversations, instead
of trying to convince your client that you are not there to steal company secrets.
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The closer the decision makers were to our cultural background, the quicker the
trust was formed and a relationship created.
Cold calling proved to be a success. This was a useful experience for us and
enhanced our knowledge of how customers could and should be approached. When
we conducted our cold calls the relationship between culture and trust was clear
in a quantitative fashion. Thorp and Mundal experienced good response from the
safari camps they called and were able to book several energy audits quite quickly.
Michelsen had poorer response and struggled getting hold of the right persons
and book meetings. When we evaluated these findings we found that Thorp and
Mundal in general had called smaller Western companies, while Michelsen called
larger companies with Kenyan employees and decision makers.
In short, if the person we talked with was from Europe, or had a European heritage
they understood what we had to offer and we got invited for a meeting almost
without a pitch. When we reached Indians a meeting was harder to get and where
we reached Kenyans it was next to impossible. This manifested itself in two ways.
Firstly the bigger the company was, the lower the odds of a European being the
decision maker was. Secondly the big companies either had an Indian or a local
Kenyan that acted as a gatekeeper, which made the booking of meetings much
harder. These results fit the minority entrepreneur literature, as described in the
Literature review, but we still wondered how these findings could be attributed
to a common cultural background.
On a poor quality telephone line it is hard to notice what kind of cultural back-
ground the person on the other side of the line has, but it is usually manageable
to decipher if one pays attention to it. We do believe that the customers notice
how we articulate ourselves and how we present our message. People from differ-
ent places in the world use unlike ways to describe things, and a Western way of
presenting a pitch may seem familiar to a Western client. Another aspect could
be that Western decision makers have an educational background from business.
Business minded people are usually more open to talking to sales people, as they
know that sellers usually tries to provide them with something of value. Laymen
more often perceive a sales call to be one seller trying to get something from him
without providing something valuable in return. We believe that a combination
of these two caused the large variation in the responses to our cold calls, and that
this is consistent with the minority entrepreneur literature.
In the actual meetings and in the energy audits we feelt the effects of minority
entrepreneurs even stronger. All of us have previously worked in sales and we
are used to dealing with customers. When meeting Western customers we felt
a surprisingly strong degree of trust, and could talk with the customers as if we
had known them prior to our initial meeting. The conversations became “in-
formal” in a positive way. It was delightful to chat with people who wanted solar
power to be a part of the solution to protect the environment. All of them had
wanted to be more eco-friendly for a while and actually thanked us profoundly for
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contacting them out of nowhere. This shared cognitive landscape of a cleaner en-
vironment created an even bigger trust than the initial effects of being a minority
entrepreneur had initially created. A type of “us green people against the world”
commonality was formed.
This trust is exemplified well in the case of Leleshwa camp versus Aberdare camp.
Joe Charleson, the british owner of Leleshwa, thanked us for contacting him and
invited us to come and conduct an energy audit without meeting us in advance.
Upon our arrival at his camp Charleson had prepared a complementary lunch and
a luxurious tent for us. He shared all his electricity data openly and we had a
great time through our stay. At Aberdare Philip Nyagah, the local Kenyan CEO,
greeted us when we arrived for our pre-booked energy audit. From the beginning
the conversation was rough and he did not quite understand who we were or what
we were doing there. This made it not only difficult to conduct the energy audit
but also challenging to build trust.
It is worth mentioning that we had the exact same approach to both these actors,
but the outcome was radically different. Nyagah refused to share essential in-
formation about the operations of the camp with us, even though we had made it
perfectly clear to him that we needed this to conduct our complementary energy
audit that he had ordered. It felt like he thought we were industry spies. One
could argue that this could be because Western entrepreneurs just do not know
how much scams there are in this region, and that foreigners are just gullible. The
same sense of unity that we had with Leleshwa, we also shared this with Cottars
Safaris, a camp run by third generation British immigrants.
It is clear that the effects of being a minority entrepreneur are huge when it
comes to dealing with customers. Trust and rapport arose automatically with
customers that had a common cultural background. This is hard to explain it
in any other way than with the networks of trust among minority entrepreneurs
(Ramachandran and Shah, 1999). We believe a sale will be achievable fairly
fast with the Western customers as soon as the entire product is developed in
completion because of this. A sale is an agreement based on trust.
Remarks on the effect of young age
“Being the age you are is a tremendous disadvantage. Especially in Africa where
knowledge and respect come with age.” – Jostein and Gerd Holmedahl, the Nor-
wegian missionaries
We had been anxious to find out how we would be perceived by customers and
partners because of our young age and that it would be hard for us to build trust.
We had heard from colleagues and people operating in Africa that our age would
be a huge disadvantage since respect and knowledge is something that is perceived
to come with age.
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To our surprise we have not felt anything negative regarding the age aspect.
On the contrary we have been treated with more respect and been taken more
seriously in Kenya than in Norway where we are treated as students. This applies
for all settings where we have met other business people, from customers and
suppliers to finance houses and networking events.
One cause might be because Africans had a hard time guessing our age, or since
we dressed up every day and acted professionally. We believe that the main reason
we got the amount of respect that we did is because people think that if you move
down to Kenya for business, you are dedicated and know what you are doing.
Like the Danish entrepreneur Kjelsgaard stated in his interview:
“Being young is not looked at as a good thing, knowledge and experience comes with
age so this doesn’t play in your favour. But Scandinavians have a good reputation
when it comes to agriculture, green tech and technology so people will presume
that you know what you are talking about when it comes to these subjects.”
Lessons learned
When we dealt with people in general in Kenya, whether it was through business
or in a social setting, we felt the positive discrimination of being perceived as
trustworthy instantly.
People we inquired about this told us that this occurs because of the old British
heritage of white people being in power and the assumption that white people are
in Kenya to conduct business. Another aspect is that locals have a reputation of
scamming and fooling people, while Europeans have a reputation of being honest.
In a network setting this means that people more often are willing to refer us to
their partners without doing any due diligence on us. This gives us an ease of
referrals that again builds initial trust before the first meeting. Combine this with
the benefits of having other minority entrepreneurs including you in their network
and you have the recipe for building social capital fast (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
Based on our experience with customers, suppliers and in general doing business
in Kenya we found that being European gives us a competitive advantage when
dealing with other Western entrepreneurs. In the study by Biggs and Shah (2006)
they conclude likewise that minority entrepreneurs have access to networks that
increase performance. This is a big asset as there are many minorities who own
companies in Kenya. However it is important to emphasize yet again that skin
colour is not what gives the advantage. After initial screening it is the Western
background, culture, reference frame, the knowledge, skills and education that
matters. Dark skinned Europeans benefit from the exact same effect. Skin colour
works as a de facto screener in mingling sessions, at cafes, etc. and make an initial
first impression on first contact as there are far more dark skinned Kenyans than
there are white skinned Kenyans.
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6.1.2 How to handle structural challenges?
“The cultural way of thinking is that they never want to give you the bad news.
Even if the roof was to fall down.” – Svein Mork Dahl, the Norwegian entrepreneur
As mentioned earlier, Kenyans have another attitude towards time than West-
erners. “The time isn’t running out, it is running in.” This amounts to local
Kenyans having a hard time keeping appointments and leads us to playing the
waiting game quite often. We had several times gotten reassurances from our local
suppliers and financial partners that the product they were working on should be
finished soon. In the beginning we were naive and believed in their promise, but
eventually learned that to get things done we had to check up on our partners
and put continuous pressure on them. This made it frustrating to deal with locals
and resulted in that we chose to deal more with other minority entrepreneurs who
have the same relation to time as us. Obviously some Kenyans do honour meeting
times, like Musau in EmAC. However, trial and error made us reluctant to initiate
meetings and dealings with locals as we felt they are likely to waste our time. It is
important to mention that many locals felt the same towards the Western minor-
ities. They find it frustrating that Westerners do not take their time but stress
around on a rigid time schedule. This also supports the findings of Ramachandran
and Shah (1999) regarding networks among minority entrepreneurs.
6.1.3 How to live with uncertainty?
“There is definitely higher uncertainty conducting business here than in Scand-
inavia so I wouldn’t recommend people that have a weak stomach to come down
here and start up their venture. The planning horizon is shorter due to the un-
certainty and you demand a premium on your return.” – Johnni Kjelsgaard, the
Danish entrepreneur
Having an effectual approach is all about experimenting in the market. Because we
did not have a clearly defined plan on what to do at all times, we had to make stops
occasionally and evaluate what we had done and how we could plan forward in the
best possible manner based on our learning. We have been working with customer
and product development simultaneously. This includes customers, suppliers and
finance institutions. It has been difficult to complete something tangible with any
of these since the entire work situation has revolved around moving forward in a
stepwise fashion with each process based on the latest development from the other
processes. When the work got tiresome it was easy to let this uncertainty affect
our thoughts regarding our future and what would happen after we graduate. We
were in Kenya and experiencing a harder reality than we expected and comparing
ourselves with friends from class that are going out in stable and well-paid jobs,
this added to the increased sense of uncertainty.
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We did not reflect on the effects uncertainty would have before we moved to
Kenya. As mentioned above this is something we quickly experienced first hand.
We believe that had we read up on theory regarding the effects of living with
uncertainty and how to deal with it beforehand, it would have given us a heads
up, and made us plan for it more thoroughly. Both effectuation and to some degree
lean teaches us that a mindset of experimentation and learning is important, we
interpreted this to more or less mean “everything works out great if you are an
adventurous person”. Lean also teaches us that it is smart to run iterations often,
but in our opinion both the effectuation and lean framework would benefit from
going into this in more detail and link it up to the challenges that arise when living
with uncertainty. As entrepreneurs far from home it is clear that we most likely
feel this more than the average entrepreneur who effectuates in his hometown,
but we still feel that theory regarding this is missing from all the frameworks.
6.2 Dynamics in the effectual approach
In this chapter we will discuss the following research question: How has the
dynamics in the effectual approach worked for RESolars business development?
In this chapter the use of the effectual approach is analyzed and discussed in
regards to how it affected the business development of RESolar. The chapter is
structured after the modules from our model, the findings and relevant theory
are discussed respectively. The model as illustrated in figure 6.1, is presented at
the end of the literature review on page 41 and includes the following modules:
1. Context assessment, 2. Internal resource assessment, 3. External resource
assessment, 4. Execution process with sub-modules 4a. Ready, 4b. Fire and 4c.
Aim.
Figure 6.1: The unified model of an effectual approach
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6.2.1 1. Context assessment
Most entrepreneurs make a subconscious choice of their context in the initial phase
of their venture. Our context was set by two initial premises, firstly we are students
at NTNU School of Entrepreneurship and part of the study programme is to start
our own company. Secondly the concept originators in Differ AS passed on the
idea to sell solar power in developing countries. A refinement of the context was
done through market research. Which developing country would be most suited
for solar power from Norwegian entrepreneurs? Several markets were evaluated,
including Kenya, Angola, Namibia, India, Indonesia and Bangladesh. Kenya was
selected as most suitable due to the limited extent of competition, good conditions
for solar power and a stable business environment with English as an official
language.
For most entrepreneurs choices like this are done without any in-depth evaluation.
Often the context you are in is given by where you are and most often a business
opportunity emerges in a given context. This assessment is rarely done based
on a theoretical consideration. Still, it is important not to forget. Without an
assessment of where you are and where you are going, you are more likely to miss
important information that can help improve your chances of success.
6.2.2 2. Internal resource assessment
There are two parts of the internal resource assessment. The first part is to
consider who you are, what you know and how much you have to spend. In the
second part the entrepreneur needs to actively evaluate how much he can risk.
The best example of where we evaluated what we knew and had to spend was
during the summer of 2011. We discovered that we did not have the skills to
develop an organization that sells electricity per kilowatt-hour to consumers, we
therefore had to reconsider what we were good at. This is when the current plan of
selling power plants to hotels and safari camps arrived. Seen in retrospect this is
obviously an internal resource assessment and so far we can conclude that this was
a smart reflection. It should be clearly noted that it was not actively considered
as an effectual approach at the time. Business model innovation (Johnson et al.,
2008; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) was used actively in this evaluation. We see
that the valuable, rare, inimitable, non-substitutable resources from the resource-
based theory (Barney, 1991) and pivot from the lean start-up approach (Ries,
2011) fit well to this reconsideration.
On several occasions we have considered and reconsidered what we have been will-
ing to loose in the process. This is what Davidsson (2005) calls affordable losses.
As long as we are students we have a personal “revenue stream” from student
loans without obligations or demand of success. This enabled us to develop RES-
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olar as we like with a low burn rate and without demands from investors. Since
we also attend an educational program that is in high demand from the industry,
we felt we took little risk. Without financial risk we afforded to put in 11’000
NOK each as share capital. We also concluded that the experience we gained by
establishing an energy company in Africa, even if it failed, would give us valuable
and marketable experiences.
We concluded that that it would be an affordable loss to spend one semester in
Kenya at our own expense. Since this had a limited cost, we moved to Kenya.
This allowed us to be closer to our customers and evolve the company at a much
greater speed than what would have been possible from Norway. At the same
time the semester in Nairobi would not affect the founders’ alternative careers, if
anything, career options would improve. With the mindset of what we can afford
to lose, we are going to Kenya again when we hand in our master thesis, with the
50’000 NOK we won with the Energy Award 2012.
As described in the findings it has been challenging to retrieve financial numbers
to create sensible business plan calculations. The affordable losses-strategy of
effectuation has allowed us to go out into the market and try. Even though we
have worked towards customers and suppliers for four months, we still do not
have the final numbers. We are testing out a new business model, therefore it
is expected that there are few figures available and that affordable losses as a
strategy is essential.
A problem we discovered with affordable losses is that people do not understand
our strategy. Even experienced entrepreneurs often ask for financial numbers,
some look sternly at us when we after operating for more than a year still do not
have definite financial estimates. So far none of the customers have commented
on this.
6.2.3 3. External resource assessment
In the third phase, who do I know that can help me is to be evaluated. What
resources can we retrieve through others? We knew two companies operating
in the solar business in Kenya before we moved down in February, Asantys and
African Solar Design. We also got in touch with Dahl just before we left from
Norway. In other words, our network in Nairobi before we arrived was limited.
Arriving in Kenya we discovered that it was easier than expected to build a profes-
sional network. Dahl quickly got us in in touch with a possible financial partner,
EmAC. In social settings it turned out to be easy to connect with new nodes
for our network (Burt, 1992). The effect of the network of minority entrepren-
eurs seems to be valid and it were stress-free to connect with other people with
a European or American descent. We also feel a larger degree of trust with act-
ors that share our cultural background. This will be discussed in greater detail
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further down under the research question: “What is the role of social capital in
creating viable business relationships?”
African Solar Design is a Kenya-based specialized renewable energy company. It
provides services and equipment in the renewable energy sector with a focus on
off-grid solar products, supply, installation and auditing. African Solar Design
is a fairly new firm but the American managing director, Mark Hankins has 30
years experience from the solar sector in East Africa.
Davidsson’s (2005) approach to actors pillar in effectuation says you are to figure
out who you should work with to be successful and this is particularly applicable
towards competitors. We never considered going into head-to-head competition
with our competitors. We have been talking with African Solar Design about
this, and have found that we should rather go into co-opetition, simultaneous
cooperation and competition, for instance through a shared installation team.
In this way a market can be created where both companies thrive instead of
destroying for each other. Although the conversations with African Solar Design
have not taken us in final agreements yet, we feel this is the correct approach.
Until any agreements are finalized we have a common understanding of what is
the most beneficial way of conducting business.
One example of the mutual respect in the field is when we later met one of the
employees from African Solar Design at the same Tourism Fair in Tanzania. We
were both targeting the same customers, and when we came to clients that had
been visited by African Solar Design they told us that African Solar Design had
mentioned us in kind words.
6.2.4 4. Execution process
The fourth phase contains three steps: Ready, fire, aim. This process was entered
as we went to Nairobi in February.
6.2.5 4a. Ready
This process was started by making assumptions as suggested in lean and effec-
tuation (Ries et al., 2011; Davidsson, 2005). The assumptions we made were that
we could learn to be a provider of solar power plants in Kenya, and assumed there
would be a market for this. During the summer of 2011, we spent weeks trying to
create a product. This proved to be difficult and it became clear that we needed
to be in the market to create a proper viable product. It seems to be an essential
decision to create a minimum viable product (Ries, 2011), in our case this was
just a limited ouline of the qualities of a solar power plant to bring out to the
customers.
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Through our minimal viable product we discovered several new requirements from
the customers, such as the needs for batteries, what sizes of power plants would
be correct and that a set of three ready-made plants would make it easier to
present and sell. In this way the minimal viable product approach has been
useful, we would not have been able to move as quickly forward and connect with
our customers otherwise. An issue later discovered was that the suppliers not
necessarily understood our approach and therefore did not know how to work
with it.
Further we assumed that technical and financial solutions would not prove to
be a problem since we believed the hard job would be to find and approach the
customers. This has mostly proven to be a correct assumption, but it showed
that for example the financial solution has taken longer to provide than initially
assumed. In the end this do not seem to be a long-term problem and in conclusion
this seems to be a very sensible approach.
6.2.6 4b. Fire
The next step is to fire. Here the entrepreneur is to go out to the customer to
figure out what they need to get feedback. In this process you explore the markets
and this is what effectuation (Davidsson, 2005) refers to as managing uncertainty
and what lean (Ries, 2011) refers to as measure in the validated learning process.
Through talks with suppliers we learned what products and solutions are available.
Likewise, we needed to get to know the needs of the customers through customer
meetings. With this we found the need for on-grid solutions in addition to the
most interesting off-grid solutions. Working with data from customers together
with our suppliers it became clear that solar power plants actually could make
cheaper electricity compared to the national electricity provider, KPLC.
The important part of the fire-step is to continually improve your product espe-
cially before you have sold anything. This is can be done in collaboration between
you and your customers and suppliers.
6.2.7 4c. Aim
The third and last step, aim, can be described by three keywords, discover, eval-
uate and pivot. In effectuation (Davidsson, 2005) this is emerging opportunities
and in lean (Ries, 2011) this is learn in the validated learning process.
How did RESolar use serendipitous encounters (Harris and Wheeler, 2005)? One
example is Dahl. We connected with him almost by chance and he has been
one of our most helpful connections. Dahl has provided us with help in many
ways including key insights to the market. One could say that Dahl is the classic
network entrepreneur and therefore wants to be found. Network entrepreneurs
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has to connect with others to get business, and is hence represented numerous
places, so that he is easy to find by a serendipitous encounter.
How important are these encounters? They have proven to be very important, it
seems like entrepreneurs like us are dependent on such encounters and the ability
to exploit them. If one constantly keep looking for such encounters you will find
them more often. In a market such as the Kenyan if you look for other minority
entrepreneurs they will be easy to find and connect to.
When doing aim and evaluating our approach we discovered that the large hotel
chains in Kenya generally were operated by large organizations, and mostly pop-
ulated by Indians and Kenyans. As discussed above in the minority entrepreneur
chapter, these are more challenging to get through to. The sales process in a large
organisation is a lot more time consuming than in smaller organisations.
What effect have RESolar’s business model innovation had in East Africa? We
used the business model innovation strategy during the summer of 2011 and found
a hole in the market as a middleman providing financial solutions. This allows us
to focus on sales, our most important core activity. This differentiates us from
our competitors and suppliers that mostly work on technical development. We
only work towards sales and care only for what the customer needs and how to
get them to buy from us.
One of the reasons we discovered business model innovation was that it was part
of our curriculum at university. It is highly unlikely that we would have been able
to use such a structured process on RESolar by chance. We found our pivot as
described by Ries (2011) because we really needed to figure out what to do and
where to go. While doing the market research in the spring of 2011 we learned
several theories on entrepreneurship that allowed us to better plan what to do
later on. Our experience is that a structured effort on reviewing and developing
your business model through the theories presented here is recommendable. In
many ways the business model innovation process is what affected RESolar the
most during 2011.
6.2.8 Concluding discussion on the effectual approach
How were the dynamic between causation and effectuation? Before market entry
we did not have a proper product, but an idea that off-grid Kenyan safari camps
and hotels in general wanted to switch their diesel generators for solar power
plants, both to reduce costs and to be able to market themselves as eco-friendly.
This proved to be a correct assumption and was exactly what the customer
wanted. This possibly proves both that we did our research properly and that we
were correct not to spend too much time before testing the product in the market.
According to the theory presented this is precisely what should be done and it
worked!
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This does not mean we have not tried elements from causation. When we conduc-
ted market research from Norway and partly from Boston we worked on creating
a business plan. This was a causal approach that did not give the desired result.
The elements of causation fit better together with an exploitation strategy, when
the company works to improve current processes. An affordable losses-approach
was also better than to calculate the traditional “hockey stick chart”. Especially
since we are students on student loans that can afford to try, “without risk”.
A final remark on the effectual approach is that effectuation is not the same as
running around as a headless chicken, some level of plans needs to be in place.
A set of goals and an idea of how to get there is usually sufficient. We found
that it has been cheaper and more effective to go to the market for a while to
talk directly with the customers, than to go back and forth several times. This
holds true even though we have complimentary office space, phone and access to
support services at NTNU. An effectual approach works very well as long as one
is prepared for the element of uncertainty.
6.3 The role of social capital
In this chapter we will discuss the following research question: What is the role
of social capital in creating viable business relationships?
This chapter strives to give an account of how social capital is used to create viable
business relationships in the East African context. This is done by assessing three
business relationships with actors in Kenya and discuss how we use social capital
towards them and how they use social capital themselves.
Relationships with other actors are crucial in all aspects of business life. In East
Africa where the market is less transparent and open than for instance the Norwe-
gian market social capital is essential for developing such relationships. Relevant
for this discussion is module 2 of the effectual model presented in the Literature
review. This includes Davidsson’s (2005) effectual topics who do I know that can
help me and approach to actors, Burt’s (1992) network entrepreneur and networks
of minority entrepreneurs.
Even though we have drawn great advantage of the social capital from our concept
originators in Differ AS we will not focus on the role social capital has played for
us in Norway, but how social capital has played a role for us in East-Africa. We
present three key contacts that have had an important impact on our research and
business development and discuss how they relate to the theory, one subject at
the time. The three contacts are two individuals and one company. First, Mark
Curtis; a Canadian professor, then Svein Mork Dahl; Norwegian entrepreneur and
lastly, EmAC; RESolars financial partner.
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6.3.1 From a social to a business relationship
Curtis is a retired professor from McGill University and has worked for UNEP in
Kenya for several years, therefore he is familiar with the different aspects of the
“green sector” and what have happened in this field the last couple of years and
who the important actors are. We met Curtis in a social setting and started to
chat over a couple of beers. As he took great interest in our project, he said it
straight out that he wanted to help us:
“In the end it is not what you know, but who you know. Knowing the right people
is extremely important and that is the best door opener for getting any where in
a country like Kenya. I would love to help as much as possible so setting you in
contact with the people I know is the least I can do.” – Mark Curtis, the Canadian
professor
Curtis introduced us to a professor from Kenyatta University, Michael Koech.
Koech was Kenya’s UNEP ambassador and this is how they got to know each
other. Koech liked the idea of RESolar and introduced us to the hotel United
Kenya Club, where he sits in the board of directors. When Koech recommended us
to the General Manager we got a meeting a week later. Without this introduction
we do not think it would be possible to get that meeting.
This is one example of how unclear the border between “businesses and pleasure”
is. You can spend time socially with someone and suddenly you end up talking
business. Like in a workplace you end up talking about work, as this is a common
denominator on similar basis as talking about the weather.
To cite the theory “It appears to be important to be prepared to connect to new
nodes at all times. Harris and Wheeler’s study show that new relationships can
arrive rather randomly. “In all the relationships rooted in social activity, whether
business related or not, a relationship developed to some degree, without any idea
of the business exchanges that may or may not subsequently take place.” (Harris
and Wheeler, 2005).” You always bring your business cards and are ready to pitch
your project to anyone anywhere. It might be a new customer or investor.
As the minority entrepreneur theory indicates, we found that connecting with
Westerners were easier than to connect with people of non-Western background.
To our understanding Curtis quickly trusted us enough to introduce us to others
in his network. Had we been local Kenyans Curtis most likely would not have
felt the same connection he did towards us as another minority. This proves how
networks of minority entrepreneurs can be easy to enter if you get to know one
node in such a network.
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6.3.2 From a business to a social relationship
Before going to Kenya we came across a Norwegian entrepreneur that was estab-
lishing an incubator in Nairobi and when arriving in Nairobi he was among the
few contacts we had. We came across his name when looking for an incubator in
Nairobi. Dahl has been involved in several business ventures in Nairobi during
his four years there. The story of how we got to know Dahl is the exact opposite
of the one with Curtis. Initially we contacted him for help with sorting out prac-
ticalities like office space, visas and to find a place to live. We met him for dinner
on a few occasions and after some time, our relationship with Dahl changed from
a pure business relation to a more social and friend-like one.
Due to Dahl’s know-how of the Kenyan business sector he has become our sparring
partner in several matters for instance how to establish RESolar, where to find
finance and suppliers and establish business relationships.
Dahl is a prime example of a network entrepreneur as Burt describes them (Burt,
1992). His business model is to map an untransparent market and be a node
between different nodes in a complex market. He has a large network, and gathers
information and opportunities and looks for where he can create synergies by
connecting people. He is good at exploiting strength of weak ties and continually
looks for structural holes. One example is how he has seen the hole in the market
that Innovation Norway and Norad does not cover for Norwegian start-ups. He
works to establish a matchmaking program that connects Innovation Norway,
Norad and start-ups, where he is the connecting node.
Minority entrepreneurs tend to stick together because they enjoy each others
company. We ended up being friends with Dahl, without reflecting about it. Even
though we knew the literature, we ended up spending our spare time with people
with similar cultural backgrounds. The more similar background, the tighter the
social ties are and this transmits into business life. We did not do this on purpose,
it was simply more comfortable to speak both business and socially with people
from the same cultural background. Surrounded by new and challenging markets
it is a nice break to speak Norwegian once in a while and feel a link back home.
Together with Dahl and other Norwegians we feel that we have a lot in common.
This also leads to easier business discussions. You can small talk about Norway
and you feel a stronger connection. This builds social capital for you towards
other Norwegians. Through being a minority the entrepreneur has extra social
capital especially when working with countrymen without any additional effort.
It is a lot easier for both parties to deal with a countryman than others.
Furthermore, Westerners and Indians still employ several positions of power in
the East African marketplace and there is an elite network that can be entered
on a cultural basis. A Norwegian entrepreneur will quickly connect to other
Norwegians and be accepted and incorporated to existing network structures.
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This makes market entry less stressful than one should think and surprisingly,
easier for minority entrepreneurs than it is for local entrepreneurs.
We would not be without all the knowledge and stories we have learnt from Dahl
in informal settings like dinners. Through this exchange of experiences, we learned
to know the market and culture quicker than what we think would be possible
otherwise.
To efficiently build a network you need to be aware that you meet business people
everywhere and in another way than at home. Also, almost all foreigners are in
Kenya to do business and they want to network.
6.3.3 Network-sourced relationships
It was Dahl that linked us up with our now current financial supplier Emerging
Capital Africa (EmAC). Since we had been referred to EmAC through Dahl we
did not feel that we had to do any further due diligence. We took it for granted
that they were reliable and that we could trust them. EmAC is led by a Kenyan
businessman, Michael Musau who has long experience from the financial sector
and banking. Arriving four years before us, Dahl was in the same shoes as us.
Finding trustworthy persons was one of his struggles. Dahl had to get to know
Musau over a time period to be certain that Musau were a reliable and trustworthy
businessman before they went into a partnership.
EmAC has proved a valuable connection. They have searched through their net-
work and also gone outside of their network to find potential investment companies
that can finance loans to RESolar’s customers. Even though they know the mar-
ket well, this has been a time-consuming process. Our conclusion is that they have
saved us much time and effort, and it has been the correct decision to outsource
this. We believe that since we were connected through Dahl, they have considered
our business more seriously and conducted this work more thoroughly and quicker
than what they would have done if we had contacted EmAC on our own.
Also Musau and EmAC use the network entrepreneur (Burt, 1992) as a busi-
ness model. They connect businesses that need financing with capital and ex-
ploits through bridging holes in companies’ networks. Regarding RESolar they
have filled the structural hole towards capital available to Kenyan customers. A
“structural-hole-filler” is an even more important role in Kenyan business net-
works, as the market is less transparent and comprehensible than Western mar-
kets. This means that new entrepreneurs should look for such network entrepren-
eurs and use them actively. This will speed up the business development process
immensely and give enormous value to the founder. In markets based on trust,
such network entrepreneurs can also help to find people you can trust, through
referrals. They can both vouch for other actors and vouch for you to others.
6.3. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 69
An example of where EmAC did this is when they introduced us to a venture
capitalist that was looking for investments in renewable energy. We believe it is
the social capital we share with EmAC that makes them trust us and present such
opportunities.
6.3.4 Lessons learned
Social capital and a broad network is a key factor to success for every entrepreneur
and it is even more essential in such untransparent markets like East Africa. Es-
pecially for minority entrepreneurs solid networks are crucial to gain competitive
advantage. The networks opens opportunities and give help for how to navigate
and operate in this foreign market. This type of network actively uses its nodes,
which in turn makes it an even greater asset.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and implications
7.1 Conclusions
Through the discussion we have seen that an effectual approach to business devel-
opment is well suited in unknown markets. The effectual model that is presented
in this thesis has enabled the case company to evolve in the Kenyan context in a
sensible manner. Our suggestion to other entrepreneurs in a similar situation is to
utilize a similar approach. Further we feel that the theories that are presented in
the Literature review fit well together in the unified model. The combination of
different perspectives creates a versatile model that is an excellent basis for entry
into a new market and we conclude that our approach has been correct for us.
The notion of social capital is extremely important to the entrepreneur in un-
transparent markets such as in East Africa. Even more than anywhere else since
it is necessary to have a network of people that can help you move your business
forward. To other entrepreneurs we strongly recommend to be ready to spend
enough time to connect with potential nodes for your network, especially people
with the same cultural background. We experienced that this was as important
as sales and product development efforts.
An efficient way to build network can be to connect to network entrepreneurs.
In a market such as the Kenyan the presence of business people like this seems
frequent. If one can connect to them and make them keep you in mind in their
business, you may have a large network of weak ties overnight.
To build up a business in Kenya as a minority entrepreneur is a challenging pro-
cess. We enjoyed an advantage due to our Norwegian origins, and as a minority
it has proven easier than expected to connect to other minorities in this market.
The theory of minority entrepreneurs seems correct and would be important to
other entrepreneurs as well. If you are headed for a market where you will be a
minority, make sure to be aware of networks of minority entrepreneurs. We con-
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clude that we benefit from our Western cultural background when doing business
in East Africa.
7.2 Implications for practitioners
We found several practical implications for actors connected to entrepreneurship
in Kenya. First we will present practical implications for the entrepreneur, then
implications for policy-makers.
7.2.1 Cultural differences in the sales process
One of the things we noticed in our sales process was the big gap in customer
response based on their cultural background. While we got a head start with the
Western clients, reaching through to the Indians were harder and even more so to
the local Kenyans. As we stated in the Findings and discussions, we credit this
to the cultural differences. Any Western entrepreneur needs to address this issue
before he enters the East African market.
We did not address this issue before we moved down and neither reflected on
it until our last cold calling session in June. After reflecting on this finding we
took the easy way out and decided not to approach customers with different
cultural background. Although this is an option for other entrepreneurs as well,
it is obviously not a good option. We do not have a definite solution for how to
approach the local customers the best. Two alternatives we are going to try out
are actively learning the culture and the local way of doing sales, in addition to
hiring local sales people.
7.2.2 Uncertainty in business development
East Africa is an uncertain market that may change quickly. The effectual ap-
proach we chose turned out to add to this uncertainty, and including the uncertain
work environment like this can easily make the work process inefficient. At times
were we a frustrated team that did not perform at its best. Looking back the best
for the team would have been to be stricter on having regular evaluation meetings
with all team members, and made specific plans with a shorter time frame. When
the environment changes rapidly it is important to keep all team members up to
date to make sure everyone works in the same direction. It might be wise to have
an external partner or an advisory board to follow up and help you to keep on
track.
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7.2.3 Issues with infrastructure
Our team use a plethora of different Internet based services to develop the business
and research for the master thesis, such services require fast and reliable Internet
connections. Seen in retrospect it might not surprise anyone that Kenya as a
developing country, does not allow the same stability of service that we are used
to from home. We did not take this into account before we went to Kenya and
after a while it became clear that a change of tools were necessary. We recommend
that other entrepreneurs prepare to take a technological step backward and plan
for more face-to-face meetings. Additionally when you plan meetings be aware
both of a different cultural relation to time and that traffic is an accepted reason
to be late for meetings. We recommend always to bring work to meetings so that
one never risks being idle while waiting.
7.2.4 Student entrepreneurs
At the same time as completing our master studies we have also started RES-
olar. This has given us some advantages as we are used to bootstrapping, limited
budgets and that we have stable income through our student loans, regardless of
where we are or what we are doing alongside our studies. This makes the approach
of effectuation and affordable losses suitable and controllable for us. A full time
job is rarely an option for students alongside their studies, the opportunity cost
of a start-up is therefore fairly low. These factors all ensure that a student is in
a unique position with spare time, a secure income and a given timeframe before
graduation where he can experiment in the market without any substantial risk.
Based on this we conclude that not only is the effectual approach an excellent
framework for student entrepreneurs, but that students are in a unique position
and should use it for entrepreneurship.
7.2.5 Suggestions to improve the Norwegian support systems
On several levels we have been unable to attract governmental support from Nor-
way. The organizations that provide government grants leave us between two
stools. Innovation Norway mostly works towards innovators operating in Norway.
Norad and Norfund can only help large companies, Norad requires that companies
has more than 10 million NOK in revenue before applying for grants. Historically
one has seen that new companies are better to discover and make the most of
new opportunities. Given the assumption that the Norwegian government would
be interested in supporting Norwegian business initiatives abroad, it would be
appropriate to suggest possible improvements.
We believe that the current structure of government grants may not be the best
way to get Norwegian businesses into world markets. It should be possible for
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entrepreneurs with projects based on business model innovation to attract a gov-
ernment grant, also if they work directly towards foreign markets.
Another aspect where a better support system would have been appreciated is in
relation to registering a company in foreign markets. Registering a company in
Kenya requires detailed knowledge of the rules and paperwork to be done to get
through the bureaucratic process. We first approached the Norwegian embassy for
guidance, but here there was no help to get for Norwegian businesses. Instead we
chose to use a service from the private market for this to ensure that we would not
get into any trouble or dead ends. We have experienced that to use professional
business brokers is an approach that most of the foreign entrepreneurs apply to
register their companies in Kenya.
For instance the Canadian and Spanish embassies have much better support sys-
tems for Canadian and Spanish businesses. According to employees at the Spanish
embassy, they help both entrepreneurs and larger companies to establish business
in Kenya. For a while we did consider to move to Uganda instead of Kenya.
In Uganda the Norwegian embassy and NHO (The Confederation of Norwegian
Enterprise) cooperate and have a support system for the entrepreneurs, and in
Kampala there is even a Norwegian business incubator, Norway House.
We have met many competent and helpful people in the instances mentioned
above, that were unable to help us mainly because of the system and specific
guidelines from the governmental program. We also see similar services and insti-
tutions working out very well for other countries, and even Norwegian embassies
working well with businesses in other countries.
We therefore believe that a revision of the current governmental programs and
their operations are necessary if Norwegian business presence is to be a gov-
ernmental goal. This includes funding for SMEs and start-ups, not only large
corporations, a business service to help Norwegian companies establish their firm
abroad, a more extensive collaboration with NHO or outsource these services to
private actors that has local knowledge, experience and passion.
Chapter 8
Further research
Some of the areas we have researched and discussed in this thesis are poorly
covered by the current research literature. This chapter summarizes the sugges-
tions we have for further research.
The direst need for further research is an evaluation of how entrepreneurs handle
the uncertainty that arise with an effectual approach to business development.
We have found no in-depth mentions of how to cope with the enormous amount
of uncertainty entrepreneurs in emerging markets experience. No studies of the
psychological aspect of business development with effectuation were found either.
How is the entrepreneur affected by an effectual approach opposed to a causal
approach? The effectual model will have increased value if more advices on per-
sonal challenges for the entrepreneur are added. Our belief is that this will better
prepare the entrepreneur for the way ahead.
The subject of minority entrepreneurs is to the extent of our knowledge also a
limited researched subject. Some research are available especially on the effects
of Asian minority entrepreneurs around the world, one discussion of this is found
in Granovetter (1995). We experienced some of these effects, but the networks of
Western minority entrepreneurs are set up slightly different. Also the networks we
have connected with provide a different kind of support than what the literature
describes as common in Asian minority-networks. Studies on how immigrants
from Western countries flock together in Africa will be interesting to read. What
mechanisms provide foundation for these networks? How does such networks
work, what output do they create and how can an aspiring entrepreneur enter
them?
Another suggestion for further research are more studies on what it is like to be
a minority entrepreneur. We have done initial research on the first phases of a
start-up. Still there are several aspects and phases of entrepreneurship that we
have not experienced. Both the minority entrepreneur literature and effectuation
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will benefit from more practical case studies on this form of entrepreneurship.
Longitudinal multi-case studies, which follow start-ups from beginning to end,
will be interesting to evaluate success criteria for minority entrepreneurs and an
effectual approach. With such data from longitudinal studies it will be possible
to create a comprehensive guide to the entrepreneur in foreign markets.
Lastly, and as a run-up to a larger study as suggested above, another study based
on how our unified effectual model works in a start-up would be interesting. If
other entrepreneurs can confirm the value of this effectual approach in real life,
this will bring value to the entrepreneurship community in general. We find the
effectual approach a good basis to establish a company in foreign markets. A
more detailed guide for entrepreneurs will therefore be useful for others.
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Appendix A
Interviews with entrepreneurs
A.1 Interview with Svein Mork Dahl
Company development in Kenya
How did you plan your company establishment before arriving in Kenya?
I did not plan my company establishment. I came down with the NGO ARC-aid
and worked for them in Kenya and true this work I went back and forth for and
1.5 year. After this period I did not want to leave. It was good to have some
connections before trying on my own.
What did you experience when you arrived in Kenya, compared to your
plan? The first thing people discover is that they need to redo their business
plan. This is especially true for businesses and NGOs that targets the people living
on the bottom of the pyramid (BOP), since nothing works as you think from home.
Here in Kenya you do not have a one-stop-shop like Brønnøysundregistrene that
we have in Norway. In Kenya permits and registration processes are done through
several instances and can be difficult and complex.
As Norwegian entrepreneurs how do RESolar go forward with founding
a company? I always use a lawyer to set up a company and recommend others
doing the same. If a customer requires that we use an international registered and
known law firm I use Piper, otherwise I use local lawyers. In East African is Kenya
defiantly the best country to conduct business in. The neighbouring countries like
Tanzania are harder to do business in. It is a lot of bureaucracy, lots of red tape
and less transparent. Kenya has today 47 ministries, but that will be reduced to
22 after elections and that will improve the red tape and bureaucratic dilemmas.
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What specific challenges would RESolar meet that is worth mention-
ing? One central issue that is challenging is to get hold of people. They do
not return calls and do not reply to emails. People are not used to have access
to Internet and it is unnatural to relate to it. It is better to call in that case if
they pick up the phone they need to do it then and there, if not, they will just
postpone it. Often folks just check email in the morning and not for the rest of
the day and it often gets “forgotten”, and they do not have to do anything about
it. Only professionals have email and use it the way we from the Western world is
accustomed to. For example the Burundi government use only yahoo-email and
this seems unprofessional and shady. For example in Norway you could do the
job yourself to get overview of competition or suppliers, this is almost impossible
to do on your own here, but on the other hand you can get someone to do the
research for you.
Business development in East Africa
How would you recommend others to build their professional and/or
social network in Kenya? Many of the people I have today in my network
have I found through Facebook. I follow discussions and groups and I keep an
eye on likeminded people on what they post and what they write. Francis, my
current secretary I found on Facebook.
The first contact I had with Kenya Investment Authority (KIA) was through their
Facebook page. I started having discussion with the ICT-manager and today he
is a person I meet with regularly and he helps me out.
Social Medias is a good way of getting to know people. If they are not on social
medias I immediately think they have something to hide. Francis and several
others are not on Facebook with their full names because they are afraid that
other people will try to steal their identity.
Even in rural areas people are usually on Facebook at least one time during the
day. When I was in Kenya with the NGO we even used Facebook to conduct
our research. It was an easy way of getting feedback from the people we targeted
since they already used this communication line.
As a white guy everyone wants to be associated with you. This gives a lot of noise
in both positive and negative ways. I find it challenging to establish network,
finding, screening and making sure that the people I link up with are the people
I want to be associated with.
To get things done I use my network, but I try to use official channels primarily.
That is why I use lawyers to that sort of things for me.
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How are you perceived as a Western entrepreneur compared to your
experience of how Kenyan entrepreneurs are perceived? It is probably
easier to do business for me than for Kenyans, people trust me more than a fellow
Kenyan. There are lot of trust issues in Kenya and the locals think that I white
guy is trustworthy.
This is not a good thing since I could do shady business and then just go back to
Norway. The locals find it “easier” to work with white people that haven’t been
in Kenya too long, and for us that have been here to long we are called Kimo.
Kimo means that we have “overstayed” our welcome. That’s because I have learnt
when to lie, what the correct prices are and I know my way around. When doing
business it is important to make sure that the local part understand that I have
been here long enough because they wont try to hassle me that easily.
Being a Western entrepreneur how do you find doing business in Kenya
It is not easy and it’s difficult to get accustomed to a totally new cost structure.
Jokingly says; “I pay more in child support than people earn in a month” Ease
of doing business should not be differentiated on being foreigner or local. For
example it is a lot easier to do business with people in Nairobi than with people
from the rural areas.
In the rural areas people think that everything is for free because of the presence
of NGOs. I have experienced the same with some foreigners that they expect
work to be done for free.
How/what is the easiest/best way to build a network for RESolar? It
will take time and resources to build your network. It is necessary to be present
here, meet the people, and do it over time. You do not necessary have to be
here yourself but you need someone to represent you and maintain local presence.
Things takes a lot more time than you think. Therefore you need more money,
even though it is cheap her. If you want to scale to other countries the systems,
bureaucracy and red tape are completely different.
How do we build a network with content that is useful for RESolar,
and what is that content? Booking meetings are difficult if you are not a
hotshot that everybody wants to have meetings with. The best way to get to
know people is by meeting them at social gatherings, sports events and etc. To
know where these events take place is not easy to know but that is where you
should be present. For example, the event that Mathru hospital arranges every
year is one of these events where you find the whole financial elite of Nairobi.
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Does RESolar receive any benefits as entrepreneurs in Kenya? There
are no big benefits you will receive. As a foreign investor you can achieve be-
nefits. But Kenyans will get the same thing. There are not many benefits from
government either.
How did you perceive us in your network? Your business model is very
interesting and especially the financial part. A lot of my work focuses on these
aspects, finding creative solutions for how to tap into the BOP segment but also
to get into the untapped market between BOP and large-scale operations.
Living with uncertainty
When operating in East Africa, do you find there is much uncertainty?
Yes. As an entrepreneur there are lots of mistakes to be made since you do not
know the culture and market. That is also why you need to take your time and
do the mistakes as cheap as possible. I did a lot of these mistakes while I was
working for ARC-aid, but then it wasn’t my own money I lost. Another aspect is
the culture, the locals never like to give you bad news. Even though the roofs are
falling down they will tell you otherwise. Most of the times my wife has guided
me. She allowed me to learn fast and in this way have reduced the number of
mistakes I could have done.
One central issue in Kenya is the political stability, what do you think
of this and how does this affect you? Yes and no. It affects the people
around me, but not me directly. I hear it all the time from business partners that
“Wait till after the elections”. That is the same situation I have with Norad and
Innovation Norway regarding the matchmaking program we are putting together.
I’m not scared by political violence, but the traffic. More people died last year in
traffic than in post-election violence. Only in Nairobi did over 150 people die last
year in traffic, but I believe the numbers are in there thousands if we include the
people that die after coming to the hospital.
How should we cope with this uncertainty and how can we continue
to develop the business, through political turmoil and change of social
climate? I don’t think there will be any turmoil, maybe some fighting in
Kibera, but that will not impact business. Last time the turmoil lasted less than
a week, 4-5 days.
A.2. INTERVIEW WITH JOHNNI KJELSGAARD 87
A.2 Interview with Johnni Kjelsgaard
Company development in Kenya
How did you plan your company establishment before arriving in Kenya?
I have started over 20 businesses and there hasn’t always been to much planning
behind all of them. Prior the start-up in Kenya I used to be a member of the
student organization ISAC. Together with them I travelled to many countries in-
cluding Uganda and Kenya. This was back in 1998 and I found the region very
interesting with a lot of potential. I talked loosely with some friends that I wanted
to start up businesses here and primarily in the IT sector since I’m bias toward
IT. Through ISAC I had a solid network of resource persons that I could rely on
initially and that helped me find the opportunities. I did not use the embassy for
this purpose.
What did you experience when you arrived in Kenya, compared to your
plan? It was much easier than excepted, less corrupt, less red tape than it was
14 years back. The way to conduct business has been vastly improved so today it
is way more straightforward.
When I first came here it was more of a jungle for finding out how the rules worked.
Now it’s more difficult for the local bureaucrats to hustle a foreigner and now you
can even demand something from them. It has happened sometimes when I come
to some bureaucrats office that instead of me bribing them they literally have a
cake on their desk and they ask me how big slice of the cake I want to buy, of
course the price isn’t 10 shilling a piece but more like 10000. In that way it is
not bribing since I would have bought cake from them. I have always replied that
I’m not hungry or that I don’t want cake. Kenya is defiantly easier to conduct
business in compared to the neighbouring countries. I haven’t personally worked
in Rwanda but I have heard that it is quite strait forward there as well.
As Norwegian entrepreneurs how do RESolar go forward with founding
a company and what specific challenges would RESolar meet that is
worth mentioning? The first time we established a company here in Kenya
we did the whole registration process ourselves, it was very learning full but all
the other times after that we have used business brokers. This is people that have
law degree but the only thing they do is establishing businesses. In this way the
process goes a lot faster and you don’t have struggle with the bureaucracy. I’m
not too concerned with any specific challenges like corruption. As I said prior I
have experienced a lot less corruption than I expected. But of course you should
be aware and prepared that it exists. At the stage RESolar is now I wouldn’t
think too much about it, but if you guys really start to make money that aspect
can become more realistic. You can meet corruption in several ways e.g. that
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other businesspeople with political connections can come and demand some of
your cake and if you don’t give them they will try to squeeze you. Sometimes
these threats can be real other times they are just empty words. A good advice
is to not create too much attention around what you are doing. As we have in
Norway and Denmark with the “Law of Jante”, this exist as much here. It is best
to live a quiet and successful life.
It is also worth mentioning the cultural aspect. There are huge cultural differences
between us Scandinavian and native Kenyans. It’s important to create a strong
corporate culture with rigid systems and good control mechanisms. If a local
person get the opportunity to cheat it is often way to tempting for him/her to
cheat than not to do that. Additionally local persons thrive better under having
strict rules and guidelines to follow. Another aspect one should keep in mind is
which tribe your employees come from. Usually in the big cities like Nairobi tribe
mixture is not a problem since the inhabitants look at themselves as Nairobians
before Kikoyo or Luo. But the further you get out of Nairobi this is something
that can lead to great tension. We have made some mistakes with this e.g. when
we had all the washing people with Luo background and all the one that worked
in the accounting department were Kikuyus. This lead to bad work environment
where they looked at the bad jobs as work for the Luo’s. We didn’t fire anyone
but when new positions opened up we had to mix the tribes.
Business development in East Africa
How would you recommend others to build their professional and/or
social network in Kenya? Getting referrals are as important here and even
more important than in Scandinavia. There is quite an overlap with the social
network and the business network. For Westerns to come to Kenya it is not easy
to get friends and the social network is limited. So often the friends you have and
go out to have a beer with are colleagues.
In the expat community there is possible to have friends like you have back home.
The best way to get a network is to attend as many as possible cocktails and
forums. Everybody uses his or her network for what it is worth so you should
take advantage of it yourself.
The Danish embassy isn’t too helpful so I rarely use them.
How are you perceived as a Western entrepreneur compared to your ex-
perience of how Kenyan entrepreneurs are perceived? There is a slightly
advantage of being white, it is not huge but it is there. Locals presume that the
knowledge you bring has a high degree of quality. For the last two and three
decades Kenyans have experienced a lot of white trash coming in. Africa has a
always drawn upon itself either people that are of the adventurous type or people
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that are running away from something and want to start their life over again. In
the last 10 years Kenya has seen more and more white people coming in with
quality skills, technical backgrounds and business skills. This has improved the
opinion of white people. Kenya has always compared itself to Singapore. When
Kenya got their independence in 1963 Kenya had two times the GDP of Singa-
pore. Today Singapore has ten times the GDP of Kenya. Kenya should do the
same as Singapore did and give all the people that want to come into the country
with a master or PhD a free work permit.
Being a Western entrepreneur how do you find doing business in Kenya
I have good and bad experiences with both and it is difficult to draw any conclu-
sions. If you are not careful you will attract the wrong people even if they are
Westerns or locals.
The only ethnical group I am sceptic of doing business with is the Indian /Asians.
They have very different ethics than us. When we find new partners to work with
we do our due diligence. We check them trough our network and see if any other
have worked with them and can come with insightful information. We also check
the businesses through the court system and see if they have any outstanding
court cases.
How/what is the easiest/best way to build a network for RESolar? I
would attend as many conferences, congresses, fairs etc. that is relevant for the
field of work that you are into. It can be an idea to visit other companies that
do almost the same that you do. I believe that other firms will agree on meeting
you, but you might find it difficult to get any information.
Does RESolar receive any benefits as entrepreneurs in Kenya? Being
young is not looked at as a good thing, knowledge and experience comes with age
so this doesn’t play in your favour.
Scandinavians have a good reputation when it comes to agriculture, green tech
and technology so people would presume that you know what you are talking
about when it comes to these subjects.
Living with uncertainty
When operating in East Africa, do you find there is much uncertainty?
There is definitely higher uncertainty of conducting business here than in Scand-
inavia so I wouldn’t recommend people that don’t have the stomach for it to come
down here and start up their own shop.
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The planning horizon is shorter due to the uncertainty and you demand a premium
on your return.
One central issue in Kenya is the political stability, what do you think
of this and how does this affect you? During the elections there might be
some tensions but I don’t think we will see the same as we saw last time. I think
the politicians got scared when they saw what a little spark could do and that
they weren’t able to control the masses. The politicians are also the ones that are
biggest in business so I hope and think they will not do the same again. They are
not interested in having a country in civil war, this would ruin their businesses.
I neither think we will experience the Arab spring here in Kenya. Even though we
are getting a larger middle class there are still to many uninformed people that
believe everything a politician in suit says.
How should we cope with this uncertainty and how can we continue
to develop the business, through political turmoil and change of social
climate? You should reduce your financial risk, not have all your money
invested here. Take out insurances that guarantees for war and so forth.
A.3 Interview with Jostein and Gerd Holmedahl
This interview is done with the couple Jostein and Gerd Holmedahl. Both of them
have contributed to this interview and filled out details for each other.
Company development in Kenya
How did you plan your company establishment before arriving in Kenya?
Gerd: We went to Ethiopia in 1969 with Scripture Mission and stayed there un-
til 1973 when we had to flee the country because of turmoil that came with the
Communism. Back in Norway Scripture Mission started planning where a new
school and an office for East Africa could be established. Scripture Mission had
its competence on East Africa so the new offices had to be established in this re-
gion. All the countries in East Africa were put under the loop. In Uganda had Idi
Amin ruled the country since 1971 so that was left out of the question. Tanzania
also had a new political regime that made the country unstable. Due to all the
turmoil in east Africa, Kenya was the best option to locate our new office. From
Norway we contacted the people that we knew in Nairobi to start looking out for
potential areas and plots that we could acquire. We also sent down people from
Scripture Mission that knew the city.
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What did you experience when you arrived in Kenya, compared to your
plan? Jostein: We didn’t have any concrete plans for how to start out, but we
were lucky that we knew people there that could help and guide us. At that time
the Norwegian ambassador were of the old admiral sort, he knew what had to be
done and did his job. He believed in our project and that we weren’t just a crazy
religious sect. He stopped suspiciousness from especially Norad people that were
sceptical to us. He personally attended and opened up the school and as he said
to us afterwards: “If you ever run into any kind of trouble come to me and I will
sort it out.”
Jostein: In the 1970s there weren’t a straightforward process of getting the right li-
censees and knowing how to proceed with establishing Scripture Mission in Kenya.
A friend and I spent an awful lot of timing running from office to office. After a
while they started giving us nicknames, for the African man find all white people
similar so my friend they just called the “busy man” and I got “Ni velle yo” which
means the man with the hair straight up. Thirty years back Kenya was the best
place for us to get established in. The situation has improved a lot in East Africa.
With the new constitution in Kenya, I believe Kenya has become a better country
for doing business. There have been some drawbacks since the Englishmen left,
like more dirt and garbage everywhere.
Gerd: Your age group talks about the new Kenya, a country where it shouldn’t
be any corruption. Today compared to our time you have the law on your side.
As Norwegian entrepreneurs how do RESolar go forward with founding
a company Jostein: I would have chosen Kenya to establish myself in if I had
the option today. Tanzania is like a middle-aged country with its laws. Ethiopia
has come a long way after ridding itself of the Communism but I’m still unsure
about them and I haven’t been in Uganda for several years so it is hard to give
them a fair judgment.
Jostein: We did the whole business registration process, if I were to do the same
thing over again I would use brokers. In that way you don’t get any surprises. I
would also recommend that you get a big network as fast as possible since that
can help on all processes. For getting through all the bureaucratic processes I
highly recommend you to have humour, be incorruptible and patience. In this
way you will get to your goal but it might take you longer time first, but in the
long run you will be saved a lot of hassle. We saw it time after time with Norad
that they wanted to cut corners, and in the heat of the moment it is easy to
bribe someone so that whatever needs to be done get fixed immediately instead
of six months later. As fast as you have bribed one person the others will know
about it and its difficult to change the lane you have got yourself in. Gerd: We
have experienced several episodes where we could have chosen the easiest way
out and paid the “premium” price. Looking back I don’t think we would have
gained anything particular in doing in that way. For example, there is a new law
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in Kenya that states that everybody shall get electricity and not pay more than
35000 Ksh for it. We have applied for this and when the guys from KPLC came
over to do the assessments they demanded that we should pay 1.6 million Ksh.
This was an absurd amount of money and we never paid what they demanded.
That’s why we haven’t installed electricity from the grid and have to rely on solar
and wind. We believe that “the power of example” is the strongest in the world
and that is something that we should strive after.
What specific challenges would RESolar meet that is worth mention-
ing? Jostein: I think we have touched on this in the above question. One thing
I can add is that I don’t think the politicians will bother to look at your company
until you get big enough to start getting into the playing field of the big boys.
Business development in East Africa
How would you recommend others to build their professional and/or
social network in Kenya? Jostein: Being white is an advantage, they believe
that you have more knowledge than them and also that you are Norwegian is an
advantage since they think you have money. Local people befriend you since they
hope and believe that it will drip on them. For example, when we were building
our house one day the construction manager came with us into town. Driving by
the market the locals looked at our car and the CM says; “today I will have to
pay more for the fruits since they have seen me in the presence of a white man.
They think that I will have earned more than I do on a regular job”. Locals are
sceptical towards people that are from big nations like America, Russia, Germany
and France because they are afraid of the imperialism. That’s why they have a
more positive attitude towards Norwegians since we are from a small country.
Jostein: When it comes to network we see that it is more important here in Kenya
than in Norway. Having a big network and knowing people in the right places will
open opportunities and also increase the chance for keeping up doors that might
have been closed on you otherwise. Another thing that is more common here than
in Norway is the use of middlemen. You need to know the social structure in firms
and organizations. If you want to talk to Mr. X you have to go through Mr. Y
that knows you and can recommend you is crucial. Gerd: Africans are costumed
with oral transmission and this still plays a crucial role and in some aspects is
trust worthier than a piece of paper. When doing deals it can be a good idea to
have witnesses or middlemen that attend the transaction. In this way if one of
the parts don’t keep their agreement of the deal there will be consequences. Only
challenge here is to have a witness that wont take bribes.
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How are you perceived as a Western entrepreneur compared to your
experience of how Kenyan entrepreneurs are perceived? Jostein: Yes,
this has changed even though there are still advantages of being white these are
getting smaller, which is a good thing.
When we first got to Kenya the British has just left the country 10 years earlier.
Many locals were still not accustomed with white people and when we were stand-
ing in queues they used to stand aside so we could pass them.
Being a Western entrepreneur how do you find doing business in Kenya
Jostein: I don’t feel there are any big differences between these groups. There
is one common thing I believe counts for us all and that is the principal, “you
scratch my back I scratch your back” and finding common grounds.
How/what is the easiest/best way to build a network for RESolar?
Gerd: You should go through connections and start with people that you trust
and build it from there. After my thirty years in Kenya I can honestly say that
there are only three persons that I truly trust. This is sad but a reality that we
are from different cultures and there are some things that is difficult to unite.
We have experienced you, Stain and Erik as very special persons. You listen to
others advices, are humble and down to earth. This is the best way to succeed
and build up your business. We have several horrible examples of how things have
been done the opposite way. Norwegian projects done by Norad where they come
down with the mentality that we know the best and don’t listen to advises. The
worst example is probably with the fisheries in Lake Turkana where they after
three years had emptied the lake for fish.
Does RESolar receive any benefits as entrepreneurs in Kenya? Jostein:
Being the age you are is a tremendous disadvantage. Especially in Africa where
knowledge and respect come with age.
Living with uncertainty
When operating in East Africa, do you find there is much uncertainty?
Gerd: You should be like the Africans and conduct the same way. When you buy
something you pay half of the cost up front. In this way there are incentives for
both of the parties to precede the deal. The seller has the incentives to get the
products or service since there will be more money coming in and the buyer has
already paid half and will pay the rest. You are now living and operating in a
part of the world that is looked upon as a warzone.
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Here in Africa we have never felt that we are the direct aim and the situations
looks always worse from abroad than how they actually are.
One central issue in Kenya is the political stability, what do you think
of this and how does this affect you? Jostein: This does not really affect you
at this stage. Not until you are big enough to start coming up on the politicians
radar will this be something that you have to worry about. There is still political
turmoil but it is less than it used to be. To hedge yourself always know the winners
in the different groups and don’t take unnecessary risks.
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Preface'This"business"plan"was"put"together"in"April"2011"as"a"delivery"in"the"course"TIØ4851"Experts"in"Teamwork"at"NTNU’s"School"of"Entrepreneurship."Analyses"and"calculations"are"based"on"data"from"primary"and"secondary"sources"collected"during"the"feasibility"analysis"and"in"the"period"January"to"March"2011."Primary"sources"are"mainly"interviews"with"academics"and"professionals"in"the"trade."Secondary"sources"are"research"reports"and"other"analysis"carried"out"in"our"focus"areas."We"would"like"to"thank"Line"Hansen,"Brage"Strand,"Olav"Nymoen"and"Martine"Narvhus"for"their"work"on"the"feasibility"analysis"and"the"concept"originators,"Jørund"Buen"and"Kristian"Tangen"for"the"opportunity"to"work"with"them"on"this"project."""Andreas"Michelsen,"Erik"Thorp"and"Stian"Mundal"
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Executive'summary'The"energy"situation"in"Africa"is"critical."Only"15"per"cent"of"the"population"in"rural"areas"of"Sub"Saharan"Africa"has"access"to"electricity"through"a"national"grid"today."Still"the"need"for"electricity"is"dire."Electricity"is"needed"for"lighting,"irrigation,"water"pumps"and"in"factories"and"businesses"to"enhance"productivity."Today"they"use"expensive"solutions"based"on"fossil"fuel,"such"as"diesel"and"kerosene."RESolar"will"reduce"the"costs"of"energy"and"increase"the"supply"of"electricity"through"innovative"modular"based"solar"power"plants."We"will"reduce"cost"in"assembly"and"logistics"massively,"thus"not"only"outperform"fossil"fuels,"but"also"the"solar"solutions"provided"today."These"mini"solar"plants"will"be"sold"to"governments"through"public"tenders."The"estimated"energy"spending"in"the"BOP"market"worldwide"is"351"billion"USD"(2.9"billion"people)."Only"in"Africa"the"estimated"total"energy"market"is"27"billion"USD"(254"million"people)."This"leads"to"the"conclusion"that"there"is"a"considerable"market"available,"and"these"numbers"are"expected"to"rise"significantly"in"the"future.""
"Our"three"most"compelling"competitive"advantages"are"that"we"deliver"five"Full]time"equivalents"without"salary"expenses,"we"are"early"movers"in"a"fast"growing"market"and"that"we"possess"an"extensive"economical"and"technical"network."
"We"will"have"our"first"sale"in"2012,"reach"positive"accumulated"cash"flow"in"2015"and"have"a"total"capital"need"of"approximately"3,3"MNOK."
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Introduction,'team'and'product'
Business'opportunities'“Access"to"electricity"is"a"key"element"in"determining"quality"of"life.”1"Solar"PV"prices"have"declined"by"70"%"the"past"ten"years,"and"are"estimated"to"decline"further."1.6"billion"People"lives"without"access"to"electricity"today.2"The"majority"of"these"people"lives"in"Sub]Saharan"Africa"and"South"East"Asia."Most"of"them"live"in"rural"villages"without"access"to"the"national"power"grid."These"are"the"so"called"“off]grid”"villages."
!“Over!the!next!five!years!emerging!economies!are!expected!to!account!for!over!50%!of!global!
growth!but!only!13%!of!the!increase!in!net!global!public!debt.!Rather!than!rebalancing,!the!
world!economy!in!the!immediate!future!will!skew!even!more!between!a!debtCridden!West!and!
thrifty!East.”3"The"economic"structure"in"the"world"is"changing;"PWC"estimates"that"countries"like"Nigeria"and"Vietnam"will"outdistance"even"China"in"average"annual"real"growth"in"GDP"and"average"annual"GDP"per"capita"growth"from"2009"to"20504."This"shows,"just"like"the"figure"below,"that"Africa"is"becoming"a"key"player"as"well."There"should"no"longer"be"a"question"if"one"should"enter"an"emerging"market"or"not,"but"rather"how"one"is"to"proceed"in"order"to"make"the"most"out"of"the"growing"economy"at"a"reasonable"risk.""
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""1"Off]grid"electricity"for’"developing"countries,"Dr"Alison"Doig,"Berkley"University"]"http://josiah.berkeley.edu/2007Fall/ER200N/Readings/Doig_1999.pdf"2"http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2010/Resources/WDR10]Main]Messages.pdf"3"Three]way"split,"The"Economist"]"http://www.economist.com/node/17677746"4"http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world]2050/pdf/world]in]2050]jan]2011.pdf"
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Vision'Create"a"sustainable"business"by"improving"people’s"life"through"saving"the"environment."
Business'idea'Through"innovative,"modularized"mini"solar"power"plants,"RESolar"will"enable"economic"growth"and"societal"development,"in"addition"to"reducing"energy"related"costs"in"rural"areas,"which"are"off"the"national"power"grid"in"developing"countries."
Team''RESolar"is"a"startup"company"located"in"Trondheim,"Norway."Behind"RESolar"are"Andreas"Michelsen,"Erik"Thorp"and"Stian"Mundal,"students"at"NTNUs"School"of"Entrepreneurship,"and"Jørund"Buen"and"Kristian"Tangen,"founders"of"the"carbon"analysis"and"trading"company"Point"Carbon."Both"Jørund"and"Kristian"has"extensive"knowledge"about"the"environmental"sector,"network"and"deep"understanding"for"doing"business"in"this"segment.""
Jørund'Buen'Expert"on"the"project]based"mechanisms"under"the"Kyoto"Protocol"(Clean"Development"Mechanism"(CDM)"and"Joint"Implementation"(JI))."Has"published"extensively"in"professional"journals"and"books"on"climate"policy"and"politics"as"well"as"the"role"of"policy"instruments"and"politics"in"stimulating"new"renewable"energy"innovation.""
Kristian'Tangen'Has"extensively"knowledge"about"the"international"environment,"energy"and"resource"management"politics"after"working"as"a"researcher"at"Fridtjof"Nansen"Institute"for"7"years."He"sat"as"Director"for"Point"Carbon"since"2002"until"2008"and"had"three"years"after"that"as"senior"expert"in"the"same"company."According"to"the"Norwegian"newspaper"Dagens"Næringsliv,"Point"Carbon"was"acquired"by"Thomson"Reuters"for"approximately"1"billion"NOK"in"2010.5"These"numbers"indicate"that"Jørund"Buen"and"Kristian"Tangen"left"with"approximately"55]80"MNOK"each.""Michelsen,"Mundal"and"Thorp"are"in"the"first"year"in"the"two]year"Masters"program"in"technology"within"entrepreneurship"at"NTNUs"School"of"Entrepreneurship."Andreas"Michelsen"has"a"technical"background"from"geosubjects"and"petroleum"technology"with"specialization"in"Environment"and"Natural"Resources"Engineering."Previously"he"has"contributed"in"the"startup"of"a"tourist"company"in"South"Africa"in"the"summer"of"2010."Stian"Mundal"is"a"civil"engineer"and"has"contributed"in"two"startups"in"Norway."Erik"Thorp"came"from"industrial"economics"and"technology"management"and"has"a"specialization"in"computer"sciences"and"ICT."He"has"worked"as"a"consultant"for"CapGemini."With"the"different"backgrounds"and"experiences"the"members"of"the"team"complement"each"other."Buen"and"Tangen"brings"along"a"lot"of"experience"and"a"track"record."They"give"RESolar"credibility"and"trustworthiness."Michelsen,"Mundal"and"Thorp"are"three"highly"commited"students"with"varying"backgrounds,"a"track"record"of"starting"smaller"companies"and"work"experience.""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""5"http://www.hegnar.no/okonomi/article427690.ece"
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Product'and'Concept'
Product'RESolar"develops"a"modularized"solar"energy"solution"for"use"in"rural"and"remote"areas"with"basis"in"standard"shipping"containers."The"concept"origins"from"the"possibilities"that"arise"from"assembling"all"necessary"parts"of"the"power"plant"in"a"container,"enabling"global"outsourcing"of"the"production,"fast"scaling"and"significantly"reduced"installation"time."Transportation"and"installation"time"and"cost"are"likely"to"be"reduced"from"over"a"month"to"less"than"a"week."Easy"installation"and"logistics,"today"accounting"for"nearly"25%"of"a"solar"power"plant"costs,"greatly"increases"the"profitability"of"our"solution."Ready]to]use"solutions"increase"both"user"friendliness"and"ease"of"maintenance."
 The"term"mini]/micro]grid"describes"a"small"power"grid"that"typically"covers"a"small"geographic"area"and"is"usually"connected"to"a"local"power"source."Once"RESolar"have"installed"the"solar"solution"in"the"village,"houses"will"be"connected"through"an"already"exsisting"grid"or"a"small"grid"will"be"put"up,"connecting"customers"to"the"grid."Nearby"the"power"plant"there"will"be"a"charging"station"where"people"who"does"not"have"electricity"installed"in"their"household"can"come"to"charge"mobile"phones,"lanterns"and"car"batteries,"which"are"used"by"many"households"to"power"up"lighting,"radios"and"TVs"today."
RESolar!focuses!mainly!on!3!areas:!
! Standardization:"Our"solution"must"be"easy"to"assemble"and"scale"well."
! Logistics:"Our"solution"must"be"practical"and"cost"efficient"to"transport."
! Quality:"Our"solution"must"be"durable,"user"friendly"and"able"to"operate"in"harsh"environments"This"will"make"RESolar"the"obvious"choice,"when"time,"quality"and"price"are"the"purchasing"criterias."
Product'Development'RESolar"will"first"develop"a"basic,"standarized"solution"that"can"deliver"approximately"100"kWh"daily,"supplying"an"African"village"of"100"household"with"electricity."This"can"be"delivered"in"2"containers,"one"container"with"the"configuration"of"batteries,"inverters,"controls"and"transformers"and"one"with"PV]modules"and"other"necessary"equipment."A"basic"solution"like"this"scales"easily"by"connecting"several"containers"in"series."With"a"smart"entry"point"in"the"market"we"can"expand"alongside"the"market"when"demand"increases."
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Recent'activities'In"collaboration"with"professors"at"the"Department"of"Electric"Power"Engineering"and"the"Department"of"Engineering"Design"and"Materials"at"NTNU,"we"have"confirmation"that"our"concept"solution"will"work"and"that"the"technical"uncertainties"can"be"solved"within"containers,"considering"size,"weight,"temperature"and"so"on."We"have"put"a"lot"of"effort"in"connecting"with"resourceful"people"at"NTNU"that"can"help"us"out"in"the"development"of"our"concept"and"give"constructive"feedback."Several"of"these"professors"and"associate"professors"have"stated"they"are"willing"to"contribute"in"a"workshop"and/or"in"an"advisory"board.""
WHO' FIELD'OF'STUDY'Marisa"Jackson" Solar"Cell"Materials"Gabriella"Tranell"" Production"of"Ferroalloys"Production"and"Refining"of"Silicon"Solar"Cell"Materials"Fride"Vullum]Bruer" Li]ion"batteries"Otto"Lohne" Materials"science."Extensive"experience"about"the"Solar"industry"Tommy"Fernandes" CEO"Solar"energy"unlimited"Olav"B"Fosso" Head"of"Department"of"Electric"Power"Engineering"Øystein"Ulleberg" Principal"Researcher"at"Institute"for"Energy"Technology""" !
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Product!development!plan!The"table"below"shows"how"RESolar"will"proceed"in"the"prossess"to"develop"the"product."""
DATE' WHAT/WHO' ACHIEVE'25.03.11" In"the"process"of"finding"students"for"writing"project"and"master"thesis"about"RESolar’s"technology"and"international"expansion"
! Department"of"Electric"Power"Engineering"
! Department"of"Engineering"Design"and"Materials"
! African"Studies"
Hopefully"RESolar"can"get"some"students"that"do"more"research"about"the"technology,"logistics,"production"and"also"aspects"concerning"the"African"countries"
11.04.11" Apply"for"NTNU"Discovery" Give"us"financial"resources"to"speed"up"the"development"process"15.04.11" Institute"for"Energy"Technology"(IFE)"]"Øystein"Ulleberg" Help"us"optimize"and"dimension"the"system"04.05.11" Workshop"with"professors"and"other"resource"persons"(see"table"above)" Get"more"precise"feedback"on"our"concept"and"pinpoint"solutions"and"obstacles"09.05.11" 2nd"meeting"with"Scatec"Solar" Discuss"how"a"joint"venture"or"an"alternative"cooperation"can"be"formed,"and"how"both"parts"can"gain"from"it."For"RESolar:"
• Transfer"of"knowledge"
• Suppliers"
• Prices"
• Calculation"models""09.05.11" Suppliers" Assemble"Norwegian"and"international"suppliers"that"can"deliver"the"parts"to"start"building"a"prototype"
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Market'analysis'
Trends'and'Market'size'Since"2005"Western"firms"have"started"to"open"their"eyes"for"the"BOP]market."People"in"developing"countries"living"on"1000]3000$"per"year"constitute"an"enormous"market."Despite"the"limited"buying"power,"there"are"a"tremendous"number"of"potential"buyers."Their"purchasing"power"is"growing"and"both"the"people"themselves,"national"and"global"authorities"see"electricity"as"an"important"means"for"improving"the"living"conditions,"equality"for"women,"education,"building"up"local"industry"and"in"this"way"develop"a"whole"nation."In"the"World"Energy"Outlook]report"published"by"the"UN"and"the"International"Energy"Agency"(IEA)"in"2010,"it"is"clearly"stated"that"to"meet"the"ambitious"target"of"universal"access"to"modern"energy"services"by"2030,"additional"investments"of"756"billion"USD"will"be"needed.6"Throughout"the"developing"world"the"IEA"states"that"73%"of"the"population"has"access"to"electricity"today."Looking"at"Sub]Saharan"Africa"the"number"is"31%"and"in"the"rural"areas"of"Sub]Saharan"Africa"it"is"merely"15%."The"energy"situation"in"Africa"is"critical."Alm’ost"600"million"people"lack"access"to"electricity,"and"the"costs"of"buying"fossil"fuels"are"high."Droughts"have"led"to"reduced"hydro"power"production,"and"countries"which"depend"on"hydro"electricity"resort"to"rationing"of"power"supply"when"drought"strikes."According"to"the"World"Resources"Institute"report"“The"Next"4"Billion”7"the"estimated"energy"spending"in"the"BOP"market"worldwide"is"351"billion"USD"(2,9"billion"people)."Only"in"Africa"the"estimated"total"energy"market"is"27"billion"USD"(254"million"people)."This"leads"to"the"conclusion"that"there"is"a"considerable"market"available,"and"these"numbers"are"expected"to"rise"significantly"in"the"future."
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""6"WEO]2010:"Energy"Poverty"]"How"to"make"modern"energy"access"universal?"]"http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/universal.asp"7"The"Next"4"Billion:"Market"Size"and"Business"Strategy"at"the"Base"of"the"Pyramid"]"http://www.wri.org/publication/the]next]4]billion"
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The"African"continent"is"situated"in"the"”sun]belt”"between"30°N"and"30°S"which"receives"the"most"solar"energy"on"the"planet."This"vast"potential"combined"with"easy"access"to"inhabited"land"areas"indicates"very"promising"possibilities"for"PV"in"Africa.8"Several"projects"and"organizations"funded"from"both"national"and"global"funds"works"towards"giving"all"people"access"to"electricity."A"project"in"Namibia9"has"shown"that"off]grid"solutions"can"be"both"better"and"cheaper"compared"to"expansion"of"the"national"grid."Since"the"market"is"in"the"early"stages"and"solar"energy"is"not"yet"competitive"compared"to"large"scale"on"grid"solutions"like"hydro"power"plants,"FiT"and"other"incentives"are"used"to"make"it"competitive"and"to"encourage"firms"to"invest.""Feed]in]Tariffs"(FiT)"are"successfully"put"in"use"in"industrial"countries"to"promote"the"use"of"Renewable"Energy"Technology"(RET)."Often"developing"countries"sees"the"situation"differently"and"prioritize"otherwise."The"national"grid"is"often"poorly"developed"and"a"large"part"of"the"population"does"not"have"access"to"electricity."According"to"Norwegian"embassies"throughout"Africa,"most"African"governments"starts"or"has"already"established"such"Feed]in]Tariffs."Another"incentive"in"this"market"is"the"use"of"CDM"(Clean"Development"Mechanism)."CDM"rewards"cuts"in"carbon"emissions"or"prevention"of"increased"carbon"emissions"with"monetary"rewards,"and"gives"a"project"like"this"an"economical"boost."CDM"usually"makes"up"for"approximately"10%"of"the"investment"costs"of"a"solar"power"plant."The"World"Bank"fronts"growth"potential"in"markets"with"incentives"like"FiT,"which"makes"them"continuously"better,"while"fossil"fuel"get"more"insecure."This"predicts"a"reduction"in"cost"for"the"solar"power"production"due"to"technological"advances"and"changes"in"the"global"economy."The"price"on"production"of"solar"cells"is"expected"to"decrease"significantly"the"coming"years."The"price"on"the"most"common"substitute,"diesel,"is"varying"and"the"tendency"is"that"it"becomes"more"expensive."This"means"that"solar"energy"could"compete"with"conventional"energy"sources."
“African!countries!are!in!lack!of!electricity!and!this!is!something!that!the!Angolan!government!
is!taking!serious.!There!is!money!in!the!budget!that!will!be!spent!directly!on!renewable!energy!
solutions!and!in!the!next!5!years!will!there!be!built!renewable!energy!solution!contributing!
with!6000!MW.!There!is!an!enormous!market!which!need!good!solutions.!I`m!sure!that!the!firms!
which!have!competitive!solutions!with!good!quality!will!earn!money!in!Africa.”"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""]Jon"Vea,"Ambassador,"Royal"Norwegian"Embassy."" '
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""8"Large]scale"solar"power"plants"]"NORAD"9"EU"and"Namibian"govermnent"in"Tsumkwe,"Namibia"
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SWOT'
'
STRENGTHS"Five"full]time"equivalents"salary]free"Technical"and"economic"network"Agile"and"dynamic"team"Start]up"experience"Extensive"knowledge"of"environmental"sector"Localized"in"Norway’s"main"technology"cluster"Complementary"know]how"in"the"team"
WEAKNESSES"No"technological"competence"in"the"team"]"yet"No"track"record"in"energy"market"Solar"energy"production"only"at"daytime"Lack"of"cultural"experience"in"the"team"
OPPORTUNITIES"Emerging"market"PV"prices"falling"AirCon"and"similar"raises"power"demand"quickly"Growing"consumption"Growing"middle"class"Entry"of"foreign"companies"Diesel"prices"rising"FiT,"CDM"and"other"environmental"subsidies"
THREATS"Someone"exploiting"our"solutions"Large"competitors"Foreign"aid"agencies"PV]modules"are"still"expensive"Expensive"equipment"]"risk"of"theft"Energy"storage"is"expensive"(batteries)"
The'Customer'
User'value'RESolar’s"goal"is"to"provide"access"to"electricity"for"rural"areas."Electricity"has"some"obvious"benefits,"it"will"allow"for"more"activity"after"sunset"and"usage"of"electric"light,"refrigerators,"TVs"and"fans."For"businesses,"electricity"will"also"allow"for"increased"productivity,"through"electric"machinery,"computers"and"other"modern"equipment."Introducing"streetlights"is"often"regarded"as"a"mean"to"reduce"crime."Case"studies"have"also"shown"that"electricity"is"important"in"enabling"women"rights"and"equality."Other"reports"concludes"that"access"to"stable"electricity"after"some"time"leads"to"small"businesses"opening"up"around"town,"building"up"the"local"industry"and"providing"economic"growth."Purchasing"behavior"Various"governmental"plans"for"electrifying"rural"areas"exists"throughout"the"developing"world."One"approach"is"the"one"used"in"Angola."During"the"next"5"years"the"Angolan"government"plans"to"develop"renewable"energy"providing"6000MW."Expanding"the"national"grid"is"not"a"sustainable"solution"due"to"the"costs."They"want"private"investors"to"take"part"in"this"expansion"and"here"international"firms"will"have"the"technological"advantage"in"addition"to"be"backed"up"with"international"funding"sources."The"Angolan"Ministry"of"Environmental"Affairs"have"therefore"done"research"over"which"villages"they"want"electrified"with"different"renewable"solutions."For"every"village"they"want"electrified"they"issue"a"public"tender"and"choose"a"suitable"supplier"through"a"regular"tender"process."The"same"purchasing"behavior"can"also"be"found"in"various"NGOs,"especially"foreign"aid"agencies."History"suggests"they"will"select"villages"and"areas"after"the"same"criteria"as"the"government,"but"might"choose"suppliers"differently."
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Purchasing"criteria"
• Reasonable"investment"costs"
• Easy"and/or"cheap"to"maintain"
• Price"and"efficiency"need"to"be"competitive"with"other"available"energy"forms."
• Proof"that"we"can"deliver"and"proof"of"quality.""
Competitive'technologies,'competitors'and'substitutes.'This"is"an"international"market"so"we"know"there"are"both"competitors"and"substitutes"from"all"corners"of"the"world."We"will,"based"on"the"complexity"and"size"of"the"industry,"not"present"a"list"of"competitors,"but"just"clarify"that"they"exist,"what"technologies"are"used,"substitutes"and"other"indirect"competitors"that"we"have"to"be"aware"of."A"list"of"competitors"could"just"as"easily"be"misleading."As"a"small"player"it"is"therefore"important"to"choose"countries"where"we"can"have"an"advantage"relative"to"the"others."In"our"criterias"for"selecting"countries"we"emphasize"the"importance"of"Norwegian"presence"(Foreign"Aid,"Embassy,"NGOs,"etc.)"that"can"give"us"goodwill"and"reduce"the"number"of"potential"competitors."In"the"list"below"are"the"most"prominent"Norwegian,"and"some"international,"competitors"and"substitutes:"" '
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Most'common'offTgrid'energy'sources'
FORMS'OF'
RENEWABLE'
ENERGY'" PROS" CONS' COMPETITORS'Solar" Sunlight"is"free"when"available."Costs"are"dropping."An"increasing"trend"in"the"market."A"heavily"researched"area."
Limited"to"sunny"areas"throughout"the"world."Current"technology"requires"large"amounts"of"land"for"small"amounts"of"energy"generation."Still"quite"expensive"compared"to"some"alternatives."
Scatec"Getek"REC"Solar"E+Co"NGO`s"
" " " Substitutes'Hydro" Very"inexpensive"once"dam"is"built."Government"has"invested"heavily"in"building"dams,"particularly"in"the"Western"U.S."
Limited"source"since"depends"on"water"elevation."Many"plants"already"built."Dams"have"affected"fish"(e.g."salmon"runs)."
Rainpower"Minipower"SN"Power"Trønderenergi"
Wind"" Wind"is"proving"to"be"a"reasonable"cost"renewable"source."Generation"and"maintenance"costs"have"decreased"significantly.""
Need"3x"the"amount"of"installed"generation"to"meet"demand."Limited"to"small"generator"size;"need"many"towers."Highly"climate"dependent"]"wind"can"damage"equipment"during"windstorms"or"not"turn"during"still"summer"days."Reliability."Investment"cost."
GE"Energy"Statoil"Hywind"Sway"Vestas"
Bio"fuel" Industry"in"its"infancy."Could"create"jobs"because"smaller"plants"would"be"used."
Inefficient"if"small"plants"are"used."Could"be"significant"contributor"to"global"warming"because"fuel"has"low"heat"content."Limited"access"to"fuel."
Biofuel"Energy"Corporation"Umoe"BioEnergy""
Diesel" Low"investment"cost."Easy"accessible"fuel."“Everyone”"can"fix"a"diesel"aggregator."
High"and"unpredictable"O&M]costs."Pollution."Depends"on"diesel"availability."
"
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Milestones'
Product'Q2"2011"Product"design"workshop""Q4"2011"Basic"solution"prototype"]"design"finalized"and"ready"to"build"Q3"2012"Refurbished"version"of"product"
Market'Q3"2011"Define"entry"region"and"country"Q3"2011"Participate"in"Africa"Carbon"Forum"Q3"2011"Attract"media"coverage"Q3"2011"Feasibility"study"in"entry"country"Q3"2011"Stand"at"“Energi"for"verdens"fattigste”"Q4]2011"Decide"for"a"location"for"pilot"project"Q2"2012"First"installment"and"pilot"project"Q3"2012"First"sale"to"customer"
Organization'Q3"2011"Entrepreneurship"study"program"at"Boston"University,"USA"Q3"2011"Incorporate"company"Q3"2011"Participate"in"business"plan"competitions"Q1"2012"Strategic"partner"on"technology""Q1"2012"Cooperation"with"local"partner"Q4"2012"Establish"base"for"assembly,"production"facility"and"local"HQ"
Economic'Q2"2011" Support"from"NTNU"Discovery"Q3"2011" Support"from"Norad"Q3"2011" Support"from"Innovation"Norway"Q3"2011" Retrieve"capital"through"emission"Q3"2012" First"sale"to"customer"2014" Reach"positive"annual"result"2015" Positive"accumulated"cash"flow"
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Execution'plan'
Selection'of'countries'As"a"small"player"RESolar"works"with"methods"for"how"to"best"make"strategic"choices"that"will"enhance"our"competitive"edge"compared"to"bigger"players"with"larger"financial"resources.""Choosing"countries"to"entry"will"be"extremely"important"choices"and"they"will"have"to"be"well"considered."For"the"selection"process"we"have"developed"a"quantitative"data"analysis"sheet"that"takes"into"consideration"many"of"the"local"factors"that"will"need"to"be"mapped"out"and"presented"in"a"way"that"can"easily"compare"the"different"countries"against"each"other."The"criterias"can"be"seen"in"appendix"2."We"have"emphasized"the"importance"of"having"Norwegian"presence"in"the"countries"that"we"want"to"enter."This"is"based"on"talks"with"Innovation"Norway,"Scatec"Solar,"Minipower"and"other"Norwegian"firms"that"operate"abroad."The"selection"process"cannot"be"done"solely"on"the"basis"of"the"quantitative"analysis,"but"they"give"a"trustworthy"indication"of"the"local"possibilities."Own"experience,"network,"contact"with"local"partners,"advices"from"Norwegian"embassies"and"other"resource"persons"will"weigh"heavy"in"a"decision"process."
“This&document&is&useful&for&my&own&knowledge&base&in&relation&to&opportunities&for&doing&business&in&
developing&countries.”"]"Ole"Jakob"Sørdalen""Sector"head,"Energy"and"Environment"in"Innovation"Norway""
PreTstudy'phase'Our"market"research"so"far"has"shown"that"it"will"be"crucial"for"a"successful"market"entry"to"have"a"proven"solution"that"reliably"delivers"what"it"promises."It"will"be"essential"to,"as"soon"as"possible,"build"a"pilot"installation"to"receive"feedback"from"users"and"to"gain"experience"so"we"can"prove"our"solution"to"future"customers."
When"What" How"Q2"2011" Product"design"workshop" Invite"relevant,"resourceful"people."Carry"out"workshop."Q2"2011" Support"from"NTNU"Discovery" Send"application"as"soon"as"possible,"preferably"before"Easter."Q3"2011" Define"entry"region"and"country" Finalize"quantitative"analysis"of"countries."Interpret"analysis."Make"selection"of"cluster"and"country."Q3"2011" Participate"in"Africa"Carbon"Forum" Andreas"and"Jørund"will"participate"and"build"network"with"relevant"actors"in"the"region."Q3"2011" Attract"media"coverage" Define"market"profile."Contact"Teknisk"Ukeblad,"Under"Dusken,"Adressa,"Asker"&"Bærum"Budstikke"and"other"interested"medias."
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Q3"2011" Feasibility"study"in"entry"country" Use"connections"through"universities"and"other"relevant"people"in"our"network."Plan"the"trip"in"regards"to"strategic"partners,"both"domestic"and"local"in"detail."Make"a"detailed"plan"for"the"stay,"pre]plan"locations,"organizations"and"governmental"bodies"we"should"visit."Book"these"meetings."Execute"the"plan"and"conduct"the"trip."Evaluate"afterwards."Q3"2011" Entrepreneurship"program"at"Boston"University,"USA" Improve"business"plan."Build"financial,"strategic"and"technological"network."Q3"2011" Incorporate"company" Acquire"the"money"needed."Sign"shareholders'"agreement."Complete"necessary"paperwork."Q3"2011" Participate"in"business"plan"competitions" Polish"our"Business"Plan."Send"plan"to"relevant"competitions."Q3"2011" Support"from"Norad" Apply"for"financial"support"for"feasibility"study."Q3"2011" Support"from"Innovation"Norway" Apply"for"“Establishment]support”"early"in"Q3."
Product'development'phase'Our"next"phase"is"to"develop"and"build"a"prototype."When" What" How"Q4"2011" Basic"solution"prototype"]"design"finalized"and"ready"to"build" Either"pay"professional"industrial"designers"or"use"student"projects."The"latter"will"be"cheaper,"but"slower."Q4"2011" Decide"for"a"location"for"pilot"project" During"the"feasibility"study"in"Q3"we"will"work"towards"a"selection"of"a"few"suitable"sites."Q1"2012" Strategic"partner"on"technology" Keep"contact"with"Scatec"Solar."Investigate"other"possibilities."Look"into"firms"like"such"as"REC"and"Eltek"Valere."
PrototypeTtesting/pilot'phase'T'Until'Q2T2012'Through"local"and"strategic"partners,"we"will"install"and"test"our"prototype"as"a"pilot"project."When" What" How"Q1"2012" Cooperation"with"local"partner" Maintain"and"formalize"contacts"made"during"feasibility"study."Cooperate"with"IN,"Norad"and"IEH"(Initiativ"for"Etisk"Handel)."Q1"2012" Retrieve"capital"through"emission" Use"media"coverage"to"build"brand."Use"economic"network"and"find"interested"investors"with"relevant"experience."Q2"2012" First"installment"and"pilot"project" New"visit"will"be"necessary"to"finalize"contracts."Assemble"containers"in"Norway."Ship"containers"to"pilot"location"and"install."Document"as"much"as"possible"of"both"plant"and"agreements"made"with"partners"and"customers"to"ensure"proof"of"concept."
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Roll'out'phase'(Distribution'strategy)'We"will"assemble"components"purchased"and"shipped"to"a"factory"in"either"Mombasa,"Kenya"or"Walvis"Bay,"Namibia,"depending"on"what"entry"markets"we"select."The"production"will"mainly"consist"of"installing"the"various"components"in"the"containers."When" What" How"Q3"2012" Refurbished"version"of"product"" Evaluate"experience"from"pilot"project"and"develop"new"version"of"our"solution."Consider"the"use"of"Norwegian"Industrial"Research"and"Development"(IFU)"Contracts."Q3"2012" First"sale"to"customer" Through"the"documentation"in"the"pilot"phase,"achieve"proof"of"concept."Work"towards"a"sale"with"help"from"the"Royal"Norwegian"Embassy,"IEH"and"Norad."Q4"2012" Establish"base"for"assembly,"production"facility"and"local"HQ"" Local"partners"with"integrity"is"a"must."Work"towards"this"goal"in"each"visit."Continuous"cooperation"with"IN,"Norad"and"IEH"."Find"sensible"land,"close"to"the"harbor"area."Build"factory"and"organization"to"assemble"container"modules."2014" Reach"profitability" Press"product"expenses,"achieve"economies"of"scale."Enter"the"aftermarket."2015" Positive"accumulated"cash"flow" This"will"be"achieved"by"scaling"number"of"sales"fast"enough."Hold"position"in"aftermarket."
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Business'model'On"entering"a"developing"country"it’s"desirable"to"reduce"risk"as"much"as"possible"and"avoid"binding"too"much"capital"in"the"country"over"a"longer"time"period"of"time."This"will"result"in"a"lower"capital"requirement"and"allow"faster"scaling."Thus,"it’s"desirable"to"pursue"a"public"procurement"process"where"we"act"as"a"total"contractor"who"undertakes"turnkey"projects"through"a"request"for"tender"from"governments,"foreign"aid"agencies"and"NGOs."This"process"is"particularly"successful"in"Angola"where"the"Norwegian"company"Mini"Power10"already"operates"with"their"mini"hydro"plants.""
""One"example"is"the"public"procurement"process"in"Angola."It’s"initiated"by"the"government"who"analyzes"and"maps"the"rural"areas"they"want"electrified"by"private"companies.""
• RESolar"responds"to"the"request"for"tender.""If"we"win"the"procurement"process,"we"install"our"system"as"mentioned"above"in"“our"solution”."
• When"the"system"installation"is"completed,"it"is"sold"to"the"government"who"will"have"the"responsibility"to"operate"it.""
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""10""www.minipowerinc.com"
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Alternative'business'model'"Even"though"this"is"our"desired"business"model"at"the"time,"we"are"looking"into"an"alternative"business"model"for"countries"where"a"public"procurement"process"is"not"an"option."This"includes"countries"with"FiT"and"PPAs."If"these"markets"are"chosen"in"the"future,"we"will"adopt"a"business"model"which"relies"on"the"direct"sale"of"prepaid"electricity"through"charging"stations,"the"mini]grid"and"utilities"such"as"water"pumps,"irrigation"and"similar."This"will"bind"up"more"capital"and"put"a"larger"risk"on"RESolar,"but"could"prove"to"be"more"profitable"in"the"long"run.""
"Not"only"will"the"economic"situation"be"completely"different"with"this"business"model,"but"our"customer"will"also"be"the"consumer,"thus"require"a"different"market"strategy."Either"way,"we"will"pursue"economic"aid"from"organizations"and"programs"like"Norad,"CDM"for"reduced"carbon"emissions,"GIEK"and"others."
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Economy'
Capital'requirement'We"have"put"together"the"following"preliminary"product"costing"based"on"meetings"with"professors"at"Department"of"Electric"Power"Engineering"at"NTNU"and"employees"in"Scatec"Solar"
PV"Modules" 350"000"NOK"Batteries" 100"000"NOK"Inverters"and"controllers" 100"000"NOK"Logistics,"labour,"cables"and"more" 200"000"NOK"Total"cost"per"installation" 750"000"NOK"Some"simple"calculations"on"our"preferred"business"model"through"legal"tenders"gives"us"the"following"accumulated"cash"flow"in"the"next"five"years."The"table"shows"we"have"a"total"capital"need"around"3,3"MNOK"and"will"have"positive"accumulated"cash"flow"in"2015."
" 2011" 2012" 2013" 2014" 2015" 2016"Sales" 0" 1" 3" 10" 20" 25"Accumulated"cash"flow" ]348"000"NOK" ]1"766"553"NOK" ]3"263"064"NOK" ]2"784"507"NOK" 1"146"631"NOK" 8"398"659"NOK""
In"the"early"phase,"RESolar"will"be"funded"by"soft"money"from"Innovasjon"Norge,"NORAD"and"others."In"addition,"the"team,"especially"the"concept"originators,"will"contribute"with"up"to"1"MNOK."The"first"power"plant"in"operation"will"provide"us"with"a"proof"of"concept"and"ease"both"further"sales"and"attract"other"investors."Norfund,"GIEK,"Eksportfinans"and"others"are"potential"investors."
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Exit'strategy'An"exit"will"most"likely"not"be"achieved"before"2016."By"that"time"we"have"built"up"a"series"of"locations"and"a"good"track"record."There"are"several"actors"who"operate"in"this"market"and"who"are"looking"for"aqusitions."Potential"buyers"could"be"E&CO,"Scatec"Solar,"Accumen"fund"and"Energy"Future"Invest."
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Appendixes'
Appendix'1'–'Economics'
"
RESULTATOPPSETT 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Salgsinntekter,Produkt/markedsgruppe,1 0 1,127,500 3,467,063 11,845,797 24,283,884 30,354,854
Sum3salgsinntekter 0 131273500 334673063 1138453797 2432833884 3033543854
Varekost,Produktgruppe,1 0 ?768,750 ?1,954,163 ?6,375,193 ?12,512,823 ?15,015,167
Sum3varekost 0 C7683750 C139543163 C633753193 C1235123823 C1530153167
Dekningsbidrag 0 3583750 135123900 534703604 1137713061 1533393688
Dekningsgrad NA 32/% 44/% 46/% 48/% 51/%
Lønnskostnader 0 ?602,550 ?1,655,004 ?1,704,654 ?1,755,794 ?1,755,794
Andre,driftskostnader ?348,000 ?974,878 ?950,942 ?1,366,514 ?1,970,894 ?2,246,848
Avskrivinger 0 ?10,250 ?27,760 ?27,760 ?17,510 0
Driftsresultat C3483000 C132283928 C131203806 233713676 830263862 1133373046
Driftsmargin NA 9109/% 932/% 20/% 33/% 37/%
Skatt 0 0 0 ?664,069 ?2,247,521 ?3,174,373
Årsresultat C3483000 C132283928 C131203806 137073607 537793341 831623673
KONTANTSTRØMOPPSETT 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Årsresultat,fra,drift ?348,000 ?1,228,928 ?1,120,806 1,707,607 5,779,341 8,162,673
Avskrivinger 0 10,250 27,760 27,760 17,510 0
Primær3kontantstrøm3fra3drift C3483000 C132183678 C130933046 137353367 537963851 831623673
Endring,i,arbeidskapital 0 ?169,125 ?350,934 ?1,256,810 ?1,865,713 ?910,646
Kontantstrøm3fra3drift C3483000 C133873803 C134433980 4783557 339313138 732523027
Investering,i,kontorutstyr 0 ?30,750 ?52,531 0 0 0
Investering,i,produksjonsutstyr 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kontantstrøm3fra3investeringer 0 C303750 C523531 0 0 0
Fri3kontantstrøm3til3totalkapitalen3 C3483000 C134183553 C134963511 4783557 339313138 732523027
Akkumulert,kontantstrøm ?348,000 ?1,766,553 ?3,263,064 ?2,784,507 1,146,631 8,398,659
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Produkt/markedsgruppe61
Oppsatt&anlegg 1 3 10 20 25
Totalt6salgsvolum6produkt/markedsgruppe61 0 1 3 10 20 25
Produkt/markedsgruppe61 Salgspris
Omsetning&på&kunde&1 1&100&000 0 1&100&000 3&300&000 11&000&000 22&000&000 27&500&000
Total6omsetning6produkt/markedsgruppe61 0 161006000 363006000 1160006000 2260006000 2765006000
Markedsandel*av*omsetning*produkt/markedsgruppe*1 0*% 0*% 0*% 0*% 0,5469*% 0,6836*%
Markedestimat6(omsetningstørrelse)
Markedsstørrelse&produkt/markedsgruppe&1 4&022&700&000 4&022&700&000 4&022&700&000 4&022&700&000 4&022&700&000 4&022&700&000
Salgsvolum
Sum6omsetning6per6kunde6produktkategori61
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
PRODUKTKALKYLER
Produktgruppe<1
Paneler 350*000 280*000 252*000 226*800 204*120
Batterier 100*000 100*000 100*000 100*000 100*000
Inverter/kontroller 100*000 100*000 100*000 100*000 100*000
Logistikk,*arbeid,*kabling*med*mer 200*000 140*000 140*000 140*000 140*000
Innsatsfaktor*5
Produktkalkyle<produktgruppe<1 0 750<000 620<000 592<000 566<800 544<120
Effektivisering*i*produksjonen
Effektiv<produktkalkyle<produktgruppe<1 0 750<000 620<000 592<000 566<800 544<120
Antall*produkter*(kommer*fra*"Inntekter"*arket) 0 1 3 10 20 25
Sum<produksjonskostnader<produktgruppe<1 0 750<000 1<860<000 5<920<000 11<336<000 13<603<000
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
PERSONALKOSTNADER
Personalplan Årslønn Bemanning
Daglig&leder 300&000 0,5 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
Utviklingsansvarlig 300&000 0,5 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
Økonomiansvarlig 300&000 0,5 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
Markedsansvarlig 300&000 1,0 1,0 1,0 1,0
AntallBansatte 0,0 1,5 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0
Lønnskostnader 0 450&000 1&200&000 1&200&000 1&200&000 1&200&000
Lønnskostnader&etter&lønnsøkning 3,0&% 0 463&500 1&273&080 1&311&272 1&350&611 1&350&611
Sosiale&kostnader 30&% 0 139&050 381&924 393&382 405&183 405&183
TotaleBlønnskostnader 0 602B550 1B655B004 1B704B654 1B755B794 1B755B794
ANDREBDRIFTSKOSTNADER
Utviklingskostnader
Prosjektering Leverandør&1 500&000 150&000 500&000 1&000&000 1&250&000
Produktutvikling Leverandør&2 300&000 150&000 100&000 100&000 100&000 100&001
TotaleButviklingskostnader 300B000 650B000 250B000 600B000 1B100B000 1B350B001
Markedsføringskostnader
Hjemmeside 1&000 1&000 1&000 1&000 1&000 1&000
Brosjyrer&og&markedsmateriell 7&000 7&000 7&000 7&000 7&000 7&000
TotaleBmarkedsføringskostnader 8B000 8B000 8B000 8B000 8B000 8B000
FasteBdriftskostnader
Husleie&inklusive&felleskostnader&J&kontor Norge 50&000 100&000 100&000 100&000 100&000
Husleie&inklusive&felleskostnader&J&produksjon/lagerlokalerKenya 50&000 150&000 150&000 150&000 150&000
Reiser 50&000 30&000 75&000 200&000 200&000 200&000 200&000
Telefoni&og&porto 20&000 0 30&000 80&000 80&000 80&000 80&000
Forbruksmateriell&kontorrekvisita 5&000 0 7&500 20&000 20&000 20&000 20&000
Utstyrsleie
Regnskaptjenester&(hvis&innkjøpt) 0 57&600 69&120 82&944 99&533 99&533
Revisor 10&000 10&000 10&000 10&000 10&000 10&000
Jurist 0 10&000 10&000 10&000 10&000 10&000
Annen&rådgiving&(annet&enn&utviklingskostnader) 0 0 0 0 0 0
ITJsupport 2&000 0 3&000 8&000 8&000 8&000 8&000
TotaleBfasteBdriftskostnader 40B000 293B100 647B120 660B944 677B533 677B533
Sum&andre&driftskostnader 348&000 951&100 905&120 1&268&944 1&785&533 2&035&534
Usikkerhetspåslag&andre&driftskostnader 0 0 0 0 0 0
TotaleBandreBdriftskostnader 348B000 951B100 905B120 1B268B944 1B785B533 2B035B534
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
KONTORUTSTYR
Kontormøbler 5,000 0 7,500 12,500 0 0 0
Møbler,til,møterom,og,representasjonsareal
Datautstyr 15,000 0 22500 37500 0 0 0
Kopimaskin
Annet,1
Annet,2
Annet,3
Sum,investering,i,produksjonsutstyr 0 30,000 50,000 0 0 0
Inflasjonsjustering 100,0,% 102,5,% 105,1,% 107,7,% 110,4,% 110,4,%
Totale5investeringer5i5produksjonsutstyr 0 305750 525531 0 0 0
AVSKRIVINGER
Avskrivingstid,kontorutstyr 3 år
Avskrivingstid,produksjonsutstyr 5 år
Avskriving5kontorutstyr
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2012 10,250 10,250 10,250 0 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2013 17,510 17,510 17,510 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2014 0 0 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2015 0 0
Totale5avskrivinger5på5kontorutstyr 0 105250 275760 275760 175510 0
Avskriving5produksjonsutstyr
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2011 0 0 0 0 0 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2012 0 0 0 0 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2013 0 0 0 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2014 0 0 0
Avskriving,på,utstyr,investert,i,2015 0 0
Totale5avskrivinger5på5produksjonsutstyr 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totale5avskrivinger 0 105250 275760 275760 175510 0
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Executive summary 
Need and Market Opportunity 
Only 16.1% of Kenya is electrified. This means that there are a lot of businesses without access to the 
national power grid. Today they typically rely on diesel generators to provide them with electricity. Diesel 
generators have high operating costs, need refueling often, pollute and fuel costs are likely to rise 
significantly. 
The rural businesses in east Africa need a simple solution they can order without technical insight or an 
industry overview. They want a turn-key solution which reduces their monthly cost of energy without high 
investment costs, pollutes less and is reliable all year around. 
Business description 
RESolar reduces businesses electricity costs by providing them with a solar power plant that they pay for 
with monthly installments that are the same as their current energy bill, until it is paid down. When the plant 
is paid down they will have a very cheap energy source for the rest of the panels’ lifespan. RESolar makes 
sure the customer only needs to place an order and we take care of the entire process and deliver a fully 
functioning solar power plant. The target customer is a business or mini-grid owner or others that use a 
substantial amount of electricity that are not connected to the national power grid, and use diesel 
generators as their primary energy source today. 
RESolar is the first company in Kenya to deliver solar power plant solutions that utilize both Feed-in-Tariffs 
(FiT) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto protocol to give additional margins and 
enable a lower sales price. 
Macroeconomic drivers 
 FiT has just been established in Kenya, opening up for a lot of new possibilities.  
 Fuel prices increases and is expected to rise significantly in the future. 
 There is an international focus on renewable energy 
 Solar energy prices has fallen with over 70% over the last ten years 
 The CDM-program has an application deadline 31.12.2011; through this program we can sell carbon 
quotas from our plants. This cannot be done easily outside the CDM-program.  
 East Africa as the most stable economy in the emerging markets in Sub Sahara Africa, and have 
shown high interest and willingness to pay for better solutions 
 East Africa is supported by plural international foreign aid programs 
What RESolar delivers 
RESolar delivers a complete loan-financed solar-power-plant solution to the customer through a financial 
partner with monthly installments at the same amount as their present energy expenses. Our organization 
will outsource all power-plant design, dimensioning, logistics, construction and installation to our upstream 
partners, and focus on our three core activities; sales, building programming and acquiring renewable 
energy incentives. Our business model is to build margins through selling power plants and keeping CDM 
and FiT in RESolar for all plants we deliver.  
Substitutes and current solutions 
To solve the problem at hand there are several options, ranging from doing nothing to extending the 
national power grid and build large-scale power plants. Among the more sensible solutions for rural 
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electrification are using diesel generators or small renewable energy plants on a mini-grid. Solar energy is 
the more versatile renewable energy source, especially near equator. The best renewable alternatives 
besides solar are hydro and bio generated electricity. They require a nearby river or large amounts of bio 
mass that can be challenging to collect in the vast areas of rural Kenya.  
Management Team 
The concept originators, Jørund Buen and Kristian Tangen previously co-founded Point Carbon, and have 
extensive knowledge about the international energy market, clean development mechanisms, and how to 
utilize them. They also have a lot of experience in dealing with the energy and resource management 
politics. 
Buen and Tangen are joined by three graduate students from the NTNU School of Entrepreneurship, Stian 
Mundal, Erik Thorp and Andreas Michelsen. The students have diversified backgrounds and knowledge 
about; civil engineering, sales, petroleum technology, and industrial economics. 
Financial Overview 
To successfully launch RESolar our current financial projections suggest we need 10 MNOK to attain a 
positive cumulative income in 2017.  
In 2017: 
 Revenue of more than 97 MNOK 
 Cost of goods sold of 63 MNOK 
 Total operating expenses will be at 19 MNOK  
 EBIT is 15 MNOK.  
 Numbers in  1’000  NOK 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Income  1 740   16 320   31 440   50 748   72 679   97 356  
Gross Margin  -     660   4 296   11 050   21 072   34 460  
(EBIT) Operating Profit  -3 420   -4 030   -2 426   1 422   7 454   15 360  
 
In total, at the end of 2017, RESolar’s 26 employees has sold and built 122 power plants. 
Exit Strategy 
Our execution strategy allows for plural exit possibilities. There are several milestones throughout the 
project and the strategy is design to allow an early exit. In 2014 the first exit window opens, as RESolar 
has built a self-sufficient organization and can be phased out of the company with limited effects on the 
daily operations. 
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Introduction 
As energy prices are rising, the demand for renewable energy sources increases. Environmental initiatives 
have led to new ways for increasing revenue in firms selling environmental friendly solutions. Feed-in-Tariffs 
(FiT) are established in most of western countries and is starting be established in many developing 
countries. FiT solutions means that the producer of “green power” will receive governmental support, often 
in the form of a fixed price per kWh produced. 
There are also exiting possibilities in the carbon quota market through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. This means that industrialized countries could invest in emission reducing 
measures where it is cheapest. The emission reduction can then be capitalized in the form of sales of 
carbon quotas. The CDM will be up for re-evaluation in 2012, and the window for getting CDM might very 
well be closing. 
Businesses in rural parts of developing countries see the benefit of having electricity and they are willing to 
pay for it. They are often far from the national grid and typically the source of electricity has been diesel 
generators. As diesel prices are increasing, renewables are becoming more and more relevant. 
Photo Voltaic (PV) technology has had a continuous improvement and the prices for solar power has 
dropped 70% the last ten years. All these trends opens exciting possibilities to deliver renewable energy to 
places where there have been little or no electrification earlier, RESolar want to tap into this market. 
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Facts and abbreviations 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism is a part of UN’s Kyoto Protocol allowing 
industrialized countries to reduce carbon emission in developing countries instead 
of their own, to reduce the cost of these reductions. 
Green incentives Common denomination to incentivize development of renewable energy sources 
Building programme A document that describes the technical attributes and needs which the finished 
power plant must deliver. A foundation for the power plant designers to conduct 
their dimensioning. 
REA Rural Electrification Agency in Kenya 
KPLC Kenya Power and Lighting Company 
Asantys German system integrator operating in Kenya that handles the process from 
dimensioning to maintenance. 
African Solar Designs Nairobi-based renewable energy company, specialized in design of rural solar 
power plants 
BOP Bottom of the Pyramid, defined as people living for less than 3000USD per year 
Brownout Significant drops in voltage, enough to harm electric equipment 
Blackout Complete power outtakes 
Solar energy Common term for electrical energy generated from energy from the sun 
PV Photo voltaic 
FiT Feed-in-tariffs; subsidies paid to energy producer per kWh 
RES Renewable Energy Sources 
RE Rural Electrification 
PPA Power purchasing agreement 
POA Program of activities connected to a CDM-project 
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The cluster 
There are many places where there is a demand for electrification solutions, but not all of these places are 
good places to do solar business. A set of criteria was chosen to select the countries to enter. The criteria 
where:  
 Market size and rural population without electrification  
 Solar panel potential, solar radiation and FiT 
 General economics and business environment in the country  
 Norwegian presence in the country  
A large number of data points were gathered to find the answer to these criteria, full list of data points and 
calculations could be found in exhibit 2. An illustration of the result is shown in Figure 1.  
As seen from the figure, India is rated as the top country from our set of criteria, followed closely by Kenya 
and Uganda. India has the most competitive landscape when it comes to bringing new renewable 
solutions to the market, and in addition India is very suitable for biomass solutions which currently are 
cheaper than solar powered electricity. The competitive landscape is completely different in the African 
countries, development has been slower there, and there is a lower biomass potential. 
Among the African countries Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are among the most political stable, has the 
best business environment, a government with a focus on green energy and is easily accessible for 
supplies since it lies near the coast. These factors, among others, make them ideal for RESolar. 
 
Figure 1  Mapping of the potential for doing off grid solar business in different countries. The categories are weighted 10 points. 
Norwegian presence bases itself on the presence of a Norwegian embassy or consulate and if there are Norwegian companies 
already doing business there. Business environment consists of different business rankings. Solar plant potential is the 
combination of the amount of solar radiation and the governmental incentives for doing solar energy. Market size is the amount of 
rural population living without electricity. For detailed numbers and calculations see exhibit 2.   
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Kenya 
Quick facts  
Population   41 Million  
Living in rural areas   78 % 
Land area   580,000 km2 
Feed in tariff for solar   $ 0.2/kWh  
Electricity spread (rural and urban)  Rural 5%, Urban 51.3 % 
Global doing business rank  98/183 
GDP   $ 32.163 billion 
 
The reasons why Kenya has been chosen to be the first market to enter are:  
 Stable, English speaking country with good regulatory environment 
 Government focus on green energy  
 $ 0.2 per kWh FiT for producers between (0,5 - 10 MWh) 
 Open for foreign business 
 Kenyan Power and Lightning Company, KPLC, which is governmental owned, stated that they want 
external actors to support their diesel grid with solar electricity1 
 As a coastal country in East-Africa, logistics to the capitol Mombasa is fairly simple and the roads are 
also very good compared to the African standard 
 Possible to get support and funding from NORFUND (The Norwegian governments investment fund for 
business in developing countries) 
 There is already an established market for renewable energy solutions in Kenya, also in the rural areas. 
RESolar are in contact with both possible suppliers and customers already present in Kenya. 
                                                
1 Henry Gichungi, Engineer at KPLC, Solar Transitions workshop UIO, February 12, 2010 
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The Need and Pain 
Our target customers use diesel generated electricity operated off the national grid. 
Pain 
Diesel generators have high operating costs, need refueling often and they pollute. Fuel costs are likely to 
rise significantly in the future and pose a financial risk because of the price uncertainty. 
Need 
Our customers need can be divided into three different jobs to be done: 
 Reduce production cost for electricity 
 Reduce pollution and harmful emission - become green 
 Reduce financial risk that the price sensitivity on diesel pose 
Small electricity producers in rural parts of Kenya often have small operating budgets that make them 
unable to make the large investments usually required to switch to renewable energy sources. To enable a 
switch they have a need to keep their monthly payments at the same level as their current expenses; this 
reveals a need for financial solutions when investing in green electricity. 
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The Solution 
As indicated above, a solution to the problem at hand ideally needs to solve four jobs, and overcome the 
problem with the limited cash available for a large upfront cost. It will have to cut operating expenses at the 
same time as it pollutes less. There are of course several options to solve this problem. 
The three main options available for an owner of diesel generators are: 
 Alternative fossil fuel sources like a gas turbine. 
 Still high operational costs 
 Connect to the national power grid 
 A very large investment cost, extremely long ROI 
 Subject to power shortage, black out and brown outs 
 Alternative off grid energy sources, Hydro, Bio, Wind and Solar 
 The green alternative 
 High investment costs 
 Needs technical insight to find an appropriate solution in each case 
 Needs a backup solution for when nature doesn’t provide 
Characteristics of the different green alternatives: 
 Hydro energy is fairly cheap, but needs larges streams of water 
 Bio energy is fairly cheap, but bio mass can be labor intensive to gather and requires large quantities of 
livestock or fertile land areas 
 Solar energy has a high investment cost, but low maintenance costs, and the sun is accessible 
everywhere in Kenya 
 Wind energy has very high investment costs and depends on enough wind. Is generally more 
expensive per kWh than the other three alternatives. 
The table above concludes that solar electricity will be the best solution at most of the sites in rural East 
Africa, where it’s not possible to connect to the national grid. 
Solar generated electricity is both cheaper and more environmentally friendly than most other options. 
RESolar delivers a solution based on photovoltaic solar panels together with some electronics, including 
inverters, batteries and charge controllers. This combination reduces operational cost to a matter of 
cleaning and protecting the equipment. The drawback of solar electricity is that the sun only up half of the 
day. Our solution is mainly directed towards customers that already have a diesel-based solution in place, 
and want to support this. The cheapest solution to provide energy at night is to keep the diesel generator 
for when solar energy is not available, but we will hold the possibilities open to create solutions that will 
include enough batteries for full 24 hour operation from solar.  
RESolar will focus on getting solar power out to the rural areas by combining all the different parts 
necessary for selling, planning, building and financing. By being a hub for all the necessary parts for 
building the plant we will ease the process from buying the plant to it is delivered turn-key ready for our 
customers. We will be able to do this cheaper than the rest of the industry by managing the green 
incentives, FiT and CDM, that follow these types of investments. We will deliver the hub service in itself 
very cheap, but then keep the revenue stream from FiT and CDM for ourselves. Our customers could not 
attain FiT or CDM on their own since their plants will be below the size required. This will give us a 
continuous revenue stream into the company that would cover for the small margin of the building project.   
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Figure 2 RESolar will act as a turnkey provider for the customer and connect of all the different parts and actors needed in the 
process of building their power plant. 
Because the need for electricity at different sites will vary a lot, we have chosen to do calculations on one 
specific site, where we found the need for solar to be around 60kW in solar panels. For the complete 
production of a plant of this size, the cost to the end user will be around 288 000 dollar, this would decline 
as prices for panels go down. The payback time for the customer is very dependent on the price of diesel 
and efficiency of the generator. Compared to a new, efficient diesel generator for a micro-grid at maximum 
efficiency, that produces electricity at around 0.4$/kWh, our plant will have a payback time of around 15 
years. However a generator rarely operates at maximum efficiency, and usually the generator may deliver 
electricity at 0.5-0.7$/kWh; this gives a payback between 6 and 11 years. All calculations are done with 
8% interest and with an assumed constant diesel price.  
Value Proposition 
The cheapest turn-key solar power solution delivered in Africa. We figure out your needs and deliver the 
perfect solution, with no change in current payment behavior at a lower cost. 
Peace of mind, turn-key solution 
 From order to finished plant, we make sure the entire process runs smooth  
 The customer will not need technical insight or knowledge of the market, we will work with them to find 
the best solution 
Reduce monetary expenses, hence reduce the switching costs  
 Provide monthly expenses at the same price, or lower, than today's diesel expenses through a 
financial loaning partner 
Greener environment 
 PR, good for tourist centered activities 
 Better local environment for customers, noise and local pollution  
Reduce financial risk  
 Diesel prices are uncertain and expected to rise, our down payments are not. 
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The Industry 
The electric power industry in developing countries is huge and underserved. In countries like Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania only fractions of the people living in rural areas have access to electricity through the 
national grid. The main transmission lines are shown in Figure 4. The total electricity consumption in Kenya 
was 4.86 Billion kWh, an according to the Kenyan Department of Energy it is suspected to grow with an 
annual 9% the next two decades. The world market for micro-grids was 4.14 Billion USD in 2010, and is 
projected to have a significant growth the next ten years.  
The industry is generally divided into four parts, electricity generation, transmission, distribution and 
retailing. The four parts is shown in Figure 3. One could also divide the industry into four other categories 
defined by their size; national grid, mini-grid, micro-grid and home systems. The national grid in Kenya is 
mainly powered by hydro and thermal energy.  
For mini-grids there are typically no need for transmission lines, because of the limited power and short 
distances, leaving only power generation, distribution and retailing. In Kenya the whole process is usually 
done by the same company. There are some 15-20 large state owned mini-grids, where a few is owned 
by KPLC and the rest by the Rural Electrification Agency. These are mostly diesel powered. KPLC has 
stated that they are open for private companies to come and support these state owned mini-grids with 
green power. This could be an exciting possibility in the future, but the procurement process in the 
government is long and as a new actor it is difficult to gain entrance here.  
Grids that are even smaller than the mini-grids are often called micro-grids. Micro-grids are most often 
owned and run by private companies in the region they deliver electricity. These micro-grids often support 
one village, a couple of houses, a NGO or a business. As with the mini-grids, micro-grids are often 
operated by one company doing the generating, distribution and retailing, but in the micro-grid, the 
operator is often also the user. 
 
 
Figure 3 Components in Kenyan power industry 
 
Figure 4 Main transmission lines 
RESolar will focus on the micro-grid segment, where one actor cannot receive FiT and CDM on their own 
because of their small size. Micro-grids are most often privately owned, making the process of selling 
simpler. Today many micro-grids in Kenya are powered by diesel, and as fuel prices are going up, it will 
become more profitable to support the existing diesel grid with solar power.  
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Five forces analysis 
Threats of new entrants 
There will be similar entrants, but since the market is vast, the chance of them choosing the same spot as 
us when we are established is small. The unlikeliness of new entrants in the micro-grid market acquiring 
CDM and FiT also offers a degree of protection. 
Bargaining power of customers 
RESolar is targeted for customers in rural areas with no access to the main power grid. This leaves them 
with few options for alternative power solutions apart from the diesel generator they use today. Unless 
hydro power is available, RESolar’s product will be the most profitable choice. 
Bargaining power of suppliers  
RESolar will rely on components and partners that are easily acquirable from other sources. This gives us 
high bargaining power towards our suppliers and little risk of not being able to acquire the resources 
needed. 
Rivalry among existing firms 
We are going to deliver a service that is different than the way power plants are delivered today. This 
makes this force a low threat to our business. 
Threat of substitute products 
Several products can threaten our value proposition. Smaller PV home systems, expansion of the national 
grid and large actors in rural electrification might all interfere with our plans. Small, cheap systems might be 
attractive in certain areas with only small businesses. Where there is demand for more power, larger 
systems, like ours, will be needed. The expansion of the grid is also a threat, but is considered unlikely as 
this is an extremely expensive option in most cases. 
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Business Model 
To map out our business model we have chosen to use the Osterwalder business model canvas. The 
canvases with the nine boxes are shown Figure 5. Under we have filled out the boxes to create the 
business model we will have.   
 
Figure 5 Osterwalder's Business Model Canvas 
Value prop  
The cheapest turn-key solar power solution delivered in Africa. We figure out your needs and deliver the 
perfect solution, with no change in current payment behavior at a lower cost. 
Customer relations  
 Site inspections 
 Feedback loops 
 Key account managers 
Customer segments  
 Tourism operators 
 Diesel grid operators 
 NGOs 
Channels  
 Direct sales force 
 Conferences and trade shows 
 Cold calls 
 Customer leads and networks 
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Revenue stream  
 Sale of power plant deployment 
 Feed-in-Tariffs 
 POA and CDM 
Key activities  
 Manage sales force 
 Acquire new customers 
 Customer management 
 Partner management 
 Keep FiT 
 Building programme development 
Key resources  
 CDM acquisition 
 Sales competencies 
 Account management competencies  
 Market insight 
 Financial instruments 
Industrial partners  
 Solar PV plant dimensioning firm (Asantys) 
 Solar PV plant installer (Contractors) 
 Parent Company (Differ) 
 Pilot customer (Basecamp Explorer, Grid operators) 
 Development aid companies (Innovation Norge, Norfund) 
 Government bodies (REA) 
 Maintenance crew 
 Shipping and logistics partners 
 Financial companies/Loan providers (SG Finance, Norfund) 
Cost structure  
 Order plants 
 In-house Sales force 
 In-house building programme management 
 Project management 
RESolar acts as a building project initiator that acquires most of its profits through innovative revenue 
channels such as Feed-in-Tariffs and CDM-projects. Our in-house activities; ordering plants, keep a sales 
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force, building programme development and manage green incentives will be our main cost drivers. The 
rest of the key activities needed to deliver our value proposition we will outsource to our key partners. A 
model showing the process is shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 6 RESolar's Business Model 
We chose to outsource project management, dimensioning and construction because these activities are 
hard to scale fast. We therefore chose to not do these activities in-house because we are relying on fast 
scaling to get reasonable revenue from CDM and FiT. Since the job of operating a power plant demands a 
lot of resources, is hard to scale, we chose to not include this activity in our operations. We will also not 
own any power plants as this is highly capital demanding and involves a high degree of financial risk. 
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Market plan 
Sales strategy and customer acquisition 
To this project; word-of-mouth marketing, TV, radio and similar advertisements will not add a lot of value. 
Personal contact with the customers is the only way we can sell projects, and this is only possible if we 
find our customers ourselves. We need exposure at conferences, trade shows, industry gatherings and 
other similar arrangements. In addition we need to map our potential customers as well. By using our “job-
to-be-done” customer segmentation, we will identify our customers and look for contact points into the 
firm, either through common affiliates within our network, or by cold calling through email, phone and/or 
personal appearances at their offices if all else fails. Here we need to contact the influencers or the 
decision makers. We need to find out how and where we will look for potential customers. There are no 
complete databases over our potential customers available. 
Once initial contact is established, we will set up a meeting and figure out their specific needs. We will then 
construct a sales pitch adapted to this. Here, it’s key to locate the decision makers and conduct the 
meeting with them. The sales pitch and the procurement process is subject to further research. When our 
sales persons have established a need for a solar power plant, we will conduct a site inspection together, 
to make the customer feel ownership over the need at hand. Before this is initiated it is crucial to semi-
close with a letter of intent. The goal of the inspections is to create a building programme and tender 
document that our customers agree upon, and then close the sale. During each meeting it is crucial to be 
alert for leads and key contact points to other potential customers. 
Customer development 
Pilot customer [2012] 
Basecamp Explorer or similar safari tourist camp who wants green electricity. Basecamp have an 
established relationship with our concept originators. We have already conducted two meetings with them, 
and we need to close a pilot customer within Q2 2012.  
Questions we need answered: 
 How will we approach a close with basecamp or a similar customer? 
 How is the procurement process for basecamp, how many decision makers are there? 
 What do they need to make a decision, what kind of information? 
 Purchasing criteria/decision points needs to be mapped. 
Profile of beachhead customer [2013] 
We will start to map potential customers as soon as the contract with our pilot customer is signed. When 
construction of the pilot project is completed we will start to conduct sales meetings. Our beachhead 
customers has to be early adopters, own an off-grid diesel power plant and have cost reductions as main 
incentive. There needs to be an already established mini-grid or that only a fairly small area of outreach is 
needed. Preferably there is no procurement process and one or few decision makers. The customer 
should either know about or trust our pilot customer. This will typically be other safari camps or some of 
the NGOs in the area. 
Scaling strategy 
In short our philosophy is go big or go home. We will start to scale with the first customer after proof of 
concept. 
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Project management 
We will hire external competence from Norway to conduct the building programme development for out 
pilot customer. This building programme expert will continue on a retainer out Q1 2014, and train up two 
Kenyan employees in our first beachhead customer project in Q2 2013. He will then step up as a building 
programme overseer at the next projects and make sure that our new hires get the help they need the first 
year. The two most skilled and experienced local hires will take over as building programme overseers 
when the retainer for the Norwegian expert runs out. One of these two skilled local employees will be 
trained to be COO of West Africa in the future. 
Sales management 
The founding team will close the sale with our pilot customer in Q2 2012. When our pilot project is built, 
and we have a proof of our concept we will hire a local sales representative and one of the founders will 
train him while they attend customers meeting together in Q2 and Q3 2013. We will hire two new sales 
persons in Q4 2013 and train them as they attend customer meetings together with one of the founders 
and the previously hired sales representative. In Q1 2014 the founder and the most experienced sales 
representative will step out as sales manager and further train two new employees. In Q2 2014 the 
founder will step out and let the most experienced sales representative become VP of sales and manage 
the four sellers. 
 
Figure 7 Sales and build programming organization development 
Distribution Channel 
The distribution and logistics of the solar power plants will be outsourced and mainly handled by the hired 
construction project management. However, we have a stake in reducing costs of the power plants, and 
will therefore try to help optimizing this as much as possible. 
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Operations 
RESolar delivers a turn-key solution and acts as a project overseer for our customers. In the first stage of 
our development, to shorten our time to market as much as possible, we will outsource most of our 
operations. In this first phase RESolar will mainly act as a sales company with in-house building 
programme development. Through our expertise in CDM, FiT and financial solutions, we will be the perfect 
choice for customers in need of smaller solar plants where price is of the essence. Both logistics and 
manufacturing will be handled by partners, such as Asantys or African Solar Designs. RESolar’s sales 
personnel will acquire customers, figure out their specific needs and customize an order for a power plant. 
This order will be fulfilled by our partners all the way through installation. We will also partner up with local 
companies to offer maintenance and other after sales services to our customers. 
After some years of only having sales and building programme development in house, RESolar will 
gradually evolve the company to include more parts of the value chain. Through expanding our set of core 
capabilities we will raise our margins. This will of course require significant growth in the organization, 
requiring several more employees which also create a need for more comprehensive secondary activities. 
At the start of phase one most operations will be done from our offices in Oslo, Norway. During this phase 
we will work towards establishing an office in Kenya, most likely in Nairobi, due to its convenient 
connections with Europe. When evolving into phase two the local attachment will become very important 
as the level of direct cooperation with Kenyan contractors increases. It is important that RESolar builds a 
self-sufficient organization so that the founders can be phased out of the company with limited effects on 
the daily operations upon an exit.  
 
Figure 8 RESolar's Value Chain 
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Project life cycle 
In the first phase, since we outsource both dimensioning and building, our power plant projects will follow 
the following time frame: 
 
Figure 9 Project development life cycle 
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Key milestones 
Solution 
Q4 2011  Clarify if RESolar is CDM-eligible 
Q4 2011 Confirm the legal issues around FiT 
Q4 2011 Close deal with strategic partner on technology - Sign a Letter of Intent with Asantys or a 
comparable supplier 
Q1 2012 Confirm that our business model will work out in collaboration with BaseCamp Explorer or an 
equivalent customer. Make necessary changes to our model to make it suit our customer 
needs. 
Q1 2013 Complete construction of pilot project plant. 
 
Market 
Q2 2012 Attract media coverage - After first sale 
Q2 2012 Closed sale for pilot project 
Q2 2013 Start our sales scaling as outlined in Market Plan 
Q1 2013 First sale after pilot project 
 
Organization 
Q3 2011 Establish Norwegian HQ in Oslo 
Q4 2011 Incorporate company 
Q1 2012 Establish partnership with financial partner - Establish a financial solution with Norfund or 
similar 
Q1 2012 Field trip to Kenya. Work with pilot customer, legal issues and strategic partner. 3 founders 
deployed in one month 
Q2 2012 If the field trip yields positive results we will return to Norway to complete our Master degrees 
and hire a specialist in programming solar building projects. 
Q3-2012-Q3-
2013 
The three founders will be in Kenya. It will be necessary that the founding team moves to 
Kenya to establish an office and operations in Nairobi or another suitable location. 
Q4-2012 Begin process of hiring Kenyan building programmers and sales persons 
Q4-2013-Q2-
2014 
Two founders in Kenya. One of the Norwegian management team will return to Oslo 
Q3-2014-> Due to the African business culture it will be necessary that at least one executive remains in 
Kenya from Q3-2014 and onwards.  
Economic 
Q4 2011 Support from NTNU Discovery 
Q4 2011 Support from Innovation Norway 
Q2 2012 Closed series A founding round 
2015 Reach positive annual result 
2017 Positive accumulated cash flow 
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Organization 
Management Team  
Jørund Buen 
Co-founder of Point Carbon. Expert on the project-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol (Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation). Has published extensively in professional journals 
and books on climate policy and politics as well as the role of policy instruments and politics in stimulating 
new renewable energy innovation. 
Kristian Tangen 
Co-founder of Point Carbon. Has extensively knowledge about the international environment, energy and 
resource management politics after working as a researcher at Fritjof Nansen Institute for 7 years. He sat 
as Director for Point Carbon since 2002 until 2008 and had three years after that as senior expert in the 
same company. 
Andreas Michelsen 
Student NTNU School of Entrepreneurship. Technical background from geology and petroleum 
technology with specialization in Environment and Natural Resources Engineering. Two years in The 
Norwegian maritime special forces and contributed in the startup of a tourist company in South Africa in 
the summer of 2010.  
Stian Mundal 
Student NTNU School of Entrepreneurship. Civil Engineering background, with project development and 
management as the main focus. Has participated in two Norwegian start-ups that both had sales as their 
core capabilities. He has also worked as a sales trainer and sales leader.  
Erik Thorp 
Student at NTNU School of Entrepreneurship. Background from industrial economics and technology 
management and has a specialization in computer sciences, project management and business strategy. 
He has worked as an intern consultant for Cap Gemini. 
Differ 
Differ will be the parent company that RESolar will fall under when proof of concept has been established. 
Differ was started by Jørund Buen and Kristian Tangen, and aims to be a company dealing with different 
types of renewable energy projects in developing countries. Differ is currently in the proses of hiring a CEO 
from the solar industry which would be to great help for RESolar. Differ has already established offices in 
Oslo this summer. Company structure is shown in Figure 10.  Differ will function as a parent company for 
RESolar where transfer of knowledge and competencies should flow easily. 
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Figure 10 Organizational Chart of Differ 
What core capabilities does RESolar need? 
Capability/Resource Do we 
have it 
Who has it/how will we acquire it 
CDM-application and 
acquisition 
Yes Jørund and Kristian has in-depth knowledge and network in 
this field. 
Insight/Knowledge about the 
Kenyan market 
No Feasibility studies in the country, Strategic partnership with 
African Solar Designs, Asantys or the like. 
Knowledge about the local 
regulatory environment  
No We need legal advisory 
Legal regulations around FiT No Build network with the institutions in charge and get advisory 
from local legal experts 
Building programme 
development and project 
management 
Partially This is part of Stain’s Bachelor’s degree, but we need an 
experienced manager. For building programming, we will hire a 
specialist to train the in-house work force. Building project 
management will be outsourced. 
Project management Partially Stian has some knowledge from his education. We will hire a 
specialist to train an in-house work force, ref: Market plan. 
Sales force management Yes Stian has knowledge and experience from prior start ups 
Creating Financial Products No We are looking for partners that can contribute with this  
Technical insight Yes Jørund and Kristian is in the process of hiring an executive 
from the Norwegian solar industry to work for Differ. 
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Risk Analysis 
Risk Probability Impact Mitigation strategy 
We are not eligible for FiT Medium High If we are unable to make the project work without FiT, 
we will need to change entry market 
FiT are reduced or 
withdrawn 
Low High Lobby through Norad and Norfund to reinitiate FiT. Or 
threaten to withdraw our operations from Kenya or 
change our business model to function without FiT 
We are unable to create 
financing solutions (No 
Norfund-support) 
Medium High Financial solutions are an essential part of the product 
we deliver. Either Norfund or commercial banks will be 
a critical strategic partner. If we don’t succeed here 
we will need to reevaluate the feasibility of the startup 
deliver. Either Norfund or commercial banks will be a 
critical strategic partner 
Legislation implies we 
have to own power plants 
Medium High If RESolar need to own power plants to retrieve CDM- 
and FiT-support, we have to reconsider our business 
model 
Our upstream partners 
vertically integrate and 
snatch our customers after 
we have created their 
need. 
Low Medium We have to stay close to our customers and make 
sure our value proposition is better than that our 
partners can offer our customers 
We are unable to get a low 
enough price point for our 
customers when we 
outsource production and 
installation 
Low Medium Reconsider if it might be financially viable to do more 
operations in-house and if this will lower the price 
point enough to attract more customers 
The market is to small /We 
can’t find enough 
customers 
Low Medium Look for other markets or change our product so that 
we attract more customers 
Trade with African 
customers has to be done 
through local partners 
Low Low Build up an organization in Africa that enables us to 
trade properly 
Our customers cuts us out 
and goes directly to our 
partners 
Medium Medium We have to stay close to our customers and make 
sure our value proposition is better than that our 
partners can offer our customers 
New entrants arrive, with 
even more knowledge 
about FiT 
Medium Low Partner up or outcompete them. 
Uneducated market - they 
don’t know their need 
Medium Low The need is clear - to us. If the market needs to be 
educated - we will need more time to make sales 
No willingness to pay Medium Medium We need strong evidence that there is willingness to 
pay in the market before we undertake further costs. If 
such evidence cannot be found the project is not 
viable. 
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Several other companies 
are doing similar projects 
Medium Medium We are differentiating on to key elements: 
Price, we need to be cheaper than most alternatives 
Turn-key solution, we will act as a property developer, 
leaving the customer with a complete solution, ready 
to use, with both FiT and CDM 
Corruption Medium Low We might miss some opportunities without bribes, but 
according to our values, as long as we keep our 
hands clean and we still can sleep at night, which is 
what matters in the end. 
 
Exit strategy 
We have not yet made any conclusions about possible exit strategies. This will be a discussion we have to 
take with the concept originators and investors. The management team finds it probable that if an exit is 
wanted the most likely option is to be acquired by either large investment companies like E+Co and 
Acumen Fund or multinational construction firms like Norwegian SN Power or other similar companies 
operating in Africa. 
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Financial plan 
Main assumptions 
RESolar’s financial plan is based on the following assumption: 
 Power plants are sold with a financial plan and RESolar receive full payment upon delivery. 
 Inflation is partially accounted for, both in expenses and income. 
 No tax benefits are considered 
 Tax rate of 28% assumed 
 Sales prices are estimated to increase 5% annually 
 Product costs are estimated to decrease 2.5% annually 
 CDM- and FiT is assumed to amount to 2000 NOK per kW installed each year 
 Pilot customer covers prototype costs 
Our income statement for the first six years of operations: 
 
 
2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017
Plants sold 1 9 16 24 32 40
Avg Selling Price 1 740 000 1 800 000 1 890 000 1 984 500 2 083 725 2 187 911
Total plants built 1 10 26 50 82 122
Income Statement:
2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017
CDM & FiT-income 120 000 1 200 000 3 120 000 6 000 000 9 840 000
Sales 1 740 000 16 200 000 30 240 000 47 628 000 66 679 200 87 516 450
Total CoGS 1 740 000 15 660 000 27 144 000 39 698 100 51 607 530 62 896 677
Gross Margin 0 660 000 4 296 000 11 049 900 21 071 670 34 459 773
CDM-application 1 000 000 200 000 0 0 0 0
Sales & Marketing 130 000 465 500 759 950 1 123 925 1 524 226 1 963 903
G&A 2 290 000 4 024 000 5 961 800 8 503 660 12 093 842 17 135 625
Total Operating Expenses 3 420 000 4 689 500 6 721 750 9 627 585 13 618 068 19 099 528
(EBIT) Operating Profit -3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 422 315 7 453 603 15 360 245
Interest Expense 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pretax Income -3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 422 315 7 453 603 15 360 245
Tax Provision 0 0 0 398 248 2 087 009 4 300 869
Net Profit -3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 024 067 5 366 594 11 059 376
Cumulative -3 420 000 -7 449 500 -9 875 250 -8 851 183 -3 484 589 7 574 787
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Sources of Funding  
RESolar will initially be funded by the concept originators. Differ will invest seed capital of at least 1 MNOK 
in the first round of funding. We furthermore assume that they will cover eventual expenses or help with 
the fundraising above this before the next round of funding, due to their interest in making the project 
succeed. 
Other possible sources of funding, especially for the second round, will be to search for new investors. 
Banks and government grants might also be a possible financing solution. In this round of funding there 
will be a need for 9 MNOK, and will most likely take place after proof of concept from our pilot customer. 
The current projections suggest that the total 10 MNOK gathered after this will be sufficient to scale the 
company and achieve a positive cumulative profit. 
Sources of Revenue 
RESolar’s main source of revenue will be the sale of power plants. In the projections sales income 
constitute around 80% of the revenue. The last bit comes from FiT and CDM and gives us our competitive 
advantage and is the revenue source that “sweetens the deal”.  
Expenses and Cost of Goods Sold 
Being a company dealing with infrastructure the main cost driver is the cost of the power plants. The total 
cost of goods sold amounts to almost 80% of our total expenses. The other 20% is then used on sales, 
marketing and general administration. For the first years of operations these expenses mainly consists of 
salaries and travelling expenses as both trips from Norway and around in the Kenyan markets will be 
important activities to develop the organization. Our head office in Oslo will be shared with Differ and will 
be fairly inexpensive. Legal advisory is also a considerable cost in the first two or three years of operations. 
We have to make sure that our assumptions about FiT and CDM are correct and it will also be crucial to 
create contracts that secure our future cash flows and reduces risk connected to the sale and financing of 
the power plants. Under no circumstances will we risk to become owner of several power plants in rural 
Kenya. 
Cash flow 
The cash flow is outlined in the market plan and business model and is further mapped in the financial 
appendices. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We’ve chosen not to do a sensitivity analysis at this point in time because we still lack some market 
numbers and this is an activity we will have to do this fall. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Financial Appendix 
Income Sheet 
 
2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017
Plants sold 1 9 16 24 32 40
Avg Selling Price 1 740 000 1 800 000 1 890 000 1 984 500 2 083 725 2 187 911
Total plants built 1 10 26 50 82 122
Income Statement:
2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017
CDM & FiT-income 120 000 1 200 000 3 120 000 6 000 000 9 840 000
Sales 1 740 000 16 200 000 30 240 000 47 628 000 66 679 200 87 516 450
Total CoGS 1 740 000 15 660 000 27 144 000 39 698 100 51 607 530 62 896 677
Gross Margin 0 660 000 4 296 000 11 049 900 21 071 670 34 459 773
CDM-application 1 000 000 200 000 0 0 0 0
Sales & Marketing 130 000 465 500 759 950 1 123 925 1 524 226 1 963 903
G&A 2 290 000 4 024 000 5 961 800 8 503 660 12 093 842 17 135 625
Total Operating Expenses 3 420 000 4 689 500 6 721 750 9 627 585 13 618 068 19 099 528
(EBIT) Operating Profit -3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 422 315 7 453 603 15 360 245
Interest Expense 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pretax Income -3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 422 315 7 453 603 15 360 245
Tax Provision 0 0 0 398 248 2 087 009 4 300 869
Net Profit -3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 024 067 5 366 594 11 059 376
Cumulative -3 420 000 -7 449 500 -9 875 250 -8 851 183 -3 484 589 7 574 787
152 APPENDIX C. BUSINESS PLAN AUTUMN 2011
 Confidential 28 
Balance Sheet 
 
Balance Sheet
2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017
Cash -3 218 333 -7 142 875 -9 702 104 -8 990 341 -3 972 833 6 626 551
A/R 217 500 2 025 000 3 780 000 5 953 500 8 334 900 10 939 556
Inventory 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other C/A 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total C/A -3 000 833 -5 117 875 -5 922 104 -3 036 841 4 362 067 17 566 107
Fixed Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acc Depreciation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Fixed Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets -3 000 833 -5 117 875 -5 922 104 -3 036 841 4 362 067 17 566 107
Liabilties & Equity:
Notes Payable 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acounts Payable 217 500 1 957 500 3 393 000 4 962 263 6 450 941 7 862 085
Accrued Expenses 201 667 374 125 560 146 802 299 1 134 839 1 591 627
Accrued Taxes 0 0 0 49 781 260 876 537 609
Total C/L 419 167 2 331 625 3 953 146 5 814 342 7 846 656 9 991 321
LTD
S/E:
Capital Stock 0 0 0 0 0 0
Retained Earnings -3 420 000 -7 449 500 -9 875 250 -8 851 183 -3 484 589 7 574 787
Total S/E -3 420 000 -7 449 500 -9 875 250 -8 851 183 -3 484 589 7 574 787
Total Liab & S/E -3 000 833 -5 117 875 -5 922 104 -3 036 841 4 362 067 17 566 107
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Cash Flow Sheet 
 
Cash Flow:
2 012 2 013 2 014 2 015 2 016 2 017
Net Income -3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 024 067 5 366 594 11 059 376
Depreciation 0 0 0 0 0 0
-3 420 000 -4 029 500 -2 425 750 1 024 067 5 366 594 11 059 376
Change in W/C:
A/R -217 500 -1 807 500 -1 755 000 -2 173 500 -2 381 400 -2 604 656
Inventory 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prepaid Exp 0 0 0 0 0 0
A/P 217 500 1 740 000 1 435 500 1 569 263 1 488 679 1 411 143
Accr Liabilities 201 667 172 458 186 021 242 153 332 540 456 788
Accr Taxes 0 0 0 49 781 211 095 276 732
Cash Flow from Oper -3 218 333 -3 924 542 -2 559 229 711 763 5 017 508 10 599 384
Financing /Investing Act.
Fixed Asset Purchases 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sale of Stock 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bank Borrow (Repay) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Financing/Inv Act. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Flow -3 218 333 -3 924 542 -2 559 229 711 763 5 017 508 10 599 384
Cash Beginning 0 -3 218 333 -7 142 875 -9 702 104 -8 990 341 -3 972 833
Cash Ending -3 218 333 -7 142 875 -9 702 104 -8 990 341 -3 972 833 6 626 551
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Product calculations 
 
Part Price Income from solar production $/kWh $/year
Panels 101 177,00$                                   Sales of power 0,7 87 721,90$    
Inverter 21 070,00$                                     FiT 0,2 25 063,40$    
Solar tracker 30 000,00$                                     CDM 0 -$                
Total income 112 785,30$ 
Balance of system, equipment 22 020,00$                                     
Installation labor 23 221,00$                                     Protection and Service 20 000,00$    
Installer margin and overhead 24 996,00$                                     
Permitting, Enviromental Studies 5 951,00$                                       Total yearly result 92 785,30$    
Grid interconnection -$                                                 
Land 11 903,00$                                     
Land Preparation 17 854,00$                                     
Housing and protection 30 000,00$                                     
Total Price 288 192,00$                                   
125 317,00                                                kWh per year
Price asumptions 
Solar panels 1,7 $ W 
Inverter 0,35 $ W
Solar tracker 3000$ per 18 panels rounded down
Rest of the numbers in SAM file
This setup gives acording to calculations in SAM 
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Appendix 2: Quantitative data 
 
 
Country  Total Density Rural % Total Per capita
Annual 
growth Rural Urban
Angola 1,85E+07 15,2 42,4 1,08E+11 5812,0 0,7 10,7 38,0
Bangladesh 1,62E+08 1263,0 72,4 2,30E+11 1416,3 5,7 28,0 76,0
Botswana 1,95E+06 2,5 39,7 2,61E+10 13384,5 -3,7 12,0 68,0
Ethiopia 8,28E+07 75,9 82,7 7,74E+10 934,4 8,7 2,0 80,0
Ghana 2,38E+07 107,0 49,2 3,70E+10 1552,4 4,7 23,0 85,0
India 1,16E+09 408,0 70,2 3,78E+12 3270,1 7,7 52,5 93,1
Indonesia 2,30E+08 128,0 47,4 9,66E+11 4198,8 4,5 32,0 94,0
Kenya 3,98E+07 71,8 78,1 6,26E+10 1572,6 2,6 5,0 51,3
Mozambique 2,29E+07 29,8 62,4 2,03E+10 885,2 6,3 6,3 21,0
Namibia 2,17E+06 2,7 62,6 1,39E+10 6410,1 -0,8 13,0 70,0
Nepal 2,93E+07 208,0 82,3 3,39E+10 1154,7 4,7 34,0 89,7
Nicaragua 5,74E+06 48,5 43,0 1,52E+10 2641,0 -6,0 42,0 95,0
Nigeria 1,55E+08 174,0 50,9 3,41E+11 2203,3 5,6 26,0 69,0
Tanzania 4,37E+07 50,8 74,0 5,76E+10 1355,7 5,5 2,0 39,0
Uganda 3,27E+07 169,0 87,0 3,98E+10 1217,0 7,0 4,0 42,5
Vietnam 8,73E+07 274,0 71,7 2,58E+11 2953,1 5,3 85,0 99,6
Population GDP
Electrification 
rate
Criterias for country selection
Corruption 
score
Doing 
business 
rank
Solar radiation 
(kWh/m^2/day)
Overall 
economic 
freedom
Norwegian 
presence
Feed-in-
tarifs
Rural 
electr. plan
Country Data uncertain
Angola 1,9 163 5,5 46,2 9 4 8
Bangladesh 2,4 107 4,5 53,0 9 5 7
Botswana 5,8 52 6,1 68,8 5 2 7
Ethiopia 2,7 104 3,5 50,5 9 5 6
Ghana 4,1 67 4,7 59,4 0 0 0
India 3,3 134 5,2 54,6 0 0 0
Indonesia 2,8 121 5,8 56,0 0 0 0
Kenya 2,1 98 4,7 57,4 10 8 9
Mozambique 2,7 126 5,3 56,8 0 0 0
Namibia 4,4 69 6,2 62,7 0 0 0
Nepal 2,2 116 4,7 50,1 7 0 6
Nicaragua 2,5 117 4,9 58,8 0 0 0
Nigeria 2,4 137 5,5 56,7 0 0 0
Tanzania 2,7 128 5,5 57,0 0 0 0
Uganda 2,5 122 5,1 61,7 10 7 9
Vietnam 2,7 78 4,5 51,6 9 4 7
Criterias for country selection
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Kenya
Population Size Denomination Source
Total population 39802015 People World dataBank
Population density 71,8 People/km^2 WolframAlpha
Rural population (% of total population) 78,1 Percentage World dataBank
Urban population (% of total) 21,9 Percentage World dataBank
Rural population 31085373,72 People World dataBank
Urban population 8716641,29 People World dataBank
Population growth (annual %) 2,64 Percentage World dataBank
GDP Size Denomination Source
Total 62591644028 Billion USD World dataBank
Per capita 1572,57 USD World dataBank
Growth rate yearly 2,59 Percentage World dataBank
Electrification Size Denomination Source
Total electrification 16,1 Percentage World Energy Outlook 2009
Rural electrification 5 Percentage World Energy Outlook 2008
Urban electrification 51,3 Percentage World Energy Outlook 2008
National rural electrification plan 9 Rank 1-10
Business situation Rank Denomination Source
Corruption 2,1 CPI Score TI CPI 2010
Doing business 98 Intl Ranking Doing Business Rank 2011
Overall economic freedom 57,4 Intl Ranking 2011 Index of Economic Freedom
Norwegian presence 10 Rank 1-10
Feed-in-tarifs 8 Rank 1-10
Cost to import 2190 US$ per containerWorld dataBank
Start-up procedures to register a business 94 Number World dataBank
Procedures to build a warehouse 12 Number World dataBank
Renewable energy situation Rank Denomination Source
Annual solar radiation 4,7 kWh/m2a Swera RREX
Govt goals for renewable energy 7 Rank 1-10
Norwegian Presence 10
Embassy (0-3) 3 Embassy = 3, Consul = 2, Embassy in neighbouring country = 1, Else = 0
Norwegian MNCs (0-1) 1
Norwegian Foreign Aid (0-3) 3 Aid p.t. = 3
Norwegian NGOs (0-2) 2
Norwegian StartUps (0-1) 1
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